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A b st r a c t
The pulling nature of crises on the ‘frontiers’ stimulates Western interventionism 
focused on state building. This interventionism is fundamentally dependent upon 
collaboration with indigenous politics and ‘collaborative systems’, the relationships 
linking interventionist actors with indigenous ones, determine its structure and 
dynamics. State building interventions rely on collaborative systems because they 
define the interface of the external forces of the intervening power with indigenous 
politics. Unless the energy and resources of the intervening power can be translated and 
internalised into terms of indigenous politics, the intervention will be unable to achieve 
its state building goals. Presently, Western states are both failing to build appropriate 
collaborative systems and to manage their collaborative partners. However, if Western 
states can improve their approach to and implementation of collaboration with 
indigenous politics, they can better manage insecurity on the frontiers through state- 
building interventionism.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n : L i f e  i n  a  F r o n t i e r
Smoke chokes the horizon. The sun is but a dulled orange spot, vainly trying to prod 
through the billowing clouds of dark sooty ash. The small, decrepit town lining the 
banks of the muddy river is eerily quiet after the violence that has just swept through it. 
The residents, those who remain, stay in their homes. The town has been transformed 
into a heavily defended garrison of the army. ‘Locked and loaded’ soldiers man 
machinegun posts at key intersections, patrols roam along the outskirts, and pick-up 
‘technicals’ with machine guns and heavy trucks with cannons pace the main road. The 
smoke, initially from the scores of huts and buildings burnt in the recent ethnic violence, 
is now coming from grass fires along the town’s perimeter. The army is burning clear 
lines of fire in case the town is again attacked by rebels.
As this scene unfolded itself in front of me one late afternoon in 2003, on Christmas of 
all days, I reflected to myself how seemingly archaic it was. I had spent the day 
counting burnt huts, 342 all told, in order to help start providing emergency relief to 
those displaced by the fighting. While going through the general mechanics of 
preparing emergency relief distributions as an aid worker for the United Nations, I could 
not help but question how this could all be going on in the 21st Century. What, with all 
its hype of globalisation, democracy, human rights, civil society, international law and 
justice, and on an on with the metaphysical myopia of an era intent on the future, but 
forgetful that not all proceeds at the same speed in the march forward of ‘progress’.
The small town of Gambella is in the far west of Ethiopia, inhabited mostly by the 
indigenous Nilotic peoples who also populate southern Sudan. It also has a significant 
presence of ‘highlanders’, those Ethiopians who are lighter in complexion and come 
from the central plateaus of Ethiopia. Even when relatively peaceful, the region of 
Gambella is as impoverished and marginal as you are likely to find anywhere in the 
world. In Gambella town, the capital, there are no paved roads, no private cars, no 
running water, only sporadic electricity, a single miserably lacking hospital, a couple 
simple schools, and for all intents, very little ‘development’ in any sense of that word. 
The countryside is even more basic, with life by the local tribes continuing in most ways 
as it has for generations, as rural subsistence farming and herding societies.
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During the length of time that I lived there, the region was plunged into anarchic 
violence. As a foreigner, it was hard to understand what was happening. It must have 
been hard even for a local. There was much violence between the region’s two major 
tribes, the Nuir and Anuak. There was also significant in-fighting between the clans and 
sub-clans of the Nuir. Even more violence occurred between one tribe, the Anuak, and 
the so-called highlanders. This manifested itself into open combat between Anuak 
militants and the Ethiopian army, which had largely failed, obviously, to instil order 
upon the border region.
The state is a very loose conception in Gambella. The region’s government has very 
little effective administrative control over the area. There are government buildings, 
and even the odd government worker, but the government has in many ways little real 
presence. What government does exist is limited to a superficial level; there might be a 
‘local administration office’ or a ‘police post’ but little cause and effect emanating from 
such places. Indeed, even the presence of the army is itself more through manning 
‘outposts’ and occasional patrols through ‘the bush’ than in maintaining a long-term 
presence where they are able to assert a monopoly on violence. In the state’s stead, 
traditional power and cultural structures are still very influential.
Sitting on the bank of the river in Gambella town on that smoky Christmas afternoon, I 
was left pondering to myself that this part of the world really was a ‘frontier’. It 
literally was the ‘Wild Wild West’ of Ethiopia. It always had been. Even the 
highlanders were Ethiopians from the central highlands who had been ‘sent forth’ by the 
Emperor Menelik to assert his claims to the western frontier region, populated by ‘black 
Africans’, as part of his imperial expansion of the Abyssinian Empire in the late 19 
Century. Gambella town itself had in turn been conceded temporarily to the British in 
colonial Sudan as a frontier trading post while the Abyssinian Empire still formally 
controlled the region.
It appeared to me that in many ways, had I been a British colonial officer a hundred 
years previous, I would have seen many of the same attributes in the region as presently 
existed. There was very little real government presence, opposing tribesmen fought
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pitched battles, bandits ambushed convoys on the region’s few dirt roads, and the 
‘Ethiopian’ army from the central government had small garrisons here and there and 
fought periodic skirmishes with an incomprehensible array of local armed groups- from 
rebels, to tribesmen, bandits, and local militias. All the while the resident herders and 
farmers largely continued their traditional way of life along the region’s riverbanks and 
across its grassy plains. They were periodically interrupted by traders with wares of 
clothing or farm tools or the proselytizing of Christian and Muslim missionaries.
Of course there were some differences too; for one thing, myself. Although few in 
number, the couple resident foreign aid workers played a disproportionately large role 
in the socio-economic welfare of the region, largely because of its lack of effective 
governance. Furthermore, there was a Western Union money transfer office, pumping 
in money from the diaspora communities of the Anuak and Nuir tribes in America and 
Australia, probably the region’s biggest source of income. The Malaysian multinational 
corporation Petronas was prospecting in the region, hoping to start drilling for oil and 
pumping it out to the economies of Asia. Western advocacy groups such as Human 
Rights Watch were soon visiting, searching for alleged human rights abuses by the 
Ethiopian government. Refugee camps supported by the international community 
hosted large populations of those displaced by the neighbouring countries’ wars.
It may all seem rather cliched for somebody not sitting on the same river bank, sweating 
under the clouds of smoke wondering if, indeed when, the shooting would start again. 
To me, Gambella was very much an actual ‘frontier’ in every sense of the word as I 
understood it. There around me was a violent, wild land full of rebels, bandits, army 
soldiers, missionaries, traders, and spear toting tribesmen and all without much notion 
of what we would now call a ‘state’. Modem ideas and technologies played a 
significant role in the region’s dynamics, preventing a complete reversion to a timeless 
history. Things such as AK-47s, political parties, global telecommunications and mass 
media, and the very real idea of an ‘Ethiopian federal government’ (however limited it 
may have been in reality), played driving roles in the region’s politics. Furthermore, 
although isolated, Gambella had a lot of contact with the outside world. It was tapped 
into international financial flows, the oil economy that drives the modem world, 
international civil society, and the humanitarian aid world of NGOs and the UN. The
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violence of the region also had profound ramifications for its neighbours, both with the 
rest of Ethiopia and across to Sudan and further afield. The movements of rebel forces, 
illegal arms, and refugees all meant that Gambella’s problems were also her neighbours, 
whether they wanted them or not.
The provocations of Gambella were not the only time I had thought of modem frontiers. 
I always had complaints about the simplicity of using terms such as ‘failed states’, 
which seemed so limited in their conceptualisation because they did not inherently take 
into account in any nuanced way the interaction that such places, as anarchic as they 
are, have with the outside world through globalisation, the driving reality of our time. It 
seemed to me- after working in states including Afghanistan, Sudan, Liberia, East 
Timor, Myanmar and the Democratic Republic of Congo- that there was much room for 
further academic debate about these two pressing realities, namely of globalisation and 
anarchic places where the state never really existed or has largely collapsed, and how 
these two realities interfaced with and shaped one another.
A second crucial theme from my time in frontiers was that as outsiders, we in the West 
are only responding to crises in the periphery of our modem world. That may seem 
rather obvious, but to many Westerners, especially within the humanitarian aid and 
foreign policy worlds, the understanding is very much that the West is driving most 
conflicts in one way or another and can hence significantly shape and resolve them. 
While many crises in the developing world, especially on the frontiers, have certainly 
been compounded or even provoked to some extent by external powers, fundamentally 
the crises, such as the one in Gambella, are products of local dynamics and are 
undertaken by local people. We can only but respond to them. To think otherwise is to 
be myopically pretentious; we do not live there, we just come and go as suits our own 
Western interests. No matter how important we think our role is, we are always but 
outsiders with a relatively superficial presence.
This leads into a third theme that has long resonated with me based on my experiences 
working in conflict zones. Whatever we try and achieve as outsiders, be it anything 
from a simple emergency aid project to trying to create a new government after a civil
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war, can only really be accomplished through ‘collaboration’ with locals. Again, this is 
a fairly seemingly obvious point, but not so much so when you talk with many of the 
aid workers of the world, neo-conservatives in Washington or even the federal 
government of Ethiopia. When working in Gambella, it was always important for me to 
remember that although I as a foreigner had access to relatively large amounts of 
resources and many ideas that I wanted to share, whatever I did required the support and 
active participation of local people.
Watching the smoke swirl above Gambella, I decided to write my PhD thesis about 
these frontiers, an idea confirmed when visiting weak and failed states, most of which 
have seen foreign interventions. They are what will be called ‘frontiers of insecurity’, 
the actual areas of anarchy in the periphery and the contact that occurs there through 
globalisation with the rest of the world. Furthermore, feeling frustrated about what 
seemed to be mostly failed attempts by outsiders to really help bring more stability to 
such troubled areas, but also to mitigate our own security problems resulting from them, 
this thesis hopes to shed some humble light on better explaining why we respond to 
these frontiers and given that, how we can better respond through improved 
collaboration with locals- those who really make all the difference for the long-term. 
This is what an emphasis on collaboration is meant to highlight: the West must 
appreciate indigenous culture and political systems and the possibilities for 
collaboration with them more before anything else can be accomplished.
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C h a p t e r  1:  O n  F r o n t i e r s  a n d  C o l l a b o r a t i o n
At the centre o f late-Victorian imperialism in Africa lies an apparent 
paradox. The main streams o f  British trade, investment and migration 
continued to leave tropical Africa practically untouched; and yet it was 
tropical Africa that was now bundled into the empire. There is a striking 
discrepancy o f direction here between the economic and imperial arms.
The flag was not following trade and capital; nor were trade and capital as 
yet following the flag. The late-Victorians seemed to be concentrating their 
imperial effort in the continent o f  least importance to their prosperity.
- Robinson and Gallagher1
While globalisation has spurred the global economy to grow manically over the past 
several decades, this growth has largely been concentrated in North America, East Asia 
and Europe. Concomitantly, in the post-Cold War era the international political 
discourse has most often focused upon the ‘rise of China’, the continuing integration 
and expansion of the European Union, the never ending Israel-Palestine conflict, the 
emergence of Russia as an energy dynamo, and the unipolar primacy of the United 
States. However, since the conclusion of the Cold War, Western states have been 
directly involved in interventions spread from Haiti and Liberia to Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, East Timor and as far as the Solomon Islands. A casual observer of these 
developments must surely be left pondering the ‘apparent paradox’ of such keen 
Western involvement in what can only be reasonably concluded as remote and 
outwardly petty locales relative to the major flows of the global economy and the power 
structures of the international system.
And yet, why are Western military forces and political agents currently active in such 
economically and politically marginal states as Liberia, East Timor and Haiti? Liberia, 
by example, is surely of little economic interest in the grand scheme of economic 
globalisation compared to the giants of America, Europe and Asia, offering little more 
than a single dilapidated Firestone rubber plantation to the world. Even aside from their 
ostensible marginality to the narratives of post-Cold War politics and economics, why is 
it that this Western interventionism has not been particularly successful in any case? By 
example, when the government of Afghanistan controls less than a third of the country 
after six years of Western interventionism and the DR Congo continues to exhibit nearly 
the same horrendously high mortality rates as it did during its official civil war from
1997-2002 despite a United Nations peacekeeping mission being present for over five 
years, there are clearly major challenges for achieving ‘progress’ in such locales. It is to 
these conundrums that this thesis seeks to offer greater clarity through its analysis on 
‘frontiers’ and ‘collaboration’.
1.1: The nexus of weak and failed states and globalisation
With the conclusion of the relatively simple bi-polar superpower conflict that was the 
Cold War, the ambiguities emerging in its stead for the international system were 
profound. Joyful initial pronouncements of a ‘new world order’ of collective security 
were quickly juxtaposed against a foreboding sense that there was rather a ‘coming 
anarchy’. What was soon apparent to all was that conventional wars between states 
were not to be as driving a concern as previously. And indeed, the post-Cold War era 
has been most defined as experiencing a “problem of the state”, witnessing the rise of 
intra-state wars in the most peripheral states of the international system. Moreover, 
other issues- such as terrorism, drugs and human trafficking, the small arms trade, and 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation- assumed greater prominence as 
newly defined ‘non-traditional security’ issues.
The process of decolonisation was assumed to have created a universal states system, 
yet in reality there were still numerous sovereignties defined by weak or non-existent 
governmental control over geographic territories. It was to the presence of these weak 
and failed states and their centrality to so many increasingly important non-traditional 
security concerns that greater prominence was given to for defining the post-Cold War 
strategic doctrines of Western states. Initial post-Cold War thinking had assumed that 
such states could be left to the humanitarian care of the aid agencies or in exceptionally 
dire situations, responded to through so-called humanitarian interventions. The ‘new 
interventionism’ of the immediate post-Cold War era- in Cambodia, Somalia, and the 
former Yugoslavia- represented a substantive break from Cold War interventionism, 
notably in that other rationales, then articulated most commonly as humanitarian, could 
supplant the state-centric ‘peacekeeping’ of the Cold War era.
And yet, as the 1990s progressed, and culminating in the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, 
there was a realisation that because of globalisation, weak and failed states are a direct
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problem for international security because aggressive non-state actors can directly 
threaten states in ways that only other states could in the past. Overall, the most 
worrying feature of the post-Cold War environment has been the “encroachment of 
chaos on the civilized world.”4
No longer was it possible to ignore anarchy and chaos on the extreme margins. 9/11 
was especially significant as it showed that even the world’s sole superpower was 
vulnerable to attacks stemming from the weakest of states and hence it “re-ignited [a] 
strategic interest in the periphery.”5 Jeffrey Herbst highlighted this point when he noted 
the “contradiction of states with only incomplete control over the hinterlands but full 
claims to sovereignty was too fundamental to remain submerged.”6 Christopher 
Clapham noted of the post-Cold War ‘new Africa’ that it would resemble its pre­
colonial origins in that it would be defined by “zones of reasonably effective 
government interspersed with ones in which anything readily identifiable as a ‘state’ is
n
hard to discern.” While Africa has had a disproportionate share of weak and failed 
states, Clapham’s imagery can be applied to the world more broadly as evinced from 
such conflict-prone states as Afghanistan, East Timor, the Balkans, Columbia, Haiti and 
Cambodia.
Michael Ignatieff once famously wrote that 9/11 highlighted of the post-Cold War
Q
world that there had been “a general failure of the historical imagination.” Namely, the 
international community, and especially the Western states, did not fathom that there are 
still “border zones... where barbarians rule and from where, thanks to modem 
technology, they are able to inflict devastating damage on the centres of power far 
away.”9 Given these ‘border zones’, a defining context of the post-Cold War 
international system was the presence of what can be more aptly termed, seemingly 
archaic but still decidedly true, as ‘frontiers’- the major contextual theme of this thesis. 
Simply put, the world, and especially the West, was forced to answer the question of 
how to respond to an anarchical frontier- a question it had thought it had answered 
through decolonisation.
Indeed, the questions of how, in an era of globalisation framed against the unfinished 
process of establishing a truly state-based international system, such anarchy could best
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be responded to have been difficult to answer. Taking action against anarchy in the 
frontiers is a timeless human need. Historically, as Barnett Rubin commented, stronger 
states have consistently “intervened along their peripheries to establish politically 
acceptable forms of order... to stabilise relations with unruly peoples on their 
frontiers.”10 The primary challenge of this presently has been that in an era where 
imperialism as an ideology is dead, the means to establishing ‘politically acceptable 
forms of order’ are fraught with difficulty and hesitation. Charges of ‘neo-colonialism’ 
sting bitterly to Western states and are compounded by a reluctance to engage in any 
type of warfare that could be considered an act of aggression.
With “post-Cold War battlefields [that are] localized but savage”11, Western states 
driven by a growing sense of human rights norms, bounded by tactics defined largely 
for conventional warfare, and somewhat naively believing in the universality of their 
political ideologies and moral parameters are wary of finding themselves involved in 
‘foreign adventures’. Overall, this leads them to show little willingness to engage in 
interventionist forays, especially when the context of globalisation has raised the 
general question of whether physical geography even still matters. Zygmunt Bauman 
has, for example, argued that “the global space has assumed the character of a frontier- 
land.”12 He goes on to argue that presently, the “frontier-land cannot be plotted on any 
map; it is not a geographical notion anymore.”13
In an era of globalisation, many doubt that physical space matters particularly much. 
This is because technology arguably makes space and distance increasingly irrelevant 
because there is now only one ‘global space’ rather than the ‘territories’ of the past. 
The most cited example of this has been critiques of the US’ ‘war on terror’. After 
9/11, many commentators on the Left challenged that the US’ response, decidedly 
misguided, was to attack two states following the actions of one shadowy, network 
dispersed non-state actor. One commentator argued, by example, that “the Bush 
Administration chose...to fight a familiar enemy whose face and address it knew”, 
namely a sovereign state, rather than engage al-Qaeda in a global space defined as a 
frontier-land.14
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While there has been an interesting academic debate as to whether geography still 
matters, it nonetheless leaves policy makers working to understand how peripheral 
chaos relates to globalisation and what ramifications that has for security in the West. 
The consistent theme of the post-Cold War era has been that interventionism focused on 
‘state-building’ is the required response to peripheral insecurity, i.e. to frontiers. And, 
indeed, it is hard for even the most devout post-modem geographer to argue that 
Afghanistan was irrelevant to the attacks in New York and Washington DC. While 9/11 
may have catalysed the realisation that peripheral anarchy can cause horrendous 
outcomes for the West, it did not clearly identify the best forms that state building 
interventionism should take.
Post-Cold War interventions have focused on strengthening the governments of weak 
and failed states through providing them with a liberal-democratic framework of 
governance. Primarily this has been through military means, mostly utilising the 
multilateral forces of the United Nations, but also on occasion those of ‘coalitions of the 
willing’ composed of several states or funnelled through a regional organisation. Under 
these broad parameters there has been much confusion and debate as to what more 
precise modalities should be developed for state building interventionism. Issues such 
as multilateralism versus unilateralism, whether pre-emption can be justified, the value 
of self-determination, the types of force that can be applied, and what norms and values 
should be applied, notably those of democracy, have been heatedly deliberated.
The results of this operational hesitance and conceptual ambiguity have been poor 
practical knowledge about how to undertake state building interventionism. The United 
Nations, as a prime example, still does not have a peacekeeping doctrine despite the 
exceptional rise in its own interventionism.15 It should be qualified that this was 
somewhat understandable in the initial post-Cold War era as the UN literally had no 
previous experience undertaking missions “when there was no government with which 
to negotiate.”16 While this was forgivable initially, lacking appropriate doctrines to 
function in new contexts serving new purposes has certainly been a major challenge 
over the longer-term.
14
Overall, interventionism during the post-Cold War era aimed at state building has not 
been particularly successful at stabilising the extreme periphery. This has resulted from 
the hesitance to define frontiers as security interests, the reluctance to engage in 
anything resembling ‘imperialism’, and disputes over what form interventionism should 
take. From Haiti to East Timor, the Balkans, Cote D’Ivoire, Afghanistan, and the 
Solomon Islands, Western military interventions have dragged on with ambiguous 
progress being achieved towards greater stability while other missions have outright 
collapsed, often spectacularly at times, such as in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
1.2; Literature review
In the post-Cold War era there has been significant academic analysis trying to 
understand whether there was to be a ‘new world order’ or a ‘new world disorder’. In 
its endless confusion, the era has lacked a seminal “Article X” such as that by George 
Kennan defining the strategic geopolitical parameters of the Cold War environment. In 
its stead there have been countless thematic approaches focusing on a menage of often 
isolated or only loosely connected emphases ranging from globalisation, empire, state 
building interventionism, and even ‘new wars’.
One of the most provocative intellectual pieces of the 1990s was an essay by Robert
Kaplan entitled The Coming Anarchy, which he followed with a book, The Ends o f the
Earth. Kaplan’s central tenet was that poverty and anarchy on the periphery were
increasing to such an extent that they were soon to become defining attributes of the
international system. His argument was novel in that it took a more holistic approach
than most International Relations-oriented work, which usually focuses on mere
politics. Resource scarcity, environmental degradation, demographic booms, crime
waves, and weak governments have coalesced to create a socio-political environment of
significant insecurity, namely becoming ‘frontiers of anarchy’. Essentially, these
attributes compose such a tide of forces that an international system based upon states is
gradually eroding and there is hence a need to “remap the political earth.” In this way,
West Africa is representative of a general trend:
... the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional 
domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of 
war. West Africa is reverting to Africa of the Victorian atlas... ‘blank’ and 
‘unexplored’.
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Kaplan notes that while a small minority of humanity will live a Fukuyama-esque ‘post- 
historical’ existence of democratic stability and capitalist abundance, the vast majority 
will be “stuck in history, living in shantytowns where attempts to rise above poverty, 
cultural dysfunction, and ethnic strife will be doomed by a lack of water to drink, soil to 
till, and space to survive in.” The localisation of politics and violence is the inevitable 
consequence of these ‘coming anarchy’ developments, whereby “‘national defense’ may 
in the future be viewed as a local concept” and individuals seek protection through 
families, clans, and tribes. Ultimately, Kaplan concludes his endeavour to map the 
future political world, “The future map... will be an ever-mutating representation of 
chaos.”
A further influential work has been The Pentagon’s New Map by Michael Barnett. 
Barnett’s work gained note because it was one of the first to strongly articulate the 
strategic parameters of the post-Cold War environment. Specifically, he focused on 
states composing the “non-integrating gap”, those “largely disconnected from the global
1 n
economy and the rule sets that define its stability.” Furthering this main contention, 
Barnett argued that “globalization’s uneven spread... delineated more than just a 
frontier separating the connected from the disconnected- it marked the front lines in a
1 Rstruggle of historic proportions.” This struggle inside the ‘gap’ has primarily required 
the US and her allies to attempt to expand economic globalisation and neo-liberal 
governance.
Another important work is Robert Cooper’s The Breaking o f  Nations. In it he argued 
that a defining characteristic of today’s “divided world” is the presence of a “pre­
modem world: the pre-state, post-imperial chaos” of states such as Somalia, 
Afghanistan and Liberia.19 While in the past, peripheral chaos would often be ignored 
because of the benefits of distance, today this is no longer possible because the “zone of 
danger and chaos” interconnects with the rest of the world through globalisation.20 
While “homeland defence begins abroad”, the Western world has had a difficult time
91engaging in such an endeavour. Fundamentally, in the present era “the imperial urge 
is dead... [and] because none of us sees the point of empires, we have often chosen 
chaos.”22
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What is interesting about these three works, amongst many others with similar themes, 
is their attempt to articulate how peripheral anarchy exists, namely in weak and failed 
states, and the responses to it. Rather than simply adhere to the label of ‘weak and 
failed states’, the literature has tended to identify peripheral areas of anarchy more 
broadly within a general understanding of their existence as weak and failed states. 
Essentially, this peripheral anarchy has been given countless names, albeit assigning 
different dynamics and causalities to it. From Kaplan’s ‘frontiers of anarchy’, Barnett’s 
‘gap’ and Cooper’s ‘pre-modem states’, many others have also tried to define those 
zones in the periphery that have assumed such prominence since the end of the Cold 
War. The purpose of this naming has been to capture their deeper meaning, notably 
how they are perceived and what conditions exist in them, rather than to leave them as 
relatively dry, hollow terms- ‘weak and failed states’.
A key theme in this work is the ostensible detachment of these areas from the core, 
stable areas of the international system, notably the West. As early as 1991, Stanley 
Hoffman was interested in “New World Disorder” based on chaos in the Third World. 
By 1993 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky were already writing of juxtaposed “zones 
of peace” and “zones of turmoil”. This initial interest has been expanded on by many 
authors subsequently. Michael Ignatieff, for instance, argued that “beyond the zone of
99 •stable democratic states... there are border zones” of the periphery. Michael 
Vatikiotis has written of the “restive margins” of Southeast Asia, such as Papua New 
Guinea and Myanmar.24 Robert Kaplan, in addition to ‘frontiers’ has framed his 
coming anarchy as stemming from the international system’s “marginal areas.” 
Linking all of these illustrations is their extremely peripheral nature and hence 
detachment from the ‘progressing’ core.
A second key theme is authors attempting to conjure through their descriptions the key 
attribute of such places, the lack of strong governance associated with sovereign 
statehood. Speaking of Africa, Christopher Clapham noted the rising prominence of 
“borderlands and zones of shifting control and areas altogether beyond the realm of 
statehood.”26 Cooper’s usage of ‘pre-modem states’ identified them as states that have 
not yet achieved the ‘modem’ status of strong government and industrialised 
economies. In its policy papers, the US government has placed its emphasis on
97identifying “ungovemed areas” and areas with the “absence of effective
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governance.” In general, many academics have striven to highlight “unsatisfactorily
90governed locations”, as Marcus Fielding termed them.
A third major theme of the literature has been in defining anarchic peripheral areas 
using assorted adjectives for turbulence and unrest. Throughout the 1990s the term ‘arc 
of crisis’ was prominent in US strategic literature, with the Pentagon utilising the term 
to describe the broader Middle East while Australia called those areas of Southeast Asia 
and Oceania problematic to it an ‘arc of instability’. William Reno argued the existence 
of “disorderly areas” , Chester Crocker focused on a “vast zone of transition and
o i
turbulence” and Lucile Carlson articulated the presence of “zones of friction” and 
“trouble spots.” Furthering these sentiments was Mark Berger who wrote of
AO
“instability, terrorism, and criminality in marginalised regions” , and Eric Hobsbawn 
who labelled them as “areas of turmoil and humanitarian catastrophe.”34
In addition to the broad literature focused on defining the peripheral anarchy of weak 
and failed states, there has been much work focused on empire and imperialism. This 
literature has sought to identify how and why the West has responded to peripheral 
anarchy through interventionism in the post-Cold War era. Michael Ignatieff s work, 
Empire Lite, has been notably provocative. In it he argued of the need to respond to the 
“danger zones” of the periphery precisely because their instability posed direct security 
risks to the West and that renewed imperialism, albeit ‘lite’ in nature, is the means 
chosen.35
In the wake of 9/11, there was much interest in Washington over calls for a return to 
imperialism to impose order on disorderly states such as Afghanistan, notably by 
prominent ‘neo-conservatives’ such as Sebastian Mallaby and Max Boot. The calls for 
specifically ‘liberal imperialism’ have been strong, with Deepak Lai, for instance,
A/*
arguing it was necessary to “promote that globalization which leads to modernity.” 
The British historian Niall Ferguson has been one of the most prolific champions of an 
assertive US Empire following in the footsteps of the British to push stability, arguing
AA
that “empire is more necessary in the twenty-first century than ever before.” This is 
because it is needed to maintain global order, in the form of institutionalised rule of law
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and effective administration over states, as well as to expand economic globalisation-
10
namely free trade, capital movements and migration.
A third major emphasis in the International Relations literature has focused on 
interventionism as the response to weak and failed states. This literature is rather 
expansive in its gamut of analysis; indeed, it has developed as a major sub-field of 
International Relations. It has evolved as notions of interventionism have developed. 
For instance, ‘humanitarian intervention’ received extensive analysis in the 1990s from 
academics such as Nicholas Wheeler. This work focused mostly on the moral and 
ethical dimensions of humanitarianism and framed much of its discourse around the 
challenges of Western states’ ‘right to protect’ endangered individuals versus the norm 
of state sovereignty. Additionally, during the 1990s, academics such as William 
Zartman and Chester Crocker focused on analysing the difficulties of state building in 
weak and failed states more generally than only through Western interventionism. This 
literature expended great efforts on analysing both the causes of state weakness and the 
possible responses to it, from improved economic aid through to military intervention.
Following 9/11, the interventionism literature narrowed to emphasise the ‘state 
building’ activities of military interventions, especially as defence policies increasingly 
placed emphasis on the ‘absence of effective governance’ in locales such as 
Afghanistan. Stuart Eizenstat, Tonya Langford, and Andrea Kathryn Talentino, 
amongst other academics, placed much prominence on the roles interventionists could 
and should play, ranging from the fairly benign ‘peacekeeping’ of monitoring peace 
agreements through to ‘peacemaking’ and ‘peace-enforcing’ whereby interventionists 
could apply force against ‘peace spoilers’ such as warlords and militias. Furthermore, 
academics, such as Michael Doyle and Francis Fukuyama, placed their analytical 
emphasis on the mechanics of state building, such as on the institutionalisation of 
governance. Additionally, other academics such as James Dobbins, Kimberly Marten, 
and Robert Orr focused more on the foreign policy aspects of state building 
interventionism, especially as regards the US as the sole superpower. Much of this 
work attempted to provide an intellectual framework for guiding the US response to 
9/11, building upon the experiences learned from state building exercises in the Balkans 
and Africa in the 1990s.
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Gaps in the literature
Overall, there has been an immense body of literature which has sought to define the 
key dynamics of the post-Cold War era by placing an emphasis on weak and failed 
states on the international system’s periphery and appropriate responses to them. 
However, despite the volume of literature on these topics, there are still gaps within it 
that allow for further research to be worthwhile.
The first major gap in the literature is that it does not consistently define the context of 
where interventions are occurring and subsequently whether or not they succeed in 
achieving their goals. As has just been illustrated, there appears to be a general 
sentiment that presently anarchy ‘out there’ affects security in the West. Many names 
have been applied to move beyond simplistically using the label ‘weak and failed 
states’. This is necessary because it is essentially a misnomer to simply leave labelling 
them as ‘states’ because by definition they lack the ‘empirical sovereignty’ so crucial to 
delineating actual states. Furthermore, keeping the term only as ‘weak and failed’ states 
does nothing to explain other than the fact that they have weak governance structures, 
not what that means more broadly for the rest of the world.
However, while it is useful to move beyond the limiting notion of weak and failed states 
to try and define such areas in a more useful manner, i.e. more explanative for 
understanding what attributes define these places and what reactions they provoke 
because of how they are perceived, the literature does not do so consistently. For 
instance, both Kaplan and Ignatieff use the term ‘frontiers’ in their work but never 
define it in any meaningful detail and also use a menage of other terminology anyway, 
as ‘danger zones’ and ‘marginal areas’ for example. Furthermore, much of the 
terminology presently used is overly broad. Barnett’s use of a ‘gap’ is dubious because 
he includes in it most of the developing world even though the problem he specifically 
identifies is limited to just the most direly weak or outright failed states. This critique 
has also been levelled frequently at Kaplan for over generalising the chaos of a few 
especially conflict prone states in West Africa to be representative of the developing 
world. As K.J. Holsti has argued, defining overly generic terminology to “predict vast 
zones of chaos and anarchy is fundamentally a mistake.”40 Many post-colonial 
developing states are doing well while others are certainly not outright disasters.
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Somalia, for example, is special by any standard and not particularly comparable to 
neighbouring Kenya as a state or as an international security concern.
The second major gap in the literature is that it places little to no consistent emphasis on 
the relationships that form between foreign interventionists and indigenous politics and 
the way that the context of ‘weak and failed states’ shapes those relationships. As Barry 
Buzan and Richard Little have argued, if one accepts that on some level there is a ‘zone 
of peace’ and a ‘zone of conflict’ then a central issues becomes how they “relate to each 
other, for that they relate in many and significant ways is beyond question.”41 
Considering this, it is notable that out of all the comparisons with imperialism, so little 
is made of the dynamics that saw it succeed or fail ultimately, ‘collaboration’ with 
indigenous politics. It is notable that academics who write extensively on imperialism 
and its advocacy- such as Ignatieff and Lai- dedicate almost no attention to 
collaboration. Indeed, one cannot find the term applied to any degree in any of their 
works. For his part, Ferguson claims that “more than anything else, the British Empire 
was an empire based on local collaboration” yet he places absolutely no emphasis 
towards defining what that means exactly, why it was so, or what mechanisms would 
allow the US to emulate it.42
And yet, as Jonathon Steele argued in one short newspaper column, in places like Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the ‘classic dilemma of collaboration’ still defines those 
interventionist endeavours.43 This timeless dilemma is true of interventions generally 
and covers both the hesitance of indigenous actors to partner with intervening forces as 
well as that of the foreign forces to choose and work with local partners. 
Fundamentally, in an era when imperialism as an ideology is dead but still remains a 
means to an end, how to collaborate, or not, is a defining issue but one that has received 
no comprehensive academic analysis. The Pentagon now euphemistically emphasises 
‘indirect action’, namely undertaking operations with and through local indigenous 
partners. The increasing mantra of US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
representative of state building interventionism more broadly, is that “everything we 
do...is ‘by’, ‘through’, [and] ‘with’ the indigs. A n d  yet, there is not a clear 
understanding of what these ambiguous terms and the sentiments behind them actually 
mean within the academic discourse of International Relations.
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Representing a common theme of thought, Lai argued of the ‘American imperium’ that 
there is a need to “build the complementary imperial administrative structure required to 
run an empire.”45 Sharing that sentiment, most of the academic analysis has focused 
rather generically on arguing laundry lists of ‘to do’ items for interventionist forces. 
For instance, many academics have argued for the need to have dedicated reconstruction 
agencies, improved multilateral partnerships, larger budgets, better linguistic skills, and 
a whole gamut of endless, usually bureaucratic items. Namely, nearly all of the 
analytical effort has been put towards understanding one side of the equation, the 
interventionist forces, rather than how they interact and partner with local participants. 
One of the few exceptions has been the outstanding book by Beatrice Pouligny, Peace 
Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People.
Overarching this general gap is that so much of the imperialism, intervention and state 
building discourse has focused too heavily on the assumed primacy and agency of the 
interventionists- be they an individual state, a ‘coalition of the willing’, or the UN- 
rather than giving more credence, and hence analysis, to indigenous actors. Considering 
that, there is not a systematic approach that looks at the definitive agency of local actors 
in states undergoing interventionism and the way that they interface with foreign 
interventionist actors. Moreover, there is no clear understanding of how the context of 
where that interaction occurs inherently shapes it- ‘gaps’, ‘arcs’, ‘marginal areas’, and 
‘trouble spots’ cannot only but be confusing. The effect that this has had on policy is 
profound. This is perhaps most so for the US which, as Ignatieff contended, finds itself 
presently fighting wars “with no clear policy of intervention, no clear end in sight and 
no clear understanding among Americans of what their nation has gotten itself into.”46
1.3: Thesis outline
... today’s environment resembles a challenge... so immense that it requires 
major shifts in strategic concepts for national security... New modes o f  
cooperation can enhance agility and effectiveness with traditional allies and 
engage new partners in a common cause.
- US Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006’47
There is a pressing need to understand why Western states are involved in interventions 
spread from Haiti and Liberia to Afghanistan and as far as the Solomon Islands. There 
is also a requirement to analyse why nearly all post-Cold War interventions have failed
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to achieve their goals or have only done so slowly and merely partially. It is this thesis’ 
argument that this can best be done through the contextualisation provided by an 
academic review of frontiers and collaboration. Needless to say, there is exceedingly 
little International Relations literature that is particularly useful to furthering an interest 
in frontier zones, their dynamics and their interactions with the wider world, or of 
‘collaboration’ between indigenous and interventionist actors. Considering that, this 
thesis will argue that where International Relations’ current analytical approaches have 
less utility, a new approach is instead required for improved analysis.
A new analytical approach is most likely to succeed if it looks at the ‘point of impact’ of 
current interventionism, specifically those relationships interfacing an intervening state 
with indigenous politics, namely who is interacting with whom, why for, and the
ao
context of the locale. Older concepts that were developed for historical-based studies 
of imperialism as it relates to frontiers do still have applicability to current academic 
studies in International Relations focused on state building interventionism in weak and 
failed states. Considering that, this thesis is not on ‘empire’ or ‘imperialism’ but rather 
on ‘frontiers’ and ‘collaboration’. Central to this thesis will be the adaptation and 
application of key theories developed by the British historians Ronald Robinson and 
John Gallagher in their seminal works on the British Empire. Emphasis will be given to 
adapting and expanding upon their arguments- notably for the definitive ‘pericentric 
pull’ of crises in the periphery, what can be considered ‘frontiers of insecurity’, as well 
as the ‘theory of collaboration’ sketched by Robinson- for application to International 
Relations in the 21st Century.
The reason for placing an emphasis on Robinson and Gallagher’s historical works, as 
compared to say Geopolitics or mainstream International Relations theories such as 
Realism, is that they provide, as Sydney Kanya-Forstner noted, a “neat, logical- almost 
irresistible- extension of a line of argument, both conceptually and in terms of its 
scope.”49 Robinson and Gallagher were brilliant historians able to show how diverse 
factors- domestic politics in the periphery, international security dynamics and global 
economics- interacted together to create a panorama of international politics which 
fostered the British Empire. Through their analysis they were able to do what current 
literature is unable- provide for the context that would provoke Western
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interventionism, explain the dynamic of that interventionism, and then articulate the 
conditions that would determine its efficacy.
Using ideas first promulgated by Robinson and Gallagher but adapted as necessary, this 
thesis will make its contribution to the study of International Relations by shedding light 
on post-Cold War state building interventionism in the peripheral anarchy of weak and 
failed states. Towards that purpose, guiding this thesis’ research will be two related 
questions:
1. Why and how do Western states presently respond to peripheral 
anarchy in the form of weak and failed states?
2. Are their responses succeeding at meeting their goals, namely 
mitigating their security concerns in the present era of 
globalisation?
The thesis will answer these questions by providing the contextualisation of 
interventions- frontiers of insecurity, viz. ‘frontier states’- and the dynamic for 
interventions- the pericentric pull of those frontiers. Most importantly this thesis seeks 
to argue that the academic review of interventions must focus on the centrality of 
indigenous political actors to defining them, namely through their ‘collaboration’. In 
sum, the thesis argues that present state-building interventions must be understood as 
interactive processes o f collaboration with indigenous politics in frontiers o f insecurity, 
namely that they are endeavours to find and strengthen suitable collaborators to meet 
Western security needs by creating more stability in frontier states. Subsequently, the 
thesis is broken down into three major sections.
The contextualisation o f frontiers o f insecurity
The initiating argument of this thesis is that what actually exists, as often before, is 
literally a ‘frontier problem’. Rather than invent a plethora of new terminology- e.g. 
trouble spots, marginal areas, arcs of crisis, zones of chaos, gaps- to describe an 
enduring historical reality, this thesis will analyse the timeless context of frontiers and 
attempts to manage them through interventionism. Conducive to this is the reality that 
many of today’s frontiers were those of yesteryear, for instance the US again finds itself 
in the southern Philippines while the British are once more fighting on the Afghan- 
Pakistan border. Frontiers of insecurity are anarchic politico-geographical areas in the
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periphery that are also zones of contact with the core states, notably the West, because 
of globalisation. This definitional construct places emphasis on the what of peripheral 
areas of anarchy, i.e. the actual politico-geographic areas of weak and failed states, and 
the why of globalisation, i.e. the actual contact with them. Despite arguments that 
geography is increasingly irrelevant, this thesis argues that territorial space still matters 
greatly; geography is not dead. There are real ‘frontier states’ and the best argument for 
this is that people still move in fairly uniform directions. There are no illegal 
immigration problems in Afghanistan, Somalia or Haiti and there are no peacekeeping 
missions in Norway, Finland or Japan. If geography is irrelevant this would not be so.
The importance of frontier states is the unique context they provide in contrast to the 
relatively simple ‘peacekeeping’ between states undertaken during the Cold War. As 
Mats Berdal argued, present interventions are occurring in “less than permissive 
environments”, notably those of domestic anarchy where local actors often directly 
agitate against interventionists.50 The construct of frontiers of insecurity provides sorely 
missing contextualisation for how weak and failed states, because of globalisation, 
interface with other actors in the international system, notably Western states. This 
thesis will focus on the significance of the contact which globalisation forces, noting the 
immediacy it provides as well as the increasingly powerful role of non-state actors that 
it facilitates. Furthermore, it is not the argument of this thesis that frontiers of insecurity 
are merely terra nullius. Rather, it is that they are in fact political worlds that require 
sophisticated interaction and partnership with indigenous politics in order to transition 
them into more stable states, namely they require nuanced collaboration. It is the 
argument of this thesis that frontiers of insecurity are actually a fairly limited 
occurrence. A major flaw of much of the current literature is that it is overly generic- 
the ‘arc’ being the Muslim world or the ‘gap’ being all developing countries. It is 
necessary to be more specific and focus on only about 20 states out of nearly 200.
Lastly, it is important to note that frontiers of insecurity are not ‘rogue states’, which are 
a substantively different matter. Dictatorships in North Korea and Iran do not make for 
frontier zones. Often academics have lumped together rogues with weak and failed 
states and this has caused profound policy miscalculations since they cannot be dealt 
with in an equivalent manner. Framing Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the same 
problem, notably claiming Iraq was substantively similar to Afghanistan, was US
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President George W. Bush’s primary mistake in diagnosing the need for toppling 
Saddam Hussein. The irony has been that subsequent to the US intervention in Iraq, it 
arguably now can be considered a frontier of insecurity. However, it should be clearly 
stated that this thesis will not analyse Iraq as it was not a frontier of insecurity in any 
manner when it was invaded by the US in March 2003.
The pericentric pull and state-building interventionism
The second argument of this thesis is that the pulling nature of frontiers, the dynamic of 
a ‘pericentric puli’, stimulates Western interventionism. In the post-Cold War era there 
has been a major shift in strategic thinking away from the central German plains and the 
Korean peninsula. A crescendo of ‘local crises’ has transformed into a ‘general crisis’ 
of frontiers of insecurity in locales previously deemed negligible to international 
security.51 This interventionism by Western states is focused on state-building, namely 
strengthening national governments to more effectively govern their sovereign territory, 
and is inherently ‘imperialistic’ because it requires the temporary control by foreign 
powers over domestic outcomes. This state building endeavour is not one particular 
activity but rather is a dynamic process focused on empowering indigenous 
collaborative partners in the form of national governments. This thesis examines how 
this process unfolds, namely how partners engage in collaborative processes to act or 
decide on issues contributing to achieving common goals, namely the more effective 
control of territory through stronger governance.
As Christopher Coker has argued, “insecurity can now only be managed.” Through 
state-building interventions, Western states are attempting to do that in response to 
frontiers, namely they “wish to ‘reshape environments’ the better to minimise risks that 
come from them.” The purpose is not to naively ‘create order’ but rather it is to 
simply create stronger, more effectively governed states that allow for security concerns 
to be mitigated and become more ‘manageable’ rather than ended altogether. The 
ultimate goal of this interventionism is to push frontiers of insecurity beyond the 
‘peripheral threshold’, viz. ending those attributes that define them as frontiers and this 
means empowering collaborative partners, again mostly in the form of national 
governments, to be able to more effectively manage their sovereign space.
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The crucial attribute of the pericentric pull of frontiers, viz. the dynamic of peripheral 
insecurity stimulating Western interventionism, is that the presence and type of local 
collaborative partners determines whether interventionism takes place and indeed if it is 
practicable. As Robinson and Gallagher argued of imperialism, “the choice of mode 
was a purely tactical consideration shaped by circumstances.”54 The circumstances 
were what possibilities for collaboration existed. What is notable about this aspect of 
the ‘pericentric school’s’ emphasis is that just as in the past, the general lack of local 
partners suitable for Western states meeting their security interests can be seen in the 
present era as well. The West seeks an international system based on at least somewhat 
functional states run by sovereign governments. And yet in the frontier states these 
indigenous partners in the form of effective national governments are decidedly lacking. 
Hence, a deeper type of engagement is required, one that can be deemed to be 
essentially about imperialistic control for the short to near term.
The importance of collaboration with indigenous actors cannot be understated for 
understanding present interventions. Interventions are required because the West 
cannot presently find collaborative partners in the form of effective national 
governments to help manage their security concerns regarding globalisation, so they 
temporarily employ imperialistic means to strengthen or even create anew such 
collaborative partners. Given that, analysing the framework, mechanics, and dynamics 
of collaboration allows for a greatly improved understanding of present interventionism. 
This thesis thus defines a ‘theory of collaboration’ for understanding present 
interventionism. It stipulates the following precepts:
• The absence or presence of effective indigenous partners as well as the structure 
of indigenous society determine whether interventions are practicable or not.
• The choice and combination of indigenous collaborative systems available to the 
intervening power should define the structure and form that the intervention 
takes- be it administrative, military, diplomatic, or legal.
• The degree of control necessitated for the intervening power to assert in order to 
achieve its goals is inversely proportionate to that of the capabilities (and hence 
control) which the collaborating indigenous elite are able to provide through 
governance.
• If the intervening power runs out of effective, responsive indigenous 
collaborating partners, it is forced to leave even if it has not achieved its goals.
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Ameliorating the collaboration problematique
The major argument of this thesis focuses on what is termed the collaboration 
problematique, a ‘wicked problem’ never to be entirely solved, merely ameliorated. In 
its simplest terms, in a time when imperialism as an ideology is dead but imperialistic 
means are required, how can the West deal with the classic dilemma of collaboration in 
frontier states? Presently Western powers are both failing to build appropriate 
‘collaborative systems’, those relationships linking interventionists actors to indigenous 
politics, and to manage their collaborative partnerships over the longer-term. The 
centrality of this crucial aspect to interventionism is the collaboration problematique- 
the inherent difficulty of finding and strengthening suitable collaborative partners within 
indigenous politics.
The collaboration problematique has several important aspects. The most important is 
that the pericentric pull provoking a strengthened presence in frontier zones is a result of 
the lack of suitable collaborative partners. If such persons or groups existed in the first 
place, there would be no provocation for an intervention. As Jochen Hippier noted, “the 
dilemma of needing dependable, effective and politically acceptable partners with 
influence in the target country lies in the fact that such partners often do not exist.”55 
Hence, the problem of finding or even creating anew suitable collaborative partners lies 
at the heart of contemporary state building interventionism. Often the goal of 
strengthening national governments contrasts sharply with the need for other types of 
action. With the reality that government structures are often non-existent, or 
exceptionally weak, ethnically divided, and/or exceedingly corrupt, it is not surprising 
that interventionist forces caught in the dilemma of needing timely action and functional 
partners instead turn to militias, warlords and at times even to criminal gangs.56 For 
instance, as Rubin Barnett argued, state building “means creating a sovereign centre of 
political accountability, which is not necessarily the same as building an ally in the war 
on terror.”57
Furthermore, the collaboration problematique currently facing Western states 
undertaking interventionism is internal in two ways. The first is that collaboration is not 
defined as a strategic doctrine presently and hence the art thereof is inadequately 
understood. This means that collaboration is simply poorly undertaken by the West; it
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effectively lacks the ‘collaborative know-how’ to undertake effective interventions. 
Second is that the West is not willing to ‘pay’ very much for its interventions as shown 
by the current emphasis on shallow democratic processes, short timeframes and limited 
material and political commitment. This means that intervening actors struggle to 
maintain collaborative systems conducive to transitioning frontier states to greater 
stability. Overall, as highlighted in the theory of collaboration, the consequence of the 
poor approach to collaboration is that ultimately the West is not translating its energy 
and resources into ‘internalisation’ by indigenous politics. Given that, present 
interventions are not particularly successful at achieving their goal of creating stronger 
states.
Compounding these problems of know-how and dedication is a profound values debate 
which conflicts collaborative relationships. Attempting to balance Western interests 
and demands- such as democratisation, human rights, liberal economics, and ‘good 
governance’- with those of their collaborative partners in indigenous politics- who have 
often opposed demands and needs for their more ‘localised’ interests and institutions- is 
inherently challenging. If imperialism is dead as both an ideology and an accepted 
means, the challenge is how to implement interventions when Westerners hesitate to be 
‘imperialists’ and actors from indigenous politics resist being ‘collaborators’.
1.4: Conclusion
This thesis concerns why some states feel threatened by anarchy in the periphery, how 
they respond to it by expanding control there temporarily, and whether they succeed 
depending upon how well they manage to interface with and shape local partners to take 
more control over territory using the governance institutions of the state. The best way 
to make interventions more effective is simply through improved collaboration with 
indigenous politics. Achieving this requires some major changes to the current 
approach taken to state building interventionism. If Western states can enhance their 
approach to and implementation of collaboration with indigenous politics, they can 
better manage insecurity on the frontiers through state-building interventionism.
A starting point is to simply place more emphasis on the centrality of collaboration to 
interventionism. If the West really does not want to engage in imperialistic
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interventions because it does not believe in imperialism as an ideology but still feels 
pressed to use imperialistic means to protect itself, it must work to improve its 
collaborative skills to find and strengthen local partners rather than send in significant 
numbers of its own troops. With no willingness to send abroad massive armies or 
undertake formal colonisation, there is a need to essentially allow the frontier to help 
take care of the frontier’s problems; to do local problem solving using local resources.
As the West does want to maintain a light presence but also to bring about profound 
changes in frontiers through state-building interventionism, it needs a new ‘doctrine of 
collaboration’. This would require a move away from conventional war strategies, 
which have encouraged an unhealthy distancing from engaging indigenous politics and 
forming real relationships. Rather, such a doctrine of collaboration would centre on the 
interventionists’ abilities to comprehend and nuance local politics in frontiers by finding 
and strengthening indigenous collaborative partners there. This responds to the dire 
reality that the Western way of war is only effective in itself against other states and 
struggles to engage the reality of frontier states, defined as they are by anarchy and non­
state actors.58
In places such as southeast Afghanistan and the eastern DR Congo, current emphases on 
awesome military power are failing and instead a new approach of engaging local 
politics more deeply through nuanced collaboration is required. On the whole, a 
doctrine of collaboration would emphasise more local partnership and fewer smart 
bombs. In this sense, such a doctrine would still combine some aspect of the ‘Rumsfeld 
doctrine’ of small, mobile, technologically advanced forces which undoubtedly have a 
lot of value with Nixon’s ‘Guam doctrine’, namely Western powers should not engage 
in wars in the periphery unless interventionist forces have local partners with real 
potential and who are motivated. In this way, any sort of ‘revolution of military affairs’ 
should focus more on the rather archaic notion of collaboration and not merely on 
technology, making it more of a retrograde revolution than a progressive one.
It is important to explain why this thesis has chosen to focus on Western states and their 
responses to frontiers of insecurity. The states of North America, Europe, Japan and 
Australia/New Zealand have been chosen because they represent the bulk of the foreign
30
actors undertaking present interventions whether by using their own military forces and 
political agents directly or through their formative influence over and funding of the 
United Nations’ missions. Furthermore, this thesis focuses on the West because, as 
David Rieff argued, only it is “rich enough and powerful enough to intervene in a far- 
off catastrophe in a way that can make a major difference.”59 Most interventions simply 
do not take place without a significant degree of Western involvement presently.
However, this thesis makes no assertion that the dynamic of a pericentric pull only 
provokes Western states in the post-Cold War era. There have also been cases of 
developing states intervening in their weak and failed neighbours, for instance Rwanda 
in the DR Congo, Nigeria in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and Ethiopia in Somalia. 
Importantly, collaboration with indigenous politics is as central to these interventions as 
it is for Western ones. In addition, the ideas articulated by this thesis also have validity 
for better understanding what Martin Shaw has termed ‘quasi-imperialism’, namely the 
control exerted over peripheral areas by the cores of power in large states that have 
imperial legacies.60 In this way, it would be useful to analyse how collaboration on 
peripheral frontiers occurs within states such as Ethiopia (in places like Gambella), 
Indonesia, Thailand, Sudan, Russia, and China. However, in order to keep the thesis of 
a manageable size, only interventions undertaken by the West will be directly 
considered.
An additional qualification of this thesis’ analysis must be made. Some would consider 
the very notion of frontiers to be direly Eurocentric and given that, lacking of academic 
rigour. While the focus of the thesis is on interventions in frontiers by Western states, it 
believes that the notion of what constituents a frontier zone is universally applicable. In 
an era of globalisation, Somalia is as much a frontier to Ethiopia as it is to Europe while 
Afghanistan occupies the parallel security concerns for India and Iran as it does for the 
United States. Furthermore, that some especially prone weak and failed states should be 
contextualised differently is fairly obvious to all except the most dogmatically 
politically correct academic. Just before being assassinated, the Lebanese militia leader 
Bashir Gemal noted of his home country that “[it] is not Norway here, and it is not 
Denmark.”61 Frontiers are a timeless condition and it is naive to think that they no 
longer exist because of a detached hope that all states are now equal in terms of their 
abilities to function as states or that there is actually only one ‘global frontier-land’. It
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is hard to imagine anyone standing in the streets of Mogadishu, Kabul or Monrovia 
thinking otherwise.
What is more, it is worth pondering about who wants ‘frontiers’. Through their 
responses, namely state building interventions, it is apparent that Western states do not. 
Mary Kaldor argued of the post-Cold War era’s ‘new wars’ that they “take place in 
regions where the state is weak, so the aim is to capture or control parts of the state
fS)apparatus.” While true on occasion, ever more this is not really the aim of 
‘frontiersmen’, the growing multitudes of increasingly powerful non-state actors. 
Violence is now often defined less by the instrumental political goals of state control 
than the maintenance of a condition, one of perpetual anarchy that permits the continued 
existence of individuals and groups that do not need, and indeed do not want, stronger 
states to exist. These include, for instance, warlords in Somalia and opium traders in 
Afghanistan. Frontiers are special precisely because they are anarchic; the goal is the 
maintenance of a perpetual frontier. Indeed, as David Keen has argued, “bizarre forms 
of collaboration” often exist in the chaos of civil wars whereby assorted local actors, 
rebel movements and rogue government agents, work together to exploit violence over 
the longer-term and actively stymie the creation of stronger states, such as happened in 
Sierra Leone in the mid- and late-1990s.
In conclusion, as Yahya Sadowski noted, with ever more complexity defining the world, 
the strategic doctrines of the West will need to be “tailored more to local particularities 
rather than relying upon global maxims.”64 There have been many debates on ‘empire’ 
and ‘imperialism’, state building and interventionism, and on globalisation and weak 
and failed states. The purpose of this thesis is not to try and probe through those 
discourses exhaustively or argue for the merits of certain arguments within them. 
Rather, the intent is to introduce the notion that ‘collaboration’ in ‘frontiers’, i.e. the 
‘point of contact’, is central to understanding why, how and whether Western 
interventions are successful or not at creating stronger states in the extreme periphery 
and hence mitigating their security concerns stemming from globalisation.
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C h a p t e r  2 :  F r o n t i e r s  o f  I n s e c u r i t y
... globalisation has drawn us out o f self-contained national or local 
communities into a larger world that offers none o f the old protections.1
Long before the creation of the present international system, frontiers have been a 
strong theme in the history of humanity. From the northern edges of the Roman Empire 
facing Germanic barbarians, the ‘Wild West’ of America, to the Northwest Frontier of 
the British Raj, frontier zones always played a central role in the politics and identities 
of their respective times. The romance, danger, and mystery that they have conjured as 
‘wild lands’, chaotic and turbulent, compelled those facing them to engage them so as to 
manage them and mitigate the insecurity emanating from them. Gradually most were 
even subsumed into the hinterlands proper. This chapter will review understandings of 
what define frontiers and from that articulate how modem frontiers exist in the form of 
‘frontiers of insecurity’, namely as ‘frontier states’, by building upon the insights of the 
British historians Robinson and Gallagher in their seminal work Africa and the 
Victorians.
2.1: Defining frontiers
Frontiers... are places where authority- neither secure nor nonexistent- is 
open to challenge, and where polarities o f order and chaos assume many 
guises.2
It is important to firstly clarify the meaning of the term ‘frontiers’ by considering its 
usage over time, notably how it relates to a boundary with which it is often confusingly 
used as a synonym. A good place to start is with Lord Curzon, writing and speaking in 
1907, who noted that the academic study of frontiers as a subject “was almost totally
thignored” despite the fact that the “majority of the most important wars of the [19 ] 
century have been frontier wars.” Curzon attempted to rectify this by focusing on the 
term in his hallmark Romanes Lecture at Oxford University where he defined frontiers 
both as geographic areas and as boundaries between states in two senses. Firstly, he 
meant as fairly ambiguous areas there “to be settled, demarcated and then maintained.”4 
Secondly, he meant it at times to be a strict territorial limit, i.e. demarcated, between
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states and noted: “Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the 
modem issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations.”5 In this way, frontiers could 
exist as fairly defined markers of territory or as more general areas of control or 
influence between political entities.
Presently, the general application of the word in public discourse has taken a fairly 
bland, utilitarian meaning confining its usage largely as a synonym of ‘boundary’, 
connoting the delineation of a border between states. The Oxford English Dictionary, 
for instance, merely describes a frontier as “a boundary between countries.”6 As the 
academic study of frontiers has largely subsided in the last forty years, especially within 
International Relations, the present definitions of it have also disappointingly tended to 
be rather simple. Within the present field of International Relations, frontiers have most 
commonly been used to signify ‘contact zones’ between different cultures and 
civilisations and especially in the context of empires. For instance, in its short entry, 
The Penguin Dictionary o f International Relations leaves its definition of frontiers as “a 
zone of contact between two entities or social systems” and notes it is distinct from a
n
boundary, which is a strict territorial limit. Another relatively common definition in 
International Relations literature is as the “politico-geographical area lying beyond the
o #
integrated region of the political unit.” However, it is remarkable that in general, the 
term has not been used very much in International Relations literature in the past several 
decades and when done, in a very abstract and fleeting manner.9 This is unfortunate as 
the term historically had much more depth to it and hence analytical value. Perhaps the 
constriction in its application has been a result of the ostensible completion of the states 
system, the ‘final frontier’ being space itself, gleefully claimed by NASA.
In order to maximise the utility of frontiers as an intellectual construct it is necessary to 
define the term in a much more nuanced way than the fairly limited usage of them as 
‘boundaries’. Overall, it is still appropriate to define a frontier as 1) the ‘politico- 
geographical area lying beyond the integrated region of the political unit’ as well as 2) a 
‘zone of contact’ for entities or social systems, as it is generally understood in 
International Relations literature. Yet, it is crucial that these two overly general 
definitional themes be complemented by some qualifications.
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Ladis Kristof, writing in the 1970s, presented some of the more nuanced understanding 
behind the origin and development of the term.10 Historically the usage of the term has 
implied to project outwards, ‘in front’, rather than inwards, ‘within bounds’ as in for a 
boundary. A frontier, originally, was not a precise delineation of a zone or area between 
entities but rather “designated an area which was part of a whole, specifically the part 
which was ahead of the hinterland.” As it was not a strict limit or the end to a political 
unit because of a belief in a universal state or existence, the frontier “meant quite 
literally ‘the front’: the frons of the imperium mundi which expands to the only limits it 
can acknowledge, namely the limits of the world.” Hence, frontiers were ‘beginnings’ 
and not ‘ends’ of societies because they were the symbolic “spearhead of light and 
knowledge expanding into the realm of darkness and of the unknown.” However, as 
more developed patterns of human life formed above the mere levels of subsistence, 
frontiers became “meeting places not merely of different ways of physical survival, but 
also of different concepts of the good life and hence increasingly political in character.”
There are three crucial differences between frontiers and boundaries, a key conceptual 
need for the present application of frontiers in International Relations. Firstly, a frontier 
is outer-oriented and “directed towards the outlying areas which are both a source of 
danger and a coveted prize... and develop their own interests quite different” from the 
hinterland, often representing “runaway elements and interests.”11 A boundary on the 
other hand is inner-oriented, created by a hinterland or state, and has no life of its own. 
While frontiers have ‘frontiersmen’ who are “teeming, spontaneous, and unmediated in 
their daily activities”, boundaries are “mediated... generalised into international law...
1 'y
removed from the changing desires of the inhabitants of borderlands.” This 
specification is why frontiers have been seen to have their own ‘spirit’, which is 
believed to create a unique process of character building conducive to life on a frontier. 
On the American frontier, as on other frontiers such as the Australian ‘outback’ or those 
of the British Empire, this could be seen in the emphasis placed on rugged 
individualism and the related belief in proactive action. Furthermore, frontiers are 
distinct from boundaries in that they are “characteristic of rudimentary socio-political 
relations and/or absence of laws” while the presence of boundaries “is a sign that the 
political community has reached a degree of maturity and orderliness, the stage of law 
abidance.”13
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Secondly, frontiers are manifestations of centrifugal forces while boundaries are those 
of centripetal forces. Frontiers do have a strategic utility in keeping out enemies which 
is dependant on the support provided by the hinterland. Yet, it is because of this need to 
use frontiers as strategic tools, to maximise all the available resources of any given 
state, that hinterlands must seek to “control and bound” frontiers and an “effort is made 
to draw a line of effective control over both ingress and egress; not only the enemy has 
to be kept out but one’s own citizens have to be kept in.”14 Hence, because of these 
opposing forces, it is natural for any state over time to seek to exchange frontiers for 
boundaries, which provide them with more security in the longer-term. This can be 
seen in what Edward Luttwak defined as the two phases of the Roman Empire as it 
related to its frontier policy.15 The first being a “hegemonic empire” and the second as 
a “territorial empire” with the former as “indirect (hegemonic) rule through clients” and 
the latter as “more overtly defensive... frontiers were delineated... and incorporated 
into the provincial structure of the empire.”16 As the Empire matured, it naturally 
sought to consolidate its security, with the primary need being to formally absorb its 
frontiers, to incorporate them effectively under its own direct control.
Thirdly, frontiers should be understood as integrating factors while boundaries are a 
separating one. A frontier is a zone of transition between different spheres of ways of 
life “neither fully assimilated to nor satisfied with each other, [and as such] provides an
1 7excellent opportunity for mutual interpenetration and sway.” Frontiers see a blending 
of the socio-political approaches of the different spheres of life. It is because of this 
“watering down of loyalties and blurring of differences” that states in turn “attempt to 
forestall by substituting the semi-autonomous frontiers with a controlled and exact 
borderline.”18 W.G. East argued that there are both ‘frontiers of contact’ and ‘frontiers 
of separation’.19 For instance, historically there have indeed been frontiers intended to 
separate opposing powers, notably through the creation or maintenance of buffer states 
like Siam, Afghanistan or Abyssinia. However, almost universally, “frontiers normally
7 ndiminish in width... and frontiers of separation are replaced by frontiers of contact.” 
Even physical walls, such as Hadrian’s Wall or the Great Wall of China, are but stages 
in wider frontier zones, not the literal end to contact between those peoples and societies 
on either side. To continue with Luttwak’s Roman analysis, even with the formation of
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a territorial empire, “Rome did not bring down the shutters” on the barbarian worlds,
• 91but continued to interact with them through diplomacy and at times warfare.
Furthermore, frontiers have psychological and cultural connotations and hence have 
frequently fulfilled symbolic functions; “Primitive man lives in a world which has a
• 99spatial unknown, a dread frontier populated by the heated imagination.” Yet well into 
modem times, frontiers have still been viewed as a “mythical place of uncertainty and
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fear.” As frontiers have largely been considered as ‘wild lands’ on the outer edges of 
any respective polity, they have represented a dark and dangerous unknown filled with 
the ‘other’. This was essential to early understandings of the term for explaining 
expansion into frontiers as spreading ‘civilisation’. The notion that they are inhabited 
by peoples of a fundamentally different societal persuasion has left frontiers with a 
strong cultural connotation of fear and danger, which in turn has left a deep 
psychological imprint on the hinterland.
Simply put, we’re afraid of frontiers because they are an unknown quantity; they are 
unpredictable. While sovereignty assumes domestic concerns, such as freedom from 
violence, are dealt with by a respective state, historically frontiers are in front of a state 
and populated by fairly autonomous ‘frontiersmen’ who largely exist with their own 
rules. ‘We’ just don’t know what will happen there because that is where we find the 
‘other’. For instance, frontiers often existed in mountainous regions for the simple 
reason that the terrain is conducive to their relatively autonomous development. As 
Christopher Coker noted, “What distinguishes regions such as Afghanistan, Chechnya, 
Kashmir, and Colombia is that they are mountainous and they breed martial people who 
are good at war.”24
2.2; Robinson and Gallagher’s ‘frontiers of insecurity’
Great Britain was on the brink o f a collision with France over the frontier 
incident at Fashoda; she advanced to Khartoum not to avenge Gordon, but 
to defend an imperilled and to recover a lost frontier.
- Lord Curzon25
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Having reviewed frontiers, a further intellectual construct necessary for introduction is 
that of ‘frontiers of insecurity’. This construct is of significant value, with adaptation 
into a rigorously defined term, to an improved understanding of current debates in 
International Relations, namely interventionism in the peripheral crises of the states 
system. The groundbreaking historians of the British Empire, Ronald Robinson and 
John Gallagher, used the term ‘new frontiers of insecurity’ as a chapter title in their 
seminal work Africa and the Victorians, which examined British colonial expansion
tVi 7 Ainto sub-Saharan Africa in the late-19 Century. They did not provide a specific 
definition for their term. Instead, their running theme was to describe the re-assessment 
of the Empire’s strategic posture starting in the crucial years of 1889-1890. During this 
time, the Empire’s leaders viewed the need to expand British rule into the anarchic Nile 
Basin frontier as absolutely essential to the Empire’s overall security.
Before the financial melt-down of the Khedive in the late-1870s, Britain had been 
strictly willing to manage her interests in Egypt through informal collaboration with the 
Khedive. However, more rigid control was increasingly necessitated since it was the 
only way of “keeping the lid on the unsolved internal crisis” of Egyptian governance 
and through the 1880s Egyptian governments progressively became ever weaker for a 
variety of reasons- such as the loss of Sudan in 1885 to the Mahdi, crippling financial
77debt, and rising nationalist sentiments against the Khedive’s rule. Given this, by 1889 
it was impossible to maintain Britain’s preferred method of securing its interests as 
there was “no way back to an independent order and the old supremacy by influence.”28
Evelyn Baring, the British agent in Cairo, warned the British Prime Minister in 1889 
that because the indigenous ruling elite had become so discredited, without stronger 
British intervention the Egyptian ruler’s reign would surely end in “‘a revolution
70[within] six months’.” The evolution in Britain’s geopolitical considerations laid new 
found significance upon Egypt because of her control of the Suez Canal and as such 
elevated Britain’s interest in her governance. And indeed, it was this internal crisis in 
Egypt which mandated the stronger presence of the British Empire there. As a British 
diplomat explained regarding the weakness of Egypt’s internal politics: “This anarchy 
provides such disorder and weakness on the Egyptian frontier that you are almost bound
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to interfere’.” By 1890, Britain had indeed made Egypt into one of its ‘veiled 
protectorates’.
This re-assessment by the British in the late-1880s of both the centrality of Egypt to 
their global security needs and their concern over Egypt’s internal stability was vital for 
understanding why there was an expansion of the Empire’s control over even more 
territories, namely present-day Sudan and Uganda, which had previously been largely 
ignored. These ‘frontiers of insecurity’ for the Empire were ‘new’ in that they had 
shifted from the long held, more conventional belief that the key to protecting India, and 
hence the Empire as a whole, lay in its immediate frontiers to the northwest facing 
Imperial Russia. This older viewpoint was in stark contrast to the new interests in the 
apparently marginal and strategically useless lands of sub-Saharan Africa, specifically 
the Nile Basin areas of present-day Sudan and Uganda. As Robinson and Gallagher 
explained, “the defensive psychology which kept watch over northern India had been 
transplanted into Africa [and] the frontiers of fear were on the move.”31 This shifting of 
strategic interests deep into Africa was quite novel and represented a significant break 
with previous imperial policy. Indeed, as Robinson and Gallagher rather wryly 
observed regarding the then Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury: “he became the first 
Victorian statesman to discover a vital interest in the middle of tropical Africa.”
Robinson and Gallagher were quite revolutionary in their explanation for the expansion 
of the British Empire into sub-Saharan Africa because they ascribed so much 
importance to the internal crises in the politics of regions in the periphery rather than 
just internal metropolitan motivations. Fundamentally, they argued that the crux of
thimperial expansion into Africa in the late 19 Century was that “from start to finish the
• • • • •  '3 1partition of tropical Africa was driven by the persistent crisis in Egypt.” Simply put, 
as long as Egypt was suffering internal crisis, Britain could not withdraw her control 
there because to do so would be “risking a return to anarchy which might draw another 
Power across the route to India.”34 This fear was especially prone as the French and 
Russians deepened their alliance in world affairs towards the end of the century.
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As Robinson and Gallagher would argue more broadly throughout their careers, the 
imperialist expansion into sub-Saharan Africa was fundamentally not brought about 
primarily by metropolitan motives for direct, formal control over foreign lands. What 
Egypt served to illustrate regarding metropolitan motives was that the “transition was 
not normally activated by these interests as such, but by the breakdown of collaborative 
mechanisms in extra-European politics which hitherto had provided them with adequate
-if
opportunity and protection.” The British leadership had contemplated evacuating 
Egypt in 1889 and 1890, but this was eventually discarded as an option because not only 
was the country of such strategic value, but that “the politics of the country offered no 
basis for collaboration after withdrawal.” To withdraw would have left Egypt open to 
either or both complete anarchy or an intervention by another Great Power, most likely 
the French.
Subsequently, faced with the prospect of attempting to collaborate with Egyptian elites 
plagued, in the words of Baring, with an “‘utter incapacity’” at governing, there was no 
other choice but for deepened British imperial control. Furthermore, although the 
Sudan had been ruled by Egypt up until its conquest by the Mahdi, the prospects for a 
rejuvenated Egypt returning to manage Sudan to resolve the issue of the Mahdi and his 
successors, were nigh impossible. Given that there were no suitable collaborators in 
either Egypt or Sudan itself, a strategic conclusion was reached by London in 1890: “In 
the end, occupation alone could make certain of the Upper Nile. The Prime Minister
'yn
agreed that sooner or later the Sudan would have to be reconquered.” Sudan was 
indeed subjugated by the British to formal imperial control by 1899.
As Robinson and Gallagher provided no explicit definition of their term ‘frontiers of 
insecurity’, it is important to review what they meant given the preceding section’s 
definition of a frontier. Firstly, the common understanding of frontiers during the 
British Empire was still very much as ‘wild lands’, anarchically occupied by tribes or 
weak kingdoms at the margins of a given state’s control or even more broadly of an 
empire’s. This usage of the term accords with the definition of frontiers as a ‘politico- 
geographical area lying beyond the integrated region of the political unit’, i.e. the state 
or the empire itself. Conversely, this makes their application of the term very different 
from the common usage of the term today as just being a ‘boundary’ between states.
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They meant an actual geographic area, not just a thin border marking. As the term was 
used primarily to describe the areas of the Nile Basin south of Egypt in the 1880s and 
1890s, they obviously did not use it to define the delineating lines between states as 
there were no formal borders then between whatever states might be considered to have 
existed in the area. What did exist were large tracks of land, occupied by indigenous 
tribes or by the Mahdi’s successors and the Abyssinians, which had been largely 
ignored by the Great Powers in their expansion of global empires prior to the 1880s.
Secondly, Robinson and Gallagher can also be seen to have had an interest in frontiers 
as ‘zones of contact’. In this sense, it can be understood as contact between polities, 
namely where the imperialists of Britain were forced to interact with indigenous politics 
and the other Great Powers in the Nile Basin frontier. To begin with, the contact with 
other Great Powers was fairly significant in the Nile Basin. While Europe itself had by 
1890 been enjoying several decades of peace, brought about by the Concert of Europe 
and its balance of power, the scramble for Africa once again allowed the Great Powers 
to confront one another in a more direct, physical manner. This was namely on the 
ground rather than primarily just through written treaties or other diplomatic 
manoeuvrings. The Fashoda debacle best epitomized this whereby the race for an 
obscure town in the Upper Nile and the literal contact there between Great Powers, 
namely between the respective French and British expeditions of Marchand and 
Kitchener, was potentially disastrous for peace and stability in Europe proper.
Furthermore, in addition it can be seen that the contact between the British in the Nile 
Basin frontier was also with actors other than fellow Great Powers. While British 
interests in the frontiers of the Nile Basin primarily stemmed from their fear of 
encroachment by other Great Powers, they also had significant contact with indigenous 
political actors as well. Obviously, the killing of General Gordon by the Mahdi left a 
very strong impression on the British as did their eventual defeat of his successor in 
1898. This interaction with Islamic fundamentalism is notable because it is strikingly 
reminiscent of many of today’s concerns about the rise of political Islam in the Sudan 
and elsewhere. On the humanitarian front, the Nile Basin was also an important zone of 
contact for the British public’s disdain for the African slave trade. Indeed, it was this 
dislike that had prompted the devoutly Christian General Gordon to return to the Sudan
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at the service of the Khedive for a second time in order to attempt to stifle the trading of 
slaves from the Upper Nile region by Arab slavers from further north. Overall, contact 
with other Great Powers, and to a lesser extent Islamic fundamentalism and slavery, was 
important interaction for the British in the Nile Basin frontier and insightful for 
understanding their foreign policy approach to the region.
In conclusion, a focus on frontiers of insecurity is central to this thesis’ research because 
of the insight that it provides regarding the shift in strategic thinking by a state, in this 
case the British Empire, towards frontier zones on the periphery. Areas that had once 
been considered marginal at best to the security of the state were rapidly changed into 
central pillars of the state’s strategic policy. As Robinson and Gallagher concluded,
“these once remote and petty interests in Sudan, Uganda and the hinterlands of Zanzibar
• 10 were changing into safeguards of Britain’s world power.” And, once these frontier
zones were elevated in their strategic importance because of the new found significance
of Egypt, a deeper imperial control by Britain of the Nile Basin was dictated because of
the lack of suitable indigenous collaborators there in order to preclude the other Great
Powers from occupying the lands in her stead.
2.3; Current frontiers of insecurity
America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing 
ones.
- The White House, ‘National Security Strategy, 2002’39
For the purposes of this thesis- to research why and how interventionism occurs in weak 
and failed states by Western states and whether or not this interventionism is successful 
at managing insecurity- it is now necessary to allocate some thought to adapting and 
refining the term ‘frontiers of insecurity’ as a dedicated intellectual construct in 
International Relations. This is necessary so as to provide the contextualisation required, 
for understanding present interventionism and hence the term must be made more 
literal, giving much greater emphasis to both the actual geographic area and the contact 
there as constituting an actual frontier. This section will refine and expand Robinson 
and Gallagher’s general introduction of the term by comparing the two dimensions of 
frontiers- as zones of contact and as politico-geographical areas- with two of the most
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driving trends in International Relations presently, globalisation and weak and failed 
states.
Defining the ‘why’ offrontiers o f insecurity- the contact o f globalisation
The post-Cold War environment is one o f  increasingly open borders in 
which the internal and external aspects o f security are indissolubly linked.
- The European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’40
Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing.
In a globalized world, events beyond America's borders have a greater 
impact inside them.
- The White House, ‘National Security Strategy, 2002’41
One of the key dynamics of the 21st Century is globalisation, what is generally 
understood to be the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections which transcend the 
states that compose the modem world. A common entry point for understanding
thglobalisation is the perception of the world as a whole. In the 19 Century, the 
conception of one ‘world’ entered the popular lexicon and was greatly solidified when 
Earth was first viewed as a single entity from space in the early-1960s. That image has 
had profound connotations for how humanity views itself, namely that of the ‘ global’- 
one holistic ‘home’ for humanity. The global can be understood as “the sum of multiple 
local activities with worldwide range, consequences and significance” which means 
globalisation “involves the interpenetration of local activities with world-wide range, 
consequence and significance.”42 Hence, of primary importance for globalisation then 
is that it ties “local life to global structures, processes and events.”43
The term globalisation has most commonly been used to define the advent of a truly 
global economy. The consideration of globalisation cannot be limited, however, to 
merely the increase in economic interaction and interdependence. There are other deep 
linkages and interconnections that are increasingly drawing people and societies ever 
closer together. Some of these increasing interactions can be considered ‘good’, such as 
greater cultural exchange through international educational experiences, while there are 
also decidedly negative consequences due to the increasing linkages and 
interconnections of globalisation, such as narcotics and human trafficking.
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Globalisation brings many fairly new conceptions of security threats other than the most 
prevalent one of the 20th Century, that of war between states. While interstate wars are 
still a threat, albeit less so of one, the UN identifies six clusters of current threats: 
economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental 
degradation; inter-state conflict; internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and 
other large-scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; 
terrorism; and international organised crime.44 In this way, understandings of what 
constitutes a ‘security’ issue have broadened such that it is no longer tied merely to the 
sovereign issues of states and can now include those issues which make individual 
citizens feel insecure.45
Central to globalisation is the role of technology and its increasing ability to allow 
people and organisations to interact with one another quicker and easier. Technology is 
also the key to much of today’s insecurity. While in the 18 Century there was 
technology of global reach, such as steamships, the speed of interconnection was not the 
same as it is today. What is new to this era of globalisation is the intensity and 
amplification possible through the technological capabilities of the computer age. 
Subsequently, the primary implication that globalisation has for present security 
considerations is its power of immediacy. This immediacy is unique because it allows 
individuals and sub-state actors to interface with the broader world much more freely. 
As Michel Foucault once famously concluded, “We are in the epoch of simultaneity; we 
are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of 
the dispersed.”46
Considering the increase in immediacy, the luxury of safety once enjoyed through 
physical distance is no more. In the past, individuals in one part of the world were 
largely free of concern that events elsewhere would directly impact upon them 
personally. Peoples in diverse parts of the world, which previously may have been 
entirely unaffected by what happened elsewhere, now find themselves drawn into what 
is essentially the same social space. Simply put, globalisation now forces contact 
because ‘we’ are all part of the same space, a planet called Earth that is inhabited by one 
group of people for all intents and purposes. While in the past it was possible to
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separate the ‘global’ from the ‘local’, this is increasingly impossible as ‘local events’ 
have worldwide ramifications.
Christopher Coker has provided some of the more insightful thinking into globalisation 
and insecurity and he notes seven globalisation related challenges that have forced states 
to redefine their security interests- weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, the 
environment, inequality, migration, organised crime and HIV-AIDS.47 Because of the 
speed and types of interaction and interconnectivity now experienced between multiple 
sources of insecurity, there is no single country that can defend itself independently 
from others since a “globalised age requires global responses.” The key consideration 
of these challenges is that they require coordinated responses since the problems 
emanating from one state cannot simply be cordoned off from the rest of them.
Furthermore, there has also been a refocusing in the present age of globalisation to 
cover more than just ‘state security’ and there is now a strong emphasis on the notion of 
‘human security’, the idea that individual humans should be part of security 
considerations in the 21st Century. This emphasis on individuals has led to a strategic 
focus on ‘preventive defence’ that requires states to take early action to prevent threats 
from growing to catastrophic size, such as nuclear proliferation, because this is more 
effective for protecting individuals.49
However, it is hard for states to attempt to manage the risks associated with 
globalisation if they themselves are finding their powers eroded by globalisation. James 
Rosenau argued that the distinguishing feature of globalisation is that its “globalising 
processes... are not hindered or prevented by territorial or jurisdictional barriers.”50 
This bypassing of states is a significant feature in rationalising globalisation’s security 
implications because it fundamentally raises doubts about the ability of states to 
maintain blanket security for their citizens.
Many academics have been quick to point out that because of globalisation, 
empowerment is shifting from governments to individuals. Michael Barnett noted that 
in the present age, insecurity can be caused primarily by individuals largely through
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their ability to move freely and to access destructive technology. Simply put, in the 
present era of globalisation, “states don’t kill people, people kill people.”51 The ability 
of states to protect their individual citizens from the violence of other individuals is a 
very challenging task, something that is quite novel to modem history. States have 
relatively long experience countering the aggression of what they understand, other 
states, through tools such as diplomacy or military strength, but they have a much 
harder time devising strategies to prevent violence by individuals against other 
individuals across state boundaries.
Despite all of the arguments of globalisation ‘shrinking’ the world and bringing 
humanity ever closer together, this needs to be qualified by the other significant trend of 
‘localisation’. People are naturally rather fearful of radical change, especially if they 
feel powerless to control it. Globalisation, and the contact that it forces, is certainly a 
radical change agent and one that people around the world have been very keen to resist 
in defence of what they do know and understand, their own local culture and socio­
economic systems. Rosenau has iterated that localisation can be understood as the 
“pressures that lead people, groups, and societies... to narrow their horizons and
c'y
withdraw to less encompassing processes, organizations or systems.” The keywords 
for understanding globalisation are ‘coherence’, ‘integration’, centralisation’ while 
localisation has connotations of ‘decentralisation’, ‘fragmentation’ and 
‘disintegration’. While globalisation is forcing people to identify themselves beyond 
just the locale where they live, localisation is on the other hand “being driven by 
pressures to narrow and withdraw... and intensifying the deep attachments to land that 
can dominate emotion and reasoning.”54
Localisation dynamics give an emphasis for people to become more introverted and 
isolated and this is especially the case when there is no government, or a very weak one, 
able to balance these localisation dynamics by facilitating the more positive aspects of 
globalisation, such as formal, regulated trade. Simply put, when the state fades people 
return to local strategies for survival. This is primarily because as there is no 
government, or one that has little to offer in tangible benefits, people must look to their 
local environment for more of their general sustenance. If a national government does 
not exist or cannot provide any real tangible benefits, then certainly the international
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community is much harder to access in positive ways other than through limited 
interactions, such as humanitarian aid.
The dynamic of localisation, the opposing reaction to globalisation, is ironically driven 
by the dynamics of globalisation itself. Indeed, it is these “continual tensions and 
interactions between the forces propelling the fragmentation of communities and those 
conducing their integration” that are a defining feature of the present age.55 Not 
everybody is enjoying the benefits of globalisation, especially economic, and presently 
the greatest cultural gap in the world is between those who are fully integrated, and 
largely willingly so, into globalising processes versus those who feel cut-off from them, 
coerced into them, or indeed just resentful of globalisation in general.
The inherent tensions between globalising dynamics provoking localising ones have the 
potential to see that “enormous social and political power is unleashed.”56 This can be 
seen presently around the world at anti-globalisation protests, the resentment of 
‘Americanisation’ in many parts of the world, and the wide-ranging efforts of people 
and communities to defend their local culture and traditions, be they French farmers, 
indigenous rebels in Mexico, or factory workers in Indonesia. In conclusion, as Coker 
noted: “To the globalised the other seems marginal; to the marginal, the globalised seem 
uncaring and exploitative. This difference is likely to be a growing source of conflict in 
the near future.”57
Having now provided a brief review of globalisation, it is possible to explain how the 
definition of frontiers can be used to develop a specific definition for frontiers of 
insecurity in relation to globalisation. Globalisation is central to the definition because 
it is very much the ‘contact’ in the two-pronged definition of a frontier, namely a 
frontier being both a ‘zone of contact’ as well as a ‘politico-geographical area’.
John Lewis Gaddis argued that one of the primary attractions historically for would-be 
immigrants to the US has been the hope that it could “insulate domestic life from a
f  Q
violent external world.” The protection of distance is no longer taken for granted in 
the post-9/11 world. Because of the nature of present globalisation, it is no longer
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possible for anybody to separate themselves fully from anybody else. We all truly live 
on one planet now. The types of insecurity presently faced- be they terrorism, WMD, or 
epidemics- cannot be separated and blocked by the borders of the world. The 
Australian military thus noted that “asymmetric threats... have reduced the value of 
defences built around geographic advantage” 59, such as distance, while the US military 
added, “geographic insularity no longer confers security for the country.”60 There are 
some who attempt to isolate themselves from the contact with others brought about 
through globalisation, hence the dynamic of localisation. However, as mentioned, the 
dynamics of globalisation versus that of localisation are such that the driving one is 
globalisation, which is fundamentally about integration rather than the separation of 
localisation.
Frontiers may simultaneously be a conduit for contact among different kinds of objects 
and activities as well as barriers to contact for other objects and activities. As Rosenau 
highlighted, there are six basic types of interaction: goods and services, people, ideas 
and information, money, normative orientations, and behavioural patterns and practices. 
The technology of the present era, through globalisation, has greatly expanded the 
possibilities for all these types of interaction. Many of the positive interactions can at 
times be supplanted by negative ones. On the one hand, the beneficial movements of 
goods and services, labour and capital through free trade have been stifled by the twin 
problems of “civil wars and lawless corrupt governments.”61 On the other hand, the 
states of the world have largely been unable to stem the more negative types of 
interaction.
Of significance is the movement of people. A world facing ‘super-empowered 
individuals’, those able to cause great damage relative to their own numerical 
insignificance, means the possibilities for danger are greatly increased. In the past, the 
primary threat for mass violence was from states, yet individuals or small groups are 
now able to do “the sort of damage which before only state armies or major 
revolutionary movements could achieve.” As Gaddis pointedly noted regarding 9/11: 
“by expending 19 lives and a few hundred thousand dollars, the attackers managed to 
kill some 3,000 people, to inflict as much as a hundred billion dollars’ worth of property 
damage, and to redefine the nature of our times.”64
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Furthermore, even while one type of interaction may be limited, given the interrelated 
nature of present insecurity, it is possible for one type of interaction to allow for more 
negative types of results to occur. For instance, the relatively free movement of legal 
immigrant labour may also allow for a rise in narcotics or human trafficking. Moreover, 
the EU has argued of the interrelated threats it faces by pointing out that 90 percent of 
heroin comes to Europe from Afghanistan through Balkan criminal gangs, the same 
ones responsible for the annual trafficking of 200,000 women for the European sex 
trade.65
While the conditions of weak and failed states hinder their economic interaction in 
terms of formal, regulated trading with the core, it does not stymie it outright. For 
instance, Somalia as a state has not really ‘existed’ since the early 1990s. In the time 
since it has not ceased to interact with the world overall, but it has so in many formal 
ways such as regulated international trade. However, what is crucial to highlight is that 
while frontiers might be ‘moving away’ from the hinterland in the sense of them having 
less ‘normal’ interaction (what could mostly be considered the ‘good globalisation’, viz. 
increasing formal economic linkages and interdependence or increased government 
participation in multilateralism), they are still interacting with the rest of the world 
through the other aspects of globalisation.
Research by the World Bank, amongst others, has persuasively shown how increased 
economic opportunities provided through globalisation allow actors in weak and failed 
states to exploit opportunities allowed for through economic globalisation.66 So while 
for weak and failed states as sovereign entities there is increasing isolation as members 
of the international system, there is not necessarily a decrease in other types of 
interactions. For instance, while the DR Congo was imploding into prolonged civil war, 
it was increasingly incapable of functioning as an actual state in the international states 
system while still being a member of it. Yet, at the same time people there were still 
exporting large quantities of goods- gold, timber, diamonds and selenium- into the 
global economy, mostly through the international black market. By way of another 
example, the Leftist rebels of Colombia, FARC, have been able to accrue 500 million 
dollars per year through the cocaine trade to continue to wage war against the Bogota 
government.67
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Importantly, in the context of present globalisation, conditions are conducive for the 
dynamics of civil conflict to be encouraged by actors benefiting from them over the 
long-term. Increased access to international markets provided through globalisation has 
augmented the ability of local elites to profit economically from perpetuated violence 
and conflict.68 Government officials, petty traders, international criminal networks, and 
warlords are all examples of actors who can benefit from the perpetuation of conflict 
which opens up immediate, very rationally sought opportunities for profit-making 
through resource exploitation and trading. In the context of weak and failed states, 
defined as they are by exceptionally inept governments, and notably when immediate 
profits can be accrued through the perpetuation of violence, controlling state 
apparatuses are not instrumentally necessary in themselves. As David Keen argued of 
rebels in African civil wars, the incentive to take control of government is not 
significant where “the state is unable either to monopolize violence or to tax economic 
activity.”69
Lastly, frontiers also have strong psychological and cultural connotations, notably as 
‘wild lands’ and have represented a dark and dangerous unknown filled with the ‘other’. 
The academic Thomas Diez has remarked that for much of recent history, the most 
common processes of ‘othering’ have been primarily geographic in nature whereby 
people living in states “establish an inside and an outside, represent the outside as a 
danger to the presupposed identity of the inside and thereby construct and reproduce
7fi ♦ •that very identity.” This was especially the case for Europe, which is now, however, 
seeing the move from a primarily geographic othering to one based on the “construction 
of ‘Europe’ through practices of othering in which identity, politics, and geography are 
intimately linked with each other, and which can therefore be called ‘geopolitical’ 
otherings.”71
This broader geopolitical othering has seen an emphasis given to a potential existential 
threat, which should be outside of one’s own space and can then be defended against. 
Europe has given its priority in this regards to defining illegal immigration and rising 
Islamic terrorism as the most significant threats it faces from others. In this way, the 
9/11 and 2004 Madrid terrorists attacks have “intensified the making of a ‘European’
79territory that needs to be secured.” Considering this fear of terrorism as well as of
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illegal immigration, Europe has developed a ‘Fortress Europe’ mentality whereby she 
has tried “to construct the widest territorial entity which can be effectively integrated 
into an area of political stability and economic prosperity in a dangerous world.” The 
boundaries of Europe have hence been expanded and strengthened to prevent the 
incursion of others from the ‘outside’ who are deemed to be a risk to the ‘inside’ 
security of Europe. Overall, Europe, by way of example for the West more generally, 
has braced itself against turbulent frontiers over the horizon in an age defined by the 
contact of globalisation.
The ‘what’ offrontiers o f insecurity- the realities o f weak andfailed states
State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global
governance and adds to regional instability.
- The European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’74
With the conclusion of the Cold War, there were widespread expectations of a 
significant peace dividend and the world has in fact grown less violent in the years since 
the end of the superpower conflict. The numbers, in absolute terms, for wars and their 
resultant casualties are both at lower levels than what they were during their high point 
in the 1970s and ‘80s. However, even while claims of a ‘new world disorder’ are 
exaggerated, what has been the case is the very significant presence of what this thesis 
terms ‘frontier states’, those weak and failed states that are effectively the international 
system’s peripheral areas of anarchy and hence exist as its ‘frontiers of insecurity’. It 
should be noted that ‘anarchy’ in this usage does not mean that of sovereign states 
existing in a system of ‘anarchy’ whereby there is no world government. Rather, it 
refers to domestic anarchy- political disorder and violence- within certain politico- 
geographic areas, viz. the frontier states themselves.
Frontier states are those that have struggled or completely failed to maintain their ability 
to exert internal sovereignty. Generally, these states can be understood as those where a 
government cannot effectively control its territory or maintain a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force. Furthermore, other key attributes are a breakdown of law, order 
and basic services, often accompanied by communal conflict, violent ethnic
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nationalism, militarism and even endemic regional conflict. The culmination of these
attributes ultimately leads to a state failing when it’s sovereign government:
no longer performs the functions normally attributed to it... the central 
authority through which laws are made and enforced is inoperative: laws are 
not made, order is not preserved and societal cohesion is not enhanced...
77government has lost its minimal capacity.
Examples of frontier states include those that have had governments, but in general have 
been exceptionally chaotic, such as Haiti and Liberia, and those that have even been 
without any government for significant periods of time, such as Somalia.
Alex Maroya argued that many present states which previously constituted the frontier 
zones of the European colonial empires continue to exhibit many of the same 
governance characteristics. In the past, colonial powers on their frontier zones kept the
70
“colonial state... [as] a bare mechanism of control” which means that today 
“institutions in former frontier areas are typically more hybridised, less stable and (in 
conventional terms) more underdeveloped than in either Western states or areas where 
the duration and intensity of the colonial experience was greater.”79 Conventional 
notions of states as being a ‘contrarian model’ where individuals in their equality have a 
social contract through government simply do not exist there. The post-colonial state, 
because of an “absence of substantial institutional capacity,” simply became a divided, 
conflicted entity where “various pluralities negotiated their relationship with each other
OA
and with the outside world.”
Having noted these considerations of Maroya, this thesis will thus argue that the actual 
frontier zones proper, i.e. frontier states, can be defined as geopolitical areas at the edge 
of the effectively controlled sovereign spaces of the present international states system: 
a zone of transition of low administrative intensity outside the centres of the
01
international states system. The following ‘frontier elements’ define frontier states :
• Present or recent armed conflict;
• a lack of effective territorial control or intensive administration;
• highly militarised institutions with a low level of responsible government;
• limited economic and social development (as conventionally understood);
• fundamental internal disagreement over the nature of the state.
In order to be considered frontier states they must cross a threshold whereby they share 
to a significant degree the above characteristics. It is not the contention of this thesis
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that there are a great many states that could be considered to have crossed the threshold 
to become actual frontier states. This thesis really only intends the term to be adequate 
for describing the most direly anarchic areas in the world, perhaps twenty states in total. 
In this way, they range presently, or recently, from such states as Haiti, the Balkans, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DR Congo, Cambodia, Burundi, Somalia, Afghanistan, to 
East Timor and the Solomon Islands.
It is worth considering in more detail the construction of frontier states in order to 
understand what it is that makes them distinctive from the rest of the international states 
system. One of the starting points for this consideration is to review the notion of 
‘quasi-states’, a term developed by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson and later by Robert 
H. Jackson. The main theme of this term is that all post-colonial states have ‘juridical’ 
sovereignty, recognition by other states as being independent states, but lack the 
‘empirical’ sovereignty of statehood, fundamentally a government with the “political 
will, institutional authority and organized power to protect human rights and provide
• • SOsocio-economic welfare” to its citizenry.
The general argument is not that ‘quasi-states’ equal weak and failed states. Rather, the 
prevalent conditions that allowed for the maintenance of many post-colonial states in 
the present international system- notably self-determination, the assumed equality of 
sovereign states, and the norm of non-intervention- leave the possibility open that some 
of these ‘quasi-states’ might fragment and weaken even further because there is still 
largely nothing to prevent them from doing so. Namely this is because, regardless of 
their empirical condition, they are recognised as sovereign states. What this thesis is 
interested in is those areas in the periphery of the international states system that have 
digressed the most in their claims to exhibit even a minimal standard of empirical 
sovereignty. Fundamentally, it is interested in those areas in the periphery that are 
anarchic because they exhibit to a significant degree the ‘absence of government’, 
‘political disorder and violence’ and general ‘disorder and confusion’.
It is crucial to further emphasise that when considering frontier states as a physical, 
geographic reality, i.e. the weak and failed state itself, that it is necessary to understand
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frontiers as being one part of a whole in the sense of them being inherently part of the 
international states system. Frontier states do not exist in a separate system to that of
the international system of sovereign states, but rather they are still an “integral part of
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the world system of governance.” This is in contrast to understanding there being a 
frontier between the international states system and a separate system, because one 
simply does not exist. They are not an ambiguous region between states or between 
states and something else.
However, this thesis will still emphasise frontiers more broadly as the ‘politico- 
geographical area lying beyond the integrated region of the political unit’. In this way 
the definition is dialectic in that frontiers in the present are part of a whole, i.e. the 
international states system, and yet the actual physical and geographic frontiers are also 
essentially detached in important ways, notably their lack of effective governance, from 
the stable, orderly part of that system, i.e. peaceful and at least relatively functional 
states that are effectively the international system’s hinterland.
Presently, the large majority of states are relatively stable, or even increasingly 
prosperous, and these can be considered as the ‘core’ of the international system. These 
states of the core are able to function largely as sovereign equals in terms of both the 
conduct of their internal, domestic administration as well as recognising one another as 
sovereign equals in the realm of international politics. They are also increasingly tied 
together, especially formally, through the linkages and interactions brought about 
through economic globalisation. The foundations of the core are America, Europe and 
Japan but also increasingly other parts of Asia, Australasia, and Latin America. 
Importantly, the vast majority of states in the developing world do not exhibit the 
conditions of being frontier states and should be considered part of the core as they have 
largely functioning governments.
Furthering an emphasis on the structure of frontier states, it is also important to note 
identity creation there, especially in relation to localisation as defined previously. 
Within frontier states, because of the erosion of state structures there, alternative sources 
of identity have developed. As Rosenau highlighted:
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... with globalising and localising dynamics having undermined the national 
level as a source of psychic comfort and with transnational entities seeming 
too distant to provide the psychic benefits of affiliation, the virtues of the 
satisfactions to be gained through more close-at-hand affiliations are likely 
to be increasingly salient... 84
In this way, identity creation returns more to the local level, notably against any
previous post-colonial sentiments of nationalism arising at the state level. This
emphasis on local identities is often confusing, or even outright perturbing to outsiders,
who can see it as ‘backward’ or even ‘barbarian’ compared to more universal identities,
such as states-based nationalism. An example of this could be the condescension with
which peacekeepers consider many of the armed bands who infest frontiers states. For
instance, the major militia in the Congo- Brazzaville during its last civil war was known
as the Ninjas. This can seem rather infantile or even severely detached from the
‘reality’ of war to outsiders, but it serves as a strong identifying point for the men who
serve in the militia and the local community that supports it.
When much of the state structure has disappeared or been direly corrupted, individuals 
often seek local modalities to protect themselves. One way is through local armed 
groups and the breakdown of government structures able to control local violence in 
frontier states has seen the manic growth in the number of non-state actors engaged in 
violence for various rationales. Coker has termed this the development of “neo-feudal 
security regimes” whereby individuals look to membership in “gangs, clans, or 
allegiance to personal warlords or leaders with their respective feudal affiliations and
Of
ties” for protection.
These protective ties that bind are often illogical or incomprehensible to outsiders and 
are one of the prime ways in which these frontier actors can be deemed as ‘runaway 
elements’ who are engaged in their own interests detached from what can be considered 
‘normal’. Life on the frontier, shaped as it is by local identities and local modalities for 
providing security, can indeed be a very alien place for governments and academics, 
amongst others, looking in from the outside. And yet, if viewed at that individual level, 
when confronted by insecurity and weak or non-existent government, it is only natural 
for people look to other modalities for identity creation and personal protection when 
and where the state is so lacking.
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The interface o f globalisation and peripheral areas o f anarchy
... previously such areas, precisely because o f  their chaos, were isolated 
from the rest o f the world. Not so today when a country without much law 
and order can still have an international airport.86
It is the initiating premise of this thesis that ‘anarchic politico-geographical areas’, i.e. 
weak and failed states, interfa ced to the international system through globalisation 
should be conceptualised as ‘frontiers of insecurity’. A weak or failed state in itself 
does not constitute a frontier. If there were no globalisation or it was different in form, 
failed and weak states could be left in isolation. However, because of globalisation, 
those same weak and failed states become frontiers of insecurity because other states, 
including those of the West, are forced to interact with them as 'contact zones'.
The contact of globalisation is what makes such states more than merely weak or failed, 
they become frontiers. This contact cannot be regulated, for instance as the European 
Union does of its expansionism eastwards. No conditionalities for greater contact can 
be set; the contact is through the forced interface with frontiers of insecurity through 
globalisation. As the US government concluded, the realities of globalisation “mean 
great dangers may arise in and emanate from relatively weak states and ungovemed 
areas.”87
The presence of frontier states is one of the most pressing security concerns presently 
faced in world politics. Indeed, the international states system has frayed on its edges as 
a relatively small minority, but still significant number of states in the developing 
world, created through decolonisation and largely maintained through the bi-polar 
politics of the Cold War, have collapsed or deteriorated over the last several decades. 
Globalisation is intimidating enough because of the power of immediacy that it brings 
and the empowerment it offers to individuals and non-state actors through technology. 
However, this is especially so when the state as an institution, the foundation of the 
international system and the primary means of regulating human interaction, is failing in 
locales stretching from Haiti to the Solomon Islands.
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The lack of governmental control in these frontier states means that it is even harder for 
the international community collectively to ‘manage’ globalisation’s negative effects, 
the risks that it creates and compounds for everybody for the indefinite future. In an age 
generating a much more ambiguous array of threats- ranging from WMD proliferation, 
environmental degradation, organised crime to the rise of Islamic terrorism- the inability 
of weak governments to counter globalisation’s insecurities and the related export of 
chaos can have grave consequences for international order. As the Australian Defence 
Ministry concluded, “globalisation can add to the potential fallout from failing states...
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the interconnectedness globalisation brings... widen and intensify their impacts.”
The relatively carefree days of the 1990s when civil wars and the related entrenchment 
of state collapse in areas of ‘remote and petty interest’ could be largely ignored by the 
international community have ended. This was because they were shattered with the 
forced realisation, mostly through the trauma of 9-11, that one’s own security in a 
globalised world founded upon a states system requires stability throughout, not just in 
the West. Fundamentally, there are still frontiers which are zones of contact and they 
morph from just being isolatable areas of anarchy to being everybody’s frontiers of 
insecurity.
Lastly, a consideration of what makes frontiers of insecurity ‘new’ from previous eras 
can serve to highlight how they are key to understanding the current security dynamics 
of the international system. In a similar way to the shift of strategic frontiers for 
Imperial Britain, the ‘new’ frontiers of insecurity in the post-Cold War era have shifted 
in several important ways. The Cold War’s geopolitical friction focused primarily on 
the plains of Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia, and only to a lesser extent on other 
developing states in the then so-called ‘Third World’. However, the post-Cold War era 
has been more focused on frontiers defining the contact zones between orderly states 
and those that are patently not internally, mostly found in Africa and the Greater Middle 
East. Indeed, ‘once remote and petty interests’ in the form of frontier states have 
assumed primary security importance for Western states since the end of the Cold War.
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This shift in emphasis from the dynamics of insecurity largely defined as war between 
states, especially with the fear of nuclear war between superpowers, to one primarily 
centred on the strategic fear of failing states and the rising destructive power of non­
state actors has been dramatic. During the Cold War there were certainly weak and 
failed states and there was also manic globalisation. However, the main difference was 
that the international system’s dynamics were largely structured on a realist’s 
understanding of an anarchic international system requiring classic power balancing and 
conflicts between states.
Given that, state failure was viewed through “the prism of superpower conflict and was
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rarely addressed as a danger in its own right.” Anarchy in the extreme periphery was 
merely to be filled and influenced as part of the accumulation of power within the 
broader struggle between the two superpowers. However, since 1991 the strategic 
rationale of the West has shifted from ‘containing’ the Soviets and communism to 
‘managing insecurity’ as global risks in all their ambiguous forms, be they terrorism, 
nuclear weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, or illicit trades. The lesson 
of the 1990s, and especially after 9/11, was that everybody needs to care about the 
“dangerous exports of failed states.”90
This shift in frontiers has meant that much of the international infrastructure constructed 
during the Cold War by the West has struggled to find updated roles for dealing with 
new security problems, notably the confluence of globalisation’s dynamics of insecurity 
and weak and failed states, i.e. with frontiers of insecurity. This situation is exemplified 
best by NATO, which for many years after 1991 had its continued existence as a 
multilateral military organisation called into question, but now sees a fresh mandate as it 
shifts to meet new needs.
These updated terms of reference include helping to bring peace and security to weak 
and failed states and helping its members increase coordination against the more 
dangerous flows of globalisation, such as illicit trafficking in nuclear materials or 
combating the movements of terrorists. It is notable that in its entire history, the only 
time NATO’s collective defence clause has been activated was after 9/11 when NATO’s
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member states declared solidarity with the USA and sought to help defend both her and 
themselves from further terrorist attack by a non-state actor. This emphasis on new 
threats has continued for NATO, most relevantly and significantly with the 
organisation’s assumption of management for the intervention in Afghanistan.
Compared to frontiers of insecurity during the 1880s and 1890s, there are also 
significant differences with those of the present. In Robinson and Gallagher’s work, 
crises in the periphery provoked a concern by European imperial powers that other 
Great Powers would exploit weaknesses there and assert their own dominance in such 
places. Presently, the threat of war between the Great Powers is not a driving, or even 
particularly plausible, concern. The European Union noted that “large-scale aggression 
against any member state is now improbable”91 while the UK has argued that “there is 
currently no major conventional threat to Europe.” In fact, conventional threats are 
now of such relatively little concern that the US National Security Strategy stressed that 
“the world’s Great Powers [now] find themselves on the same side- united by common 
dangers of terrorist violence and chaos.”
Currently, the fear of Western states is not that other Great Powers will exploit crises in 
the periphery, but rather that the anarchy resultant from peripheral crises will increase 
all of the negative consequences of globalisation, which they are forced to have contact 
with. There is especially a fear that the crises of frontier states will be exploited not by 
other Great Powers, but rather by increasingly powerful non-state actors, such as 
terrorist groups, and violent individuals who cannot be dealt with by Western states in 
the older, conventional manner as for other states. The significant threat posed by non­
state actors “waging war in a global system” is direly compounded by the fact that these 
non-state actors are able to catalyse global agitation within and through frontier states.94
2.4: Conclusion
The DRC...a country o f more than fifty million people with no functioning 
government or national institutions, a vast territory contested by tribal and 
ethnic forces, foreign armies, regional satraps, private militias, warlords, 
brigands, and black marketers. Congo seemed just about as hopeless as 
any place on earth.95
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This thesis has chosen to focus on ‘frontiers’ for a number of reasons. The primary 
reason is that responding to peripheral anarchy in the form of frontiers is a timeless 
problem. While the 21st century may be defined by globalisation and its compression of 
time and space, that does not negate the fact that there are still geographic territories that 
constitute dire security threats because of their anarchy. John Lewis Gaddis wrote that 
cartography, “like cognition itself, is a necessary simplification that allows us to see 
where we are going.”96 A geographic understanding of ‘frontiers’ allows academic 
analysis to conceptualise a reality clearly by using a timeless construct. Rather than 
invent new terminology, this thesis emphasises frontiers to allow for consistency and 
definitional clarity allowing for a better contextualisation of present interventionism.
This chapter has sought to argue that there are frontiers presently. Taken together, the 
why of globalisation, i.e. the actual contact, and the what of peripheral areas of anarchy, 
i.e. the actual politico-geographic areas of weak and failed states, allows for an 
understanding of frontiers of insecurity actually existing. If there were no contact 
through globalisation, there could be no understanding of them as frontiers; they would 
just be peripheral, isolated areas of no consequence. Conversely, if there were no 
physical reality of peripheral areas of anarchy, the actual weak and failed states, there 
could be no consideration of modem frontiers actually existing either. There would be 
no frontiers, just a complete and largely functional international states system with lots 
of contact between its component parts, viz. sovereign states, through globalisation. 
That frontier zones do indeed exist means that they must be dealt with, a subject to be 
discussed in the next chapter.
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C h a p t e r  3 :  M a n a g i n g  F r o n t i e r  S t a t e s  t h r o u g h  
S t a t e  B u i l d i n g  I n t e r v e n t i o n i s m
Many countries in the South West Pacific remain challenged by internal 
conflict [and] the need for stable governance... The ability to manage and 
enforce sovereignty is an abiding concern.
- Government of Australia, ‘Australia’s National Security, 2005,l
The presence of anarchy looming in frontiers is a timeless challenge and leaders have 
needed to respond accordingly to protect those ‘within the realm’ against such troubles. 
Regarding present needs for managing ‘frontiers of insecurity’, this chapter will firstly 
argue that a ‘pericentric pull’ emanating from frontiers explains why such places 
stimulate a response from Western states, namely their intentions to mitigate their 
security concerns relating to them. Secondly, this chapter will explain how Western 
states respond to frontiers of insecurity. It will argue that since the end of the Cold War, 
that response has been in the form of state building interventionism, namely of finding 
and strengthening suitable ‘collaborative partners’ there in the form of national 
governments capable of more effectively managing their sovereign territory.
3.1: Rationales and methods for responding to frontiers
We need both to think globally and to act locally.
- The European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’2
This thesis intends to better understand how and why the West responds to ‘anarchy in 
our midst’, namely interventionism into frontiers of insecurity. This chapter will 
articulate the pericentric school of imperial theory, notably that argued by imperial 
historians explaining Western expansionism in response to peripheral crises. While this 
thesis is not one on empire and imperialism, the review of the dynamics specific to 
those phenomena is important because theories of empire and imperialism look to 
understand how and why some states impose control over other states- namely those 
deemed peripheral and dangerous, i.e. as frontiers- in order to achieve their own 
strategic objectives.
Historical responses to frontiers
...a s  the ambitious schemes o f the humanitarians broke one by one against 
the facts o f  Africa, statesmen became more and more hard-headed.
- Robinson and Gallagher3
Robinson and Gallagher argued throughout their works that imperial expansion was 
primarily the result of peripheral crises rather than in strictly systemic imperatives to 
accrue power or the metropole’s capitalist dispositions. They highlighted that the 
“times and circumstances” of British imperial expansion into parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa were indeed “called forth by crisis” from within those locales.4 It was only when 
the ability of those regions themselves failed to provide “satisfactory conditions” that 
Britain felt compelled that “power [be] used imperialistically to adjust those 
conditions.”5 Crucially, as suitable conditions developed in the periphery, namely the 
presence of local collaborators of sufficient capacity for effective local governance, the 
“frequency of imperialist intervention lessens and imperialist control is correspondingly 
relaxed.”6
Another British historian who has emphasised responses to crises in the periphery is 
David Fieldhouse. He noted that a “general crisis” sparked by numerous problems in
ththe periphery provoked British imperial expansion in the latter quarter of the 19 
Century. As Fieldhouse explained, “for the first time in modem history, these local 
problems were so widespread and the Europeans powers concerned so numerous that 
collectively they constituted a ‘general crisis’ in the relations between Europe and the
n
less-developed world.” The need for expansionism to secure themselves saw 
Europeans implement a “new imperialism” because they were “pulled into imperialism
O
by the magnetic force of the periphery.”
A third important British historian, David McIntyre, focused on what he called the 
“tropical frontiers” of Fiji, the Niger Delta and the Malay States, which had seen 
“ferment and disintegration” in the early 1870s.9 Namely, the British Empire had a 
“frontier problem” since the “internal conditions [of these frontiers] posed serious 
threats to the security of the colonies” bordering them because of both geographical
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proximity and socio-economic interchange.10 Because of this insecurity, these frontiers 
hence required “expansion into new areas” by the Empire in order to secure itself.11 
The tropical frontiers that McIntyre highlighted were not as significant as those that 
others focused on- such as the Northwest Frontier- which highlights that even in 
exceptionally peripheral areas, such as Fiji, the Empire still felt the need to respond to 
peripheral crises for security rationales.
John Galbraith was a further prominent imperial historian to argue that there was a “pull
I <2
exerted by ‘turbulent frontiers’.” Specifically, British expansion was resultant from
11the “‘man on the spot’s’ reaction to the problem of the turbulent frontier.” This was 
primarily because “Britain as the paramount power... must be responsible for order and 
security” not only in its immediate areas of sovereignty but in their general proximity as 
well.14 A response of expanding imperial control was most often done with great 
hesitance as the peripheral areas generally were of little commercial value and 
strategically provoked further problems. As Galbraith concluded, this was because 
efforts “to eliminate the disorderly frontier by annexations... in turn produced new 
frontier problems and further expansion.” 15 An ever expanding empire was left ever 
more exposed to turbulent frontiers.
US history also provides examples of expansionism being provoked by frontiers. John 
Lewis Gaddis argued that Americans have long felt that “expansion... is the path to 
security.” 16 An early example of this was General Andrew Jackson’s invasion of 
Spanish Florida in 1818, an action later defended by President John Quincy Adams who 
argued that either Spain properly manage the territory or “cede to the United States a 
province... which is in fact derelict, open to occupancy of every enemy, civilized or
17savage, of the United States.” An anarchic frontier- be it Florida, Texas or California- 
required that power vacuums be filled, both to impose order against internal actors 
spawning insecurity and to cancel the threat of other states occupying them. Gaddis 
concludes that “concerns about ‘failed’ or ‘derelict’ states are nothing new in the history 
of United States foreign relations” as could be seen from her expansion into frontiers in
1 ftcontinental North America and later further afield.
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The key dynamic in all of these examples of ‘frontier problems’ was that it was from the 
peripheral crises themselves that expansionism was stimulated rather than metropolitan 
motivations to accrue power or the amorphous dictates of global capitalism. Peripheral 
crises are the driving dynamic of imperial expansionism, at certain points and locales, in 
that the crux of the crises is the lack of suitable indigenous partners with whom an 
external power could work through without resorting to costly imperial expansion. 
Essentially, the type of collaborative relationships possible determined the type of 
imperial expansion. Significant indigenous actors with cohesion and capacity for local 
governance allowed for relationships to be developed without seeking any type of 
imperial control, merely the furtherance of commerce and trade. If some control was 
required, then stronger actors allowed for informal rule to be implemented rather than 
expensive formal control. However, it was when crises in the periphery saw either a 
complete lack of indigenous partners or the collapse of competent partners that the 
deepening of imperial control became necessary.
The present pull o f frontiers
In an era o f globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as
those that are near at hand... the first line o f defence will often be abroad.
- The European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’19
Western interventions since 1989, including through the UN, have been spread from 
Haiti to Kosovo, Somalia, Liberia, the Congo, Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor and 
the Solomon Islands. That the military forces of so many Western states have found 
themselves in such a gamut of locales around the world raises some important questions 
for understanding International Relations presently. Namely, why are states which had 
previously been deemed as ‘remote and petty interests’ achieving such significance 
strategically for the West currently? What are Western interventionists attempting to 
achieve there and how are they attempting to achieve it?
The pericentric pull of frontiers of insecurity continues to stimulate interventionism by 
Western states seeking to secure themselves from the insecurity emanating from them. 
Presently, this pericentric pulling is the primary dynamic provoking interventionism 
into frontier states as they pose significant security challenges for the wider world. The
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locales of present interventions show a common trait: domestic instability stemming 
from a lack of rudimentary governance. Fundamentally Western states are responding 
to the lack of effective governance that allows for the uncontrolled proliferation of 
security problems emanating from such places, especially because of the empowerment 
of non-state actors- be they terrorists, insurgents, or criminal gangs- who are able to act 
free of or with limited governmental influence over their activities.
An interest in responding to frontiers for security rationales can be clearly seen in the 
present defence policies of Western states. As the sole superpower, the US has led. 
This has notably been so since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and since then the US has acted 
on the premise that the US’ global role requires it “effectively projecting and sustaining 
our forces in distant environments.” For US government policy, this means that the 
US “must remain vigilant to those states that lack the capacity to govern activity within 
their borders”, notably to prevent dangerous non-state actors from exploiting
91“ungovemed spaces and border areas.” The non-state actors considered to be a threat 
in such anarchy include “a diverse collection of terrorists, insurgents, paramilitaries, and 
criminals” that are problematic because they “seek to undermine the legitimate
99 •governance” of weak and failed states. As these crises of governance pose security 
challenges to Western states, it means they cannot sit idly by and hence military 
responses are required. Given that, since the end of the Cold War, the US has led 
interventions in places as disparate as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo and thence on 
to Afghanistan.
The US’ strongest European ally, the United Kingdom, has been quick to argue that its 
own armed forces have “the increased likelihood of deploying forces outside... [our
• 99historically] core regions”, namely Europe and the Middle East. Considering this, the 
UK Ministry of Defence argued in its White Paper that it has a need to “extend our 
ability to project further afield” because “instability and crises... will require us both to 
engage proactively in conflict prevention and be ready to contribute to short notice 
peace support and counter terrorism operations.”24 It has already seen its forces since 
the end of the Cold War in as assorted locales as Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan 
and the Balkans. Another key US ally, Australia, has also seen its armed forces, the 
Australian Defence Force, deployed in operations ranging from East Timor and
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Afghanistan to the Sudan. Although a small country, its foreign policy has placed a 
special interest, notably alongside New Zealand, in the “security challenges faced by the 
island states of the Pacific.” In this regards it has been active in those island nations to 
its north, notably East Timor, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Fiji.
For its part, the European Union has noted in its foreign policy papers that in the 
relatively short period since the end of the Cold War, European forces have “been 
deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the Democratic
9 f%Republic of the Congo.” These interventions in distant states have been in addition to 
the EU’s, as well as her member states, significant interest and participation in the 
interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the mid-1990s, in Kosovo after the US and 
UK’s initial air campaign there in 1999, and in Macedonia since 2003. The Balkans has 
been a special EU priority, notably as the fall-out from the Balkans in terms of 
organised crime and refugees has had dire ramifications for it. Given that, the EU has 
argued that “restoring good government... and enabling the authorities there to tackle 
organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime
97within the EU.” The French have also demonstrated a keen interest in mitigating 
anarchy in world. President Jacque Chirac, for instance, made note of “the threat that
90
failed states carry for the world’s equilibrium.” France’s armed forces have found 
themselves deployed around the world, including to Afghanistan, but have tended to be 
found in Francophone states such as Cote D‘Voire, the DR Congo, Chad and the Central 
African Republic.
Even the two most notably pacifistic states in the West, Japan and Germany, are feeling 
the need to project their military power further. Japan is in the process of reforming its 
1946 constitution with its immobilising pacifist conditions. This has been encouraged 
by tensions with China and North Korea but also represents a desire to be able to 
participate in missions outside of Northeast Asia, something represented by the fact that 
the Japan Self-Defense Forces continue to support operations in Afghanistan. Germany 
is also in the process of reforming its military, with Berlin noting in its 2006 Defence 
White Paper that the Bundeswehr is to be “thoroughly restructured into an intervention
9Qforce” to participate in “peace-creating interventions.” German troops have been to 
the DR Congo repeatedly since the turn of the century and are presently serving in both
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Lebanon and Afghanistan. As Newsweek highlighted, the Germans seem to have finally 
accepted “the idea that their once-cosy role has ended” and their greater participation is 
required in state building interventionism.30
The United Nations, at the behest of Western states, has steadily seen its role in the 
post-Cold War era change. While the UN had historically undertaken ‘classic 
peacekeeping’ missions involving the monitoring of peace agreements between states, it 
has since 1989 increasingly conducted interventions into frontier states aimed at state 
building. The BBC, amongst others, has highlighted that the “route [that’s been set for 
the UN] is much more interventionist, moving away from the UN’s traditional emphasis
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that it cannot meddle in the internal affairs of a member state.” Indeed, increasingly 
since the end of the Cold War, “more blue helmets [have been] in action” than at any 
time in history. This momentum towards increasing the UN’s assertive presence has 
seen its missions deployed to such diverse locations as Somalia, Burundi, the DRCongo, 
Haiti, the Ivory Coast, Cambodia, East Timor, Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 
amongst others. It is notable that even the African Union, at the encouragement of and 
with support from Western states, has seen its forces deployed to Sudan and Somalia 
while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was involved 
repeatedly in interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
3.2: Frontiers require engagement
The world is inter-dependent. To be engaged is only modern realpolitik.
- British Prime Minister Tony Blair33
Following an explanation of interventionism based on the pericentric pull of security 
rationales, it is now necessary to examine how that response is manifested. The 
possible responses to the anarchy of frontier zones have historically been to try and 
isolate it, to retreat from it, or to engage it to some extent in order to mitigate or 
overcome it. Attempts at isolation or retreat, namely to try and cease interaction with 
frontiers, are infeasible due to the immediacy provided by globalisation in its present 
form. Frontiers of insecurity exist precisely because globalisation forces other states to 
have contact with them. With ever more powerful technology, space is compressed and
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even physical distance does not stop interaction between peoples and cannot completely 
prevent the movement of illicit goods and services.
Attempts to ignore problems in frontiers have seen their negative ramifications for the 
outside world delayed, not ended. Kofi Annan, by example, argued that “ignoring 
failed states creates problems that... come back to bite us.”34 The primary lesson of 
Afghanistan in the 1990s was that although it was largely ignored as a security concern 
by Western states, in the hopes that the insecurity there would be contained by its 
geographic isolation, it eventually turned into an epicentre of insecurity for the West. 
The US learned this reality the hardest and only later came to appreciate from 
Afghanistan’s experiences that internal strife and anarchy “do not stay isolated for 
long.”35 Another example of this has been the near total anarchy of Somalia since 1991 
and the West’s general efforts to isolate itself from that problem by largely ignoring it 
after its retreat from UN peacekeeping efforts there after 1994. With the rise of global 
terrorism, Indian Ocean piracy, and the usage of Somalia’ anarchy as an explosive 
playground for proxy wars between neighbouring Eritrea and Ethiopia, the dangerous 
spill-over effects of that state’s internal problems have proved impossible to contain.
As the West lives in a world where it cannot isolate itself; it must respond to the dangers 
facing it through engagement of some sort with its frontiers of insecurity. Since 1989, 
possibilities for engagement with problematic areas in the periphery were framed by 
understandings garnered from the past, namely that of preferring economic or political 
engagement where possible. In terms of what might generally be considered political 
engagement, attempts were on occasion made to broker agreements between the 
assorted domestic actors in a state or region’s civil strife, such as the US’ efforts in Haiti 
in the mid-1990s or the EU’s initial efforts in the Balkans in the early 1990s, both 
centred on trying to foster moderation and mediation.
Economic engagement has taken the form of development aid, a method that had been 
tried throughout the Cold War era. With the reduction of Cold War imperatives, 
‘conditionalities’ placed on this assistance since 1991 have sought to encourage 
governments to move towards ‘good governance’, notably in terms of countering
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corruption, encouraging democracy, and improving government efficiency. The 
international financial organisations, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, have been central to driving this development. Furthermore, utilising the 
influence of large multinational corporations has also allowed Western states to exert 
some influence. For instance, William Reno noted in the case of Angola in the 1990s 
that large oil and private security companies became “back channels for strong state 
influence without commitment to expensive direct rule.”
However, in those areas that qualify as frontiers of insecurity, the degree of violence 
and the extent of the corrosion of the state effectively negate any positive effects that 
political or economic engagement with them might bring. Political engagement in such 
areas is limited because it is likely that none of the indigenous political actors, 
especially national governments, have the capacity to implement decisions and 
agreements negotiated with the help of outside parties. For instance, even after peace 
talks concluded for the DR Congo, it still required a UN military force to allow for the 
implementation of the peace agreement there. In terms of economic engagement in the 
form of development aid, the simple lack of credible partners to work with in states that 
are frontiers of insecurity is largely overwhelming. At times there are none in the form 
of even a weak government, such as Somalia for most of the 1990s, or they are so 
lacking in credibility or hold such extreme positions that engagement is nigh 
impossible, such as with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan or the Taylor dictatorship in 
Liberia.
Moreover, the challenge of trying to influence governments in frontier states through 
multinational corporations is limited by the fact that while such governments may have 
the legitimacy of sovereignty, they may not have any practical control over their own 
territories outside of the capital (or in Somalia’s transitional government’s case, they do 
not even control Mogadishu).37 That is to say, it is hard to work with actors who 
possess a legal recognition, i.e. sovereignty, but no physical control. On the other hand, 
insurgents or warlords who might control territory and actually be in a better position to 
work through, lack the legitimacy of sovereignty, which limits options for engaging 
them legally. The US learned this the hard way when it backed Mogadishu warlords in
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2004-05 and was widely criticised for doing so after they were defeated by a rival 
Islamist movement.
Overall, it can be seen that the criteria that define the internal conditions of frontier 
states mean that engagement with them requires even more intrusiveness than mere 
economic or political outreach if the insecurity that the West is trying to mitigate is to 
be possible. Traditional political and economic engagement strategies are workable 
approaches for ‘developing states’, namely those that still have functional governmental 
structures with a meaningful degree of control over their sovereign area. In the states 
that are today’s frontiers of insecurity, however, the possibility for working through 
such governments is largely impossible. Hence, as in days gone past, stronger states 
feel the need to impose deeper forms of control in order to assuage their own security 
concerns.
3.3: Frontiers require state building interventionism
Some conflicts pose such a grave threat to our broader interests and values
that conflict intervention may be needed to restore peace and stability.
- The White House, ‘National Security Strategy, 2006’38
The American journalist Walter Lippman once noted of the Cold War that “unless 
ideology can be translated into geography, the conflict cannot be dealt with.” As was 
true for the Cold War, is true for the present- geography still matters. However, while 
during the Cold War “world leaders... worried about who was amassing power; now 
they worry about the absence of it.”40 The more passive, blase attempts at intervention 
that had been undertaken in the 1990s, when it was still felt that frontier states merely 
“excited pity, anger and shame” have been replaced by a re-awakened understanding 
that “chaos spreads... [and] a zone of chaos can turn into a major direct threat to state 
security elsewhere.”41 Terrorism, narcotics, and illegal immigration, amongst others, 
must be made ‘real’. There are still physical frontier zones, the actual peripheral areas 
of anarchy, and they need to have effective governmental control instilled over them in 
order to mitigate the negative outflows that globalisation makes possible. If geography 
is not ‘dead’, it means there is still a need to ‘manage space’ and that entails working to
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strengthen the governments of states, something only achievable through state building 
interventionism.
In this manner the 9/11 terrorist attacks presented a conundrum: how to make the 
response to them ‘real’. Much analysis has noted the irony that the US’ response to a 
‘stateless’ terrorist network was to invade a state. However, the USA was faced with 
the challenge of how to respond to al-Qaeda after the attacks, whether to combat it 
through international police efforts and international law or to wage war in a specific 
territory. Ultimately, the US argued that it needs an “active, forward and layered 
defense.”42 Globalisation is what dictates the requirement for a ‘layered defense’. 
Functioning states ‘out there’ are merely the first layer of defence, followed by 
international policing efforts, such as multilateral agencies like Interpol and Europol, 
and then by individual Western states’ domestic security and judicial systems. These 
multiple layers are required to counter the negative ramifications of globalisation. As 
an initial step, the US chose to conduct an intervention in Afghanistan while it also 
pursued other ‘non-spatial’ measures for combating international terrorism, such as 
through the international financial system and countering terrorist cyber-propaganda.
That geography still matters is also recognized by none other than al-Qaeda itself. That
‘stateless’ terrorist group’s number two commander, Ayman al-Zawahiri, highlighted
the value of holding territory when he argued thus:
Victory by the armies cannot be achieved unless the infantry occupies the 
territory. Likewise, victory for the Islamic movements against the world 
alliance cannot be attained unless movements possess an Islamic base in the 
heart of the Arab region.43
While the US had pushed al-Qaeda out of Sudan in 1996, it was still able to find
sanctuary in Afghanistan from where it could train members and organise attacks. The
US Government, startled by the effectiveness of al-Qaeda after 9/11, bitterly noted that
“the absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for
terrorists, criminals, and insurgents.”44 Following the US’ intervention in Afghanistan,
al-Qaeda has been able to regroup in the anarchic northwest of Pakistan, which
appropriately composes the Northwest Frontier Province.
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Strengthening an international system o f states
... in an era when dozens o f states are under stress or recovering from  
conflict, there is a clear international obligation to assist states in 
developing their capacity to perform their sovereign functions effectively 
and responsibly.
- The United Nations, ‘A more secure world’45
Driving a sharpened awareness of ‘frontiers’ after 1991 has been the emphasis placed 
on the domestic anarchy of such states by the international community, especially the 
West. There is a strong need to strengthen an international system based on states that 
currently has members that cannot effectively manage their territory, allowing for the 
unmitigated negative flows of globalisation and the empowerment of dangerous non­
state actors. The overarching imperative has thus been to defend an international 
system based on states by strengthening those members that are essentially unable to 
manage themselves, even if that requires interventionism, a dislikeable policy 
prescription because of its human, political and material costs.
Strengthening states through their national governments has been deemed the best way 
to counter the dangers of globalisation, viz. through functional governments more 
effectively managing their territories. As the US has noted in its foreign policy 
statements, it intends to “create conditions conducive to a secure international system” 
and that “such conditions include the effective and responsible exercise of 
sovereignty.”46 This sentiment was echoed by the UK when she argued that her 
“security and national prosperity depend upon international stability” and she will 
consequently be willing to “deliver effective military force in peace support and 
intervention operations.”47 For its part, the EU claims as a guiding purpose “to promote 
and maintain stability around the world” and that “by helping to create security and 
stability in the wider world, the EU also helps to make life safer within its own 
borders.”49
What is notable about the pericentric dynamic is that just as in the past, the lack of local 
partners suitable for Western states to meet their security interests can be seen in the 
present era as well. The West seeks an international system based on functional states
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run by effective governments, yet in the frontier states these indigenous partners in the 
form of sovereign national governments are decidedly lacking. Hence, a deeper type of 
engagement is required, one that can be deemed to be essentially about imperialistic 
control for the short to near term. This sentiment is best articulated by the US 
Government when it says that it “will expand the community of nations that share 
principles and interests with us...[and] help partners increase their capacity to defend 
themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.”50
Overall, the primary challenge for responding to the present frontiers is to change their 
internal dynamics so that they can participate as ‘normal’ members of the international 
system, namely in the sense that they can exert stronger control over their sovereign 
territories. By intervening for relatively short periods of time, and leaving after the 
“creation of self-sustaining state capacity”, Western states are able to ensure their 
security concerns are met by long-term collaborators in the form of more effective 
national governments.51 US policy summarises this theme well; the ability of non-state 
actors to export terrorism, narcotics, or fuel internal insurrection “will be outweighed by 
the capacity and resolve of local governments to defeat them.” 52 This is exactly what 
those undertaking interventions want to happen after they leave.
Considering that, the rate of interventions into frontier states has increased notably in 
the post-Cold War era as notions of sovereignty and the justness of intervention have
n
broadened, spurred along by security imperatives. Hence, there has been an 
increasing willingness to engage in coercive military interventions and, as Robert 
Cooper concluded, such interventionism has in fact become “increasingly normal.”54 
For instance, during the Cold War the US launched military interventions once a decade 
on average, but since 1989 the US has led interventions approximately every other 
year.55 For its part, the United Nations has seen the pace of its interventions accelerate, 
with a new peacekeeping mission being undertaken approximately every six months as 
compared to ever four years during the Cold War.56 In numbers this has meant that 
from 1945 to 1978 the UN conducted 13 operations, from 1978 to 1988 it did no new
cn
operations, yet since 1989 47 have been undertaken.
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Before proceeding, it is important to qualify this thesis’ interest in the dynamics of 
imperialism, as highlighted by the historians of the pericentric school, with its 
application towards analysing present interventionism. This thesis is not interested in 
the debate of whether or not the US or the West in general is an empire. Rather, it is 
interested in whether it operates as an empire in terms of its short-term interventions 
into frontiers of insecurity since the end of the Cold War. Hence it is important to 
highlight that there are some important differences between present interventionism and 
imperialism historically, but that present interventionism is at least ‘imperialistic’ 
without being ‘imperialism’ in the full sense of that word. This point must be qualified 
so that the dynamics highlighted through imperial history, specifically the pericentric 
pull of frontiers and the importance of indigenous collaboration, can be applied to 
understanding the success or failure of current interventionism.
Imperialism can be defined as the “the process of establishing and maintaining an 
empire.”59 Post-Cold War interventions should be considered imperialistic because 
they result in one state coercively interfering in another to the point where the one can 
be said to control to a significant degree the other’s effective sovereignty. 
Interventionism requires a significant degree of control in the internal affairs of one 
state by another, the key similarity with imperialism. Rather than mere influence, 
intervention must be to the degree where both internal and external processes and 
outcomes of a target state can be controlled by the intervener. However, the depths of 
control, in terms both of length and of intent, are not strong enough to warrant labelling 
them as imperialism in the full sense of that word. Contemporary interventionism 
should therefore be understood as more coercive than hegemony, yet less than 
imperialism.
Empires of the past focused largely on the permanence of their control over peripheral 
societies whereas present interventions merely see control as temporary and only 
“justified as the exercise of force and coercion necessary to restore peoples to their 
sovereignty.”60 This contrast was also made by James Rosenau of Cold War 
interventions with imperialism historically by arguing that “these latter phenomena 
involve the continued presence of the intervening actor in the target society.”61 The 
same contrast can be made for present interventions since while at times there is formal
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occupation, there is no long-term implementation of empire and the permanent presence 
of foreign coercion. Indeed, the whole point of the present interventions is the 
temporary exertion of control necessary to transition the targeted frontier state towards 
achieving domestic changes whereby it is deemed ready to resume its full, sovereign 
independence.62
Furthermore, present interventions attempt to transition frontier states by strengthening 
their national governments, which inherently requires a profound degree of participation 
by locals. Western states need competent national governments with whom they can 
collaborate with to better respond to the security challenges of globalisation in order 
that the pericentric dynamic is assuaged. Given this key difference with past 
imperialism, the degree of forceful coercion is considerably different presently. Violent 
coercion is applied primarily against specific ‘peace spoilers’ and political wrangling 
undertaken with domestic elites to conform to expectations of the interventionists, such 
as for democratic elections. Overall, present interventionists focus not on catalysing 
change through military force but rather “discover ways to generate voluntary 
cooperation” conducive to allowing frontier states to stabilise.
While these interventions are ‘imperialistic’ in that they briefly control frontiers states, 
there has been no return to colonialism or even informal imperialism as witnessed in 
previous eras. The current interventionism is very much intended to strengthen 
sovereign states as part of the universalisation of the international states system. As the 
US has argued, through interventions it seeks to “bolster threatened states... and build 
capacity.”64 This is echoed by the UN in its interventionist interest to “assist states in 
developing their capacity to perform their sovereign functions effectively and 
responsibly.”65 Western states, including their actions through the UN, accept that the 
world is entirely enclosed in equal sovereignty and a return to the imperialism of the 
past is unacceptable. However, while imperialism as an ideology is dead, there is still 
an interest in ensuring an international system of effective states even if that includes 
accepting that sometimes the ‘imperialistic’ means of interventions be utilised, an 
unfortunate necessity and one that has provoked much hesitance by the West. This has 
indeed hindered the effectiveness of present interventionism, something to be discussed 
thoroughly in subsequent chapters.
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State building interventionism in detail
The European Union... intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and 
to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, 
and in the DRC.
- The European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’66
The driving dynamic of the Westphalian states system is the notion of sovereignty. 
Intervention most broadly can be understood as the violation of the sovereignty of 
another state by a fellow state. For the purposes of this thesis, intervention will be 
specifically defined as: “To interfere, usually by force or the threat of force, in another 
state’s internal affairs, especially to compel or prevent an action or to maintain or alter a 
condition.” More broadly, interventionism can be considered as a general behavioural 
pattern stemming from the proclivity of a state or a group of states in partnership to 
intervene in the internal affairs of other states.
In order to understand what state building is in the context of post-Cold War 
interventionism, it is firstly necessary to review what constitutes a ‘state’ and what the 
‘building’ of it might entail. A good definition of what constitutes a state is provided by 
Anthony Giddens, who defined it as existing “when there is a political apparatus 
(government institutions, such as a court, parliament, or congress, plus civil service 
officials), ruling over a given territory, whose authority is backed by a legal system and
/TQ
the capacity to use force to implement its policies.” Even in an era of globalisation, 
states cannot be detached from the fundamental need to exert sovereign control over 
their territories. The primary need for correcting ‘state failure’ is hence for the state’s 
government to be “reconstituted in some form”, viz. to be ‘built’.69
State building was historically considered to be brought about through war, a theory 
most notably articulated by Charles Tilly when he famously argued ‘war makes states, 
states make war’. This thesis will use the term ‘state building’ rather than ‘nation 
building’, which is often used synonymously in International Relations literature. A 
‘nation’ is more appropriately understood as “a distinctive group of people who feel a 
communal bond on the basis of culture, history, religion, geography or linguistics”
70 • • •rather than as a state by itself. Decolonisation failed to bring effective governance to
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some of the international system’s new states and given that, the present state building 
process sees the consolidation of a state potentially happening through foreign 
intervention rather than through war by itself. Considering this, state building 
definitions in International Relations focus on the use of interventions to stop domestic 
conflicts and reconstruct and strengthen national governments. James Dobbins thus 
defined state building as foreign efforts which “aim to halt a conflict... and promote the 
emergence of an indigenous government capable ultimately of resuming full
• • # 7 1responsibility for the security and well-being of its population.”
State building interventions should be understood as exercises in building the capability 
of frontier states to be effective members of a sovereignty-based international system. 
Mark Berger nicely summarises this general theme of present state building efforts 
thusly:
... an externally driven, or facilitated, attempt to form or consolidate a 
stable, and sometimes democratic, government over an internationally 
recognised national territory against the backdrop of the... universalisation 
of a system of sovereign states. 2
It is important to highlight that the form of the government sought is ‘sometimes
democratic’ but that the primary goal is that of a creating a ‘stable government’ that can
effectively control its sovereign territory.73 The issue of democratisation in the context
of imperatives for stability will be raised in subsequent chapters as a major issue but at
this point, the definition of state building will focus on the creation of stable states
rather than on democratisation in itself.
The post-Cold War era has been defined by interventions that are much more 
penetrating of what has traditionally been considered within a state’s sovereign 
jurisdiction. The evolution of interventions can be seen in their categorisation within 
International Relations literature as ‘generations’. The so-called ‘first generation’ 
interventions were those that occurred mostly during the Cold War and were considered 
‘classic peacekeeping’ missions whereby foreign military forces, usually under a UN 
mandate, worked to monitor a peace agreement or ceasefire between opposing states. In 
this way they were very much geared towards enforcing Chapter VI of the UN Charter, 
“recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute”, 
and also decidedly lacking in any state building intentions.
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However, second generation interventions, namely those involving the UN since the end 
of the Cold War, have been geared towards Chapter VII implementation, “such action... 
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” This has 
meant operations that were “qualitatively different from those of traditional 
peacekeeping... [because they attempt at] helping to build a long-term foundation for 
stable, legitimate government.”74 Even so, second generation interventions were 
generally undertaken after the conclusion of a peace agreement and with the general 
consent, albeit often tenuously, of the warring parties, notably including non-state actors 
rather than only state governments. It was often necessary for military forces sent on 
peacekeeping missions “to go in prepared for battle” against non-state actors threatening 
agreements rather than merely expecting to monitor an agreement between state 
governments. Examples of second generation interventions include those in Haiti, 
Bosnia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, and the Solomon Islands.
As with second generation interventions, those of the third generation have also been 
geared towards Chapter VII mandates since the end of the Cold War. Crucially, they 
are “peace enforcing” operations intending to “use force to impose a peace” and have 
not been proceeded by even a tenuous ceasefire much less a peace agreement. In this 
spirit, they have been “military-led” interventions rather than merely “military-
77supported” such as those of the second generation. The most prominent examples 
have included the UN intervention in Somalia and US-led interventions in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan. Crucial to both second and third generation interventions is a focus on 
state building as the primary goal which makes them qualitatively different from the 
first generation. That there are few first generation peacekeeping missions presently 
highlights the prominence of intra-state war and state failure since the Cold War’s 
conclusion.
The third generation intervention in Somalia in 1993-1994 set the post-Cold War 
precedent that no longer would “‘quasi-states’ enjoy protection under the principle of
70
non-intervention.” Second and third generations effectively saw the revocation of 
such ‘courtesies’ extended previously to such states. Interventions now centre on the 
“idea of trying to control foreign societies... [and have the] intrusive aim of shaping the
70political development” of them. It is important to conclude by noting that this has
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been because Western states have pushed for an expanded understanding of what 
constitute ‘threats to peace’, notably state failure and all the negative ramifications that 
this has for international security, what has been termed the pericentric dynamic. 
Indeed, it is important to again emphasise that the intervention in Somalia in the early- 
1990s was an important precedent as it was the first time that “statelessness” was 
acknowledged as a threat to an international system of states and requiring of an 
intervention.80
An important approach for understanding present interventionism is to consider it as a 
spectrum in terms of interventionists controlling the sovereignty of a target state. On 
one end would be lighter interventions where the “multinational forces [aren’t] strong 
enough to assert control over the country” and are there at the consent of warring
01
parties. The foreign forces are able to assert some presence in the capital city and 
perhaps a few other major urban centres but no effort is made to implement a 
comprehensive security presence, what Foreign Policy magazine has called 
“peacekeeping on the cheap.” In these cases, the intervening force never assumes any 
formal sovereign responsibilities and examples of such interventions include Haiti and 
in the DR Congo.
On the other end of spectrum are “overwhelming intervention^]”, such as that into 
Bosnia in 1995, when “foreign troops effectively installed an international protectorate 
for the ethnically divided government.” In this sense, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and 
East Timor can be considered as semi-trusteeships of the international community, 
similar to ex-German colonies after the First World War. In these cases the UN 
formally assumed to a significant degree responsibility for administering those states for 
an extended period of time. For instance, in Cambodia the UN process went beyond 
just the monitoring of a peace agreement and rather established a ‘Transitional 
Authority’ that “actually... substituted for Cambodian sovereignty in key areas.”84
In the middle of the spectrum of external control of sovereignty is where frontier states 
have seen intensive interventions, leading to the toppling of governments, but which do 
not establish formal UN protectorates. The best example of this was the US’ overthrow
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of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime in 2001. In that case a very weak government deemed 
hostile to the US was quickly defeated and an internationally-supported transition 
process immediately allowed for an indigenous government to take over. Overall, most 
interventions since the end of the Cold War have been on an “uncomfortable path 
between trusteeship and complete withdrawal.”85
A second understanding of present interventionism comes from viewing it as “a process 
rather than an event.” Present interventions centre on the complex task of state 
building rather than on the simpler goals of interventions in previous eras, notably 
monitoring a peace agreement between two states. State building efforts presently 
undertaken through interventions should be seen as “a process of cultivation that fosters
R7the growth of local actors.” More specifically, it can be seen as a two pronged 
process. The first prong is the development of the “specific instruments states use to 
control society, that is, state capacity” and the second prong is the element of how
no
“states and societies negotiate their relationship, that is, the kind of state.” These are 
complicated tasks and require a large variety of activities to accomplish.
An interventionist state building process can be seen as the series of events starting with 
the instigating one- such as the signing of a peace agreement and the arrival of foreign 
military forces or indeed a foreign military invasion- through to the ‘conclusion’ of the 
intervention. This can be assumed to exist when the target state’s government has 
resumed full control of its sovereign space. In this understanding, an intervention could 
be considered to be a process that’s come to a ‘successful’ conclusion in terms of
O Q
sufficient “state stability” allowing for international withdrawal. On the other hand, it 
can also come to an end with the retreat of an intervening force which has not achieved 
its stated goals, such as the UN from Somalia in 1994. In either case what is important 
is that within an international system defined by sovereignty, present interventions are 
indeed “finite and transitory” and can be said to cease when their “convention breaking 
behaviour” no longer exists.90 Either a sovereign state resumes sovereign control in 
terms of being a relatively stable state or indeed lapses into an anarchic one, but in 
either case without a coercive, interfering foreign presence.
80
In addition to defining post-Cold War interventions as a spectrum and as a state building 
process, it is subsequently important to briefly discuss that they are multifaceted, 
complex endeavours. Overall, ‘state building tasks’ intend to create a “stable political 
structure.”91 In general, post-Cold War interventions usually follow a model although 
key differences are whether the ‘negotiated settlement’ is instigated by outsiders or 
merely mediated by them. This model was best summarised by Marina Ottaway, who 
described it thusly:
The model usually envisages a negotiated settlement and the holding of a 
national conference... to reach an agreement on the structure of the political 
system, followed by elections. In addition to these core activities, the model 
calls for subsidiary but crucial undertakings, beginning with the 
demobilization of former combatants and the development of a new national 
army, then extending to reforming the judiciary, restructuring the civil 
service, and establishing a central bank- thus creating all the institutions 
deemed necessary to run a modem state.92
In this light, it is apparent that state building interventions are more than just the
presence or use of military force for occupying a foreign country. They can be said to
constitute a “hinge between foreign, development and military policy” and without
looking at them as such, it is impossible to analyse them properly.
Considering the ambitions of state building interventions, the types of activities they 
undertake cover a wide gamut of needs, such as filling security vacuums, dealing with 
humanitarian issues, rebuilding government institutions, and implementing new 
economic policies. Interventionist militaries play the crucial role in present 
interventions, often gmdgingly when forced to undertake activities they consider 
beyond their traditional responsibilities as ‘war-fighting forces’. Whether this is 
appropriate or not will be discussed in later chapters, but suffice to say the activities 
they implement “can encompass formal military occupation, counter-insurgency, [and] 
peacekeeping” as well as what are traditionally considered non-military tasks such as 
governance, policing and development work.94
The usage of military power to instigate change in the governance of frontier states is 
required, at least initially, to quell or at least mitigate civil violence while a national 
government is formed or strengthened. This necessity is, at its simplest, dictated by the 
fact that those intervening, even if through the UN, at times have “to use force to stop
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those who try to undercut them.”95 Utilising military force, either to force a settlement 
or to protect one, is required because of the presence of ‘spoilers’ to peace processes 
and agreements, be they militias, warlords, insurgents, terrorists or any other amongst a 
plethora of non-state actors. This threat is especially prescient in an era where there is 
an increasingly willingness to intervene even when not all of the conflicting parties 
consent to the involvement of the intervening power, such as in Kosovo, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Somalia and Haiti.96
Furthermore, interventions apply military power as a catalyst to achieve a strategic 
objective, the creation of a more stable state with a government capable of exerting
• Q7sovereign control over its territory. In this sense, rather than waiting for a civil war to 
rage on in seeming perpetuity, the intervening power is willing to catalyse the situation 
through its own military force. This is deemed necessary because it is felt that “there is 
inadequate domestic capacity to deal with the situation and outside help is needed to
Q O
jump-start the process.” Passive, external participation has been deemed lacking in 
resolving the problems of the frontier states. The pericentric pull dictates that proactive 
action be undertaken, including applying military force when required. While the 
interventionist military forces play primary roles, state building activities also require 
the efforts of other foreign actors. NGOs and UN agencies currently do the “hard work” 
activities necessary to “help states transition from civil war to civil society.”99 These 
can include training programmes, infrastructure construction, humanitarian aid 
provision, and democracy promotion, amongst numerous others.
Lastly, it is important to highlight the tasks required during state building 
interventionism have provoked important changes in the defence posturing of Western 
states. One of the most notable changes has been a new emphasis on projecting force 
into frontiers, or as NATO articulates the need, “the possibility to be expeditionary, to 
project stability.” 100 An emphasis on ‘expeditionary capabilities’ has been driven by the 
realisation that in the present and future, the US, as well as other Western states, will 
not be “conducting war against nations [but rather will be] conducting war in countries 
we are not at war with.” 101 This means militaries must now prioritise being able to 
conduct ‘irregular’ warfare activities such as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
campaigns.
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In addition to expeditionary capabilities, present interventions require militaries, as 
mentioned previously, to partake in actual state building activities. While an 
intervention may be initiated by military force, what follows next is where the transition 
is, in theory, achieved by ‘the expedition’ and the actual state building activities are 
undertaken. The US military has termed these follow-up efforts as ‘Stability, Security, 
Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR)’ operations. SSTR operations intend to produce 
those “effects” which cumulatively “lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S.
I AA
interests.” Within Europe, the UK has best articulated this need to enhance capacity 
to transition frontier states following initiating military action. In its “effects based” 
planning, the UK military emphasises the need to “stabilise”, which it defines as “to set 
the secure and stable conditions required for political and economic action so as to bring
i ma situation under control.” As with civilian counterparts, these activities can include 
training programmes, infrastructure construction, and humanitarian aid provision, 
amongst numerous others.
3.4: State building interventionism as frontier management
... to assist in the establishment o f effective and responsible control over 
ungoverned territory.
- US Department of Defense, ‘National Defense Strategy, 2006’104
Before concluding, it is important to articulate how state building interventionism is a 
strategy of management undertaken by Western states. Sociologists, notably Ulrich 
Beck, have developed the theme of ‘risk society’ which emphasises that a reflexive 
rationality presently guides actors who have no secure ends to choose between but who 
instead endeavour to balance ‘risks’. A risk is a scenario provoking a policy response in 
order to prevent that scenario from becoming real. Furthermore, risks can be considered 
perceptions of future dangers that need management. In risk societies, politics is 
essentially a process of ‘risk management’, notably when governments identify success 
not as singular outcomes but rather as the “ability to manage processes of 
transformation.” 105
This concept of risk society has been expertly applied by Mikkel Rasmussen towards 
strategic studies in the post-Cold War era, namely that risk management is the “new
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guiding principle of strategy” because it allows policy makers to connect apparently 
random events, policy initiatives, and technological developments within the context of 
globalisation.106 Indeed, in an era defined by globalisation, Western strategy is limited
1 ft7to an emphasis on managing risks rather than “creating enduring security.” This is 
notably so because present security challenges are not in the form of state-centric 
warfare with conclusive outcomes, such as ‘surrender’ and ‘victory’, but rather on a 
menage of non-state actors who are greatly empowered through globalisation because of
the immediacy it provides. Overall, risk management in an era of globalisation requires
108“managing imperfection.”
Risk management as a strategy is centred upon the ‘precautionary principle’, 
propositioned most notably in environmental and crime prevention policies, and intends 
to prevent problems before they surface or at least to mitigate them before they become 
unmanageable. Prevention is the key aspect of risk management due to the simple 
rationale that the causes of insecurity in an era of globalisation are diverse and largely 
unpredictable. In the past, when risks were ascertained they could at least to some 
extent be isolated or deterred. However, because of the immediacy offered through 
globalisation, this is largely impossible now. For instance, the spread of bird flu or a 
computer virus cannot be simply isolated geographically or even by time as some risks 
only manifest themselves slowly over an extended period. As guaranteeing final results 
is no longer feasible, more diverse strategies must be adopted. Essentially, the strategy 
must endeavour towards preserving a “manageable environment [in which] the threats 
that might erode control in the future... [are to] be pre-empted.” 109
How can governments manage risks in an era of globalisation? Christopher Coker has 
provided insights into how risk management is implemented, notably that because of 
globalisation, “instead of managing security, we manage insecurity.” 110 Resultant from 
the uncertainties of the risks currently faced, the “only option open to governments is to 
police the world.” 111 This policing is primarily of managing communities that are 
considered the most threatening. Crime prevention as a precedent is especially apt, 
namely to remove factors that allow crime to be part of a social environment in order to 
manage it. In this sense, ‘risk profiling’ becomes critical and whereby governments 
seek to identify the most prominent risks so that they can be dealt with proactively
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rather than merely reactively. In this way, risk management as a strategy mirrors those 
of ‘preventive defence’ and ‘anticipatory defence’ put forth respectively by the Clinton 
and Bush administrations in the US.
If one were to assume the role of a strategic policy maker, surely one of the most 
obvious risks would be frontiers of insecurity; and if insecurity can now only be 
managed, state-building interventions are a management strategy by Western states. 
Rasmussen argued as much when he noted that the increased number of interventions 
by Western states since the end of the Cold War reflected “the challenges of
119globalisation and the way the governments of risk societies have interpreted them.” 
Fundamentally, state building interventionism is a strategy response attempting to 
‘reshape environments’ in order to minimise the risks that come from them.
As Lane and Sky noted of Western forces in Afghanistan, and true of interventions 
elsewhere, interventions are fundamentally a “contest of ungovemed space” with 
dangerous non-state actors.113 Western states, because of the pericentric dynamic, 
realise that their own security depends on “proactive and sustained efforts abroad to 
prevent security threats emanating from unsatisfactorily governed locations.” 114 The 
purpose is not to naively ‘create order’ as a clear-cut outcome, but rather it is to simply 
engender stronger, more effectively governed states as best possible to allow for 
security concerns to be mitigated and become more ‘manageable’ rather than ended 
outright. Even in the West itself, insecurity is merely managed. By example, illegal 
trafficking and terrorism exist in the UK yet the most reliable responses to them are 
government policies aimed at limiting them to the greatest extent possible. This is what 
is sought in frontier states as well, the allowance for more effective governance to 
manage risks locally.
The crux of this management strategy is placed on empowering sovereign governments, 
namely effective local ‘collaborative partners’, to better manage their territory. 
Exercising control through more effective governance allows for national governments 
to combat dangerous non-state actors and the negative outflows of globalisation. At its 
simplest, this means more effectively controlling territory through state power, what
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Robert Orr terms a “minimally capable state.” 115 In this manner, the pro tem presence 
of interventionist troops provides a “stop-gap” until the national government has the 
capability of fulfilling these duties by itself.116
3.5: Conclusion
Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to 
develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, 
robust intervention.
- The European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’117
In concluding, it is necessary to qualify the assertions of this chapter with the 
imperatives of prioritisation. East Timor as a frontier is not as pressing for Germany as 
it is to Australia. However, there is nonetheless a profound, overarching strategic 
interest in the West to prevent and mitigate state failure, but it is done in consideration 
of the strategic concerns of the respective states and in review of available resources. 
Given this, it is only when a state, a coalition thereof, or a multilateral organisation 
becomes ‘sufficiently animated’ that it will be willing to incur the costs of
I i o
intervening. Not every frontier will merit a direct response. Those deemed of 
priority might see such outcomes if policy-makers in interested states consider them as 
such, viz. Afghanistan was a US priority, East Timor an Australian one, and the Balkans 
paramount for the EU.
This chapter has sought to answer two questions: why the West responds to the 
challenge of anarchic frontiers and why it responds through state building 
interventionism. Through the pericentric pull, Western states are fundamentally 
responding to the lack of effective governance that allows for the uncontrolled 
proliferation of security problems emanating from frontier states through globalisation. 
What is most notable about the pericentric dynamic is that just as in the past, the lack of 
local ‘collaborative partners’ suitable for Western states to meet their own security 
interests can also be seen in the present era. The West seeks an international system 
based on at least minimally functional states. Yet, in the frontier states indigenous 
partners, in the form of minimally effective national governments, cannot be found 
currently. Hence, a deeper type of engagement is required.
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This engagement has been through state building interventionism focused on improving 
the capabilities of indigenous partners in the form of national governments. Whether it 
is the multilateral intervention of the UN in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the US’ largely 
unilateral intervention in Afghanistan, or Australia’s presence in the Solomon Islands, 
the purpose of state building interventionism is to strengthen national governments that 
are then better able to exercise improved sovereign control over their territory, 
combating dangerous non-state actors and mitigating the negative outflows of 
globalisation such as narcotics, human trafficking, and organised crime. If the West can 
strengthen frontier states, it means national governments there will then be able to better 
manage the insecurity of globalisation themselves and by doing so, Western states are 
better able to guarantee their own security and that of the wider international 
community.
Considering state building interventionism as an effort to strengthen national 
governments to better exercise effective control over sovereign territories, there is a 
need to give proper emphasis to the inherent centrality of local actors as critical to the 
entire endeavour. The next chapter will argue that ‘collaboration’ between an 
intervening power and indigenous politics is the definitive theme that runs through the 
state building processes of current interventions. Unless collaboration can be 
engendered in a manner conducive to working through the state building processes, 
interventions can only but fail in achieving their objective. Given that, the art of state 
building is fundamentally one of collaboration.
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C h a p t e r  4 :  T h e  T h e o r y  o f  C o l l a b o r a t i o n
The difficulty... is in knowing what form intervention should take. 1
The previous chapter argued that Western states react to the pericentric pull of frontiers 
of insecurity through state building interventionism. While that explanation provided an 
improved understanding of how Western states respond, it did not suitably explain 
whether that response is adequate to meeting the actual security needs of Western states. 
The balance of the thesis will be focused on answering that question by seeking to 
understand why the state building interventions of the post-Cold War era succeed or 
fail, namely whether the West is able to ‘manage’ its frontiers of insecurity thus 
mitigating the pericentric pull of peripheral crises.
In order to ascertain if the West is indeed managing frontiers of insecurity, it is 
necessary that a better understanding of the efficacy of present interventions be 
garnered. This chapter will consequently contend that an emphasis be placed on the 
centrality of ‘collaboration’ to interventions by defining a theoretical approach for it, 
namely a ‘theory of collaboration’. The central principle of a suitable theory of 
collaboration must be that indigenous ‘collaborative systems’, which interface an 
intervention’s external participants with indigenous politics, determine more than 
anything else the efficacy of post-Cold War interventions.
This argument is premised on the assertion that the agency of indigenous political actors 
is definitive as is their interplay with an intervener’s agents and both are widely 
disregarded or misunderstood in the present International Relations analysis of state 
building interventionism. Without fully analysing the structure, dynamics and centrality 
of indigenous collaborative systems developed and applied in interventions in frontier 
states, it is impossible to truly understand whether or not they succeed or fail in reaching 
their goals, creating more effectively governed states.
4.1: Why it is necessary to analyse ‘collaboration*
Collaboration... is a word with an unsavoury sound, amplified by the 
reaction against the Qusilings and Petains o f  World War II... [yet] there is 
no reason why they should lead us to either studiously ignore collaboration 
or reduce it to a simple act o f betrayal?
James Rosenau argued nearly forty years ago that the academic analysis of interventions 
was “singularly devoid of efforts to develop systematic knowledge on the conditions 
under which interventionary behaviour is initiated, sustained, and abandoned.” 
Rosenau’s comments were prescient and what is still lacking is a theoretical 
understanding of interventions that allows for consistent analysis. The present literature 
about state building interventionism is primarily flawed because of its overemphasis on 
the assumed primacy and agency of the intervening power as an actor.4 Yet, the 
importance of indigenous actors should not be understated.
Interventions are required because the West cannot presently find ‘collaborative 
partners’ in the form of effective national governments to help manage their security 
concerns regarding globalisation, i.e. the pericentric pull, so they temporarily employ 
imperialistic means to strengthen or even create anew such collaborative partners, viz. 
through state building interventionism. Hence, it is worth specifically considering how 
an intervening power actually interacts with indigenous actors, giving them more 
importance as players with significant agency, and whether this might hence provide 
more insight into understanding how and why interventions unfold and their overall 
efficacy. A theory is required to allow for a consistent framing of the discourse around 
these considerations of the agency of indigenous actors and their interactions with the 
agents of an intervening power in the form of collaboration.
Collaboration has widely assumed a negative connotation in a political sense as 
meaning ‘cooperating with the enemy’, notably in regards to Nazi Germany. One 
historian thus described it as “all manner of cooperation, active or passive, shown to the 
occupier; anything, in fact, that enables an occupation to continue.”5 However, despite 
such stigma, the word collaboration actually has a long past largely free of such taint 
and has more generally been understood as ‘working together in an undertaking’. This
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can be seen etymologically in that collaboration is a back-formation of the of the word 
collaborator, which in turn stems from the Latin collaboratus, a past participle of 
collaborare (“to work with”).6 Other academic analyses- such as that in the computer 
and library sciences, governance and business management fields- have avoided using 
the term in a constrictive normative sense and instead applied it using the ‘classic’ 
definition. For example, within governance literature, collaboration delineates
n
“networks, ‘joined up’ governance, and partnership working.” Overall, within other 
academic disciplines, collaboration is seen as a non-normative, utilitarian process in 
which autonomous actors work together in an “attempt to increase values for the other 
as well as for oneself.”8
An attempt to look at collaboration intellectually, given its negative connotations and 
historical baggage, might seem decidedly masochistic, even counter-productive, within 
International Relations. If collaboration as a term is to provide value to International 
Relations it must be clearly defined and rigidly applied so as to strengthen its utility for 
suitable analytical application. Considering that, this thesis will apply a value neutral 
understanding of collaboration and it should be understood as a utilitarian term “in a 
purely functional sense.”9 A suitably definition, to be used by this thesis, is: 
collaboration occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of a problem domain 
engage in an interactive process to act or decide on issues related to that domain.10
The key distinction between collaboration and similar words is its dynamic nature as an 
interactive process. While cooperation is similar in intent (and a synonym at least in the 
vernacular), it has a more static meaning. It implies a limited, fairly well defined 
partnership required for reaching a limited goal. Conversely, collaboration intends for a 
dynamic relationship that can evolve and change and importantly does indeed involve 
cooperation but also to an important degree, manipulation.11 Hence, collaboration can 
be seen as a multifaceted process involving more than mere cooperation.
Given that collaboration is an interactive, dynamic process involving the finely balanced 
dialectic of cooperation and manipulation, all of the collaborating participants intend to 
maximize one another’s abilities to achieve more together than what they could
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individually, what can be termed ‘collaborative advantage’. The specific goals for 
collaboration between the participants may vary but overall the relationship must be one 
of mutual benefit and loosely aligned towards a broader, commonly understood 
outcome. While there may be ‘unfair’ terms of power, and hence agreements, during 
the progression of collaborative relationships it is still necessary that all participants feel 
that they have more to gain than lose through the partnership in order for collaboration 
to exist. Lastly, the participants of a collaborative relationship must exhibit some
degree of autonomy from one another otherwise they can be seen to ‘merge’ rather than
1 ^to collaborate.
Collaboration during interventions
Much of the academic study of collaboration comes from imperialism literature. Even 
the most totalitarian empires required some degree of support from indigenous peoples 
to exert local control and to sustain themselves over the longer-term. The centrality of 
collaboration to imperialism has long been highlighted. Niall Ferguson, for instance, 
noted empires “do not survive long if they cannot establish and sustain local consent.” 14 
The most effective imperialists were those best at collaborating with indigenous politics, 
thereby achieving ‘economy of force’. By example, Allen Isaacman argued for 19th 
Century European imperialism in Africa that “without collaborators, the Europeans 
could not have imposed their rule so thoroughly and with such a minimal cost in 
manpower.” 15
While collaboration may be central to exerting control during imperialism, is it even 
applicable to present interventions? If empires could not be maintained without 
collaboration, it is all the more valid for present interventions which do not see nearly 
the same degree of coercion involved in the imperialism of the past, have very short 
timeframes which increases the need for participation from locals, and most 
importantly, the entire purpose of present interventions is to empower locals by building 
up their capabilities for governance. Tonya Langford argued that state failure is a 
“complex and essentially political problem” and responses to it cannot be simplified to 
merely externally driven and imposed solutions that singularly attempt to settle war, 
build governing institutions, or revive an economy.16
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Indeed, there is a strong need to see interventions as politically defined processes 
revolving around indigenous actors. Patrick Regan came closest to highlighting this 
when he argued that the “makeup of the participants to the conflict affects the strategy
17for and likelihood of successful” interventions. The need to exert control through 
mere ‘imperialistic’ interventions inherently ‘requires collaboration with indigenous 
politics. This is because present state building interventions see external and internal 
actors work together to create a more viable state, i.e. they are intrinsically a 
collaborative effort. At times, such as in the early stages of an intervention, the 
interventionists may be paramount, but they are still fundamentally dependent on local 
participation throughout.
Considering this, there is a need to systematically look at the interface of an intervening 
power with indigenous politics and the best way to do that is by analysing it from a 
collaboration standpoint. Overall, state building interventionism should be defined as 
dynamic, interactive processes o f collaboration interfacing intervening agents with 
those of indigenous society; empowering indigenous actors, namely national 
governments, to exercise more effective sovereign control over their territory. The 
West needs national governments in frontier states to work more effectively, i.e. this is 
the ‘problem domain’ of collaboration, and state building interventions are collaborative 
processes that attempt to achieve that.
US *collaboration ’ during interventions
We will help... domestic partners increase their capabilities to contend with
complex issues o f common concern.
- US Department of Defense, ‘National Defense Strategy, 2005’18
A further reason why a systematic analysis of collaboration is necessary is because it 
has euphemistically been introduced into defence policy papers without concurrently 
being accorded significant weight in the academic discourse on state building 
interventionism. A review of US defence policies yields the most apt examples of what 
more appropriately should be termed collaboration. While the US Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) initial efforts during an intervention may be the military defeat of an
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enemy, the overall focus is on “transitioning responsibility” to a national government 
and ultimately “helping others to help themselves.” 19
In its post-Cold War emphasis on expeditionary capabilities and stability operations, the 
DoD therefore increasingly expresses an interest in what it terms an ‘indirect approach’. 
At its simplest, the indirect approach can be defined as “building up and working with
AA #
others.” Fundamentally, this entails empowering indigenous partners, which allows
the US to “to act with and through others... shifting from conducting activities
91ourselves to enabling partners to do more for themselves.” Central to the efforts of an 
indirect approach is working together to “achieve common objectives”, such as the 
defeat of a shared enemy but also of eventually improving a partner government’s 
ability to “police themselves and govern their populations more justly and 
effectively.”22
The value of such an indirect approach is that “building and leveraging partner 
capacity” allows it to function more effectively during the complex operations required 
for state building interventions. This is because many of the US’ interventions occur 
in areas of the world where US forces want to maintain, as best possible, a “low- 
visibility presence” for as short a period as is feasible.24 Furthermore, the critical 
significance of an indirect approach is the legitimacy it brings to such operations. The 
DoD argued this when it noted that by “working indirectly with and through others” it 
helps to deny popular support to an enemy because US partners have “legitimacy with
9c
their own people.” Considering all of the above, the DoD now places a priority 
interest in “being organized to work with and through others, and of shifting emphasis
9from performing tasks ourselves to enabling others.” How these Pentagon policy 
prescriptions have actually been actuated is more problematical and this thesis is hence 
intent to provide an initial, humble attempt to rectify the gap in the academic 
understanding thereof.
4.2; Robinson’s ‘sketch’ for a theory of collaboration
The theory o f collaboration suggests that at every stage from external 
imperialism to decolonisation, the working o f imperialism was determined 
by the indigenous collaborative systems connecting its European and Afro-
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Asian components. It was as much and often more a function o f Afro-Asian 
politics than o f European politics and economics.
- Ronald Robinson27
Of specific interest to this thesis is Ronald Robinson’s seminal article entitled “Non- 
European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of
Collaboration.”28 Robinson’s argument was that collaboration with indigenous politics 
was the ‘non-European foundation’ of imperialism and given that, collaboration was 
definitive for determining the shape and course of imperialism. The transition from 
more benign, informal influence to deeper levels of imperial control was primarily the 
result of a breakdown of collaboration between the agents of an empire and its 
collaborators in the periphery. Following crises in the periphery, what had once been 
accomplished without imperial control was no longer possible, requiring a deepening of 
control and a re-shaping of local ‘collaborative systems’, those relationships between 
imperialists and indigenous collaborative partners critical to achieving their strategic 
interests.
Robinson argued that without indigenous collaboration, it would have been impossible
for any European state to establish, much less maintain, imperial control abroad since
the military and administrative power necessary for that rule was “drawn through the
*
mediation of indigenous elites.” Considering that, the “central mechanisms” of 
imperialism were the “systems of collaboration... which succeeded (or failed) in 
meshing the incoming processes of European expansion into indigenous social politics 
and achieving some kind of evolving equilibrium between the two.” Given this 
centrality of collaboration to imperialism, Robinson argued that the “changing bargains 
of collaboration... define the actual working of imperialism at the point of impact at a 
particular time” and subsequently the “study of. them appears to offer a more 
comprehensive view of the factors involved than does the one-eyed analysis of
 ^t
European forces.”
Robinson’s arguments for emphasising collaboration in itself will subsequently be 
applied for defining an updated theory of collaboration. However, before proceeding it 
is first necessary to define the collaborative dynamics that differentiate imperialism
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historically from present interventionism. Firstly is to consider that while present 
interventions are ‘imperialistic’ in that they briefly control internal processes and 
outcomes within frontiers states, there has fundamentally been no return to formal 
colonialism or even informal imperialism as witnessed in previous eras. Indigenous 
collaboration during imperialism, and especially that of totalitarian empires, was largely 
motivated by a belief that the empire was permanent so collaboration with it, though 
unfortunate, was necessary. Present interventions are decidedly different. 
Collaboration will occur, but not primarily because indigenous actors feel the 
interventionists are going to be occupying their country permanently or even for an 
extended period.
The current emphasis of state building interventions is for transitioning frontier states by 
strengthening their national governments, something defined intrinsically by the active 
participation of local peoples. In past colonialism, if they gained social and economic 
power, indigenous collaborating elites rose to challenge their imperial rulers, something 
the imperialists did not intend to happen. This is what Robinson considered the
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evolutionary inversion of collaboration, what he called “non-collaboration.” Given 
that, imperialists tried as much as possible to maintain a balance of “political influence 
between imperial collaborators and nascent nationalists” in order to keep both in 
check.34 The purpose of keeping indigenous collaborators relatively weak was that it 
was required to perpetuate colonial rule in the long-term. In contrast, the whole purpose 
of present interventions is to actually expedite the process of ‘collaboration inversion’ 
rather than to stymie it. Interventionists want to be ‘over-powered’ and ‘challenged’ by 
the national government so that they can leave as quickly as possible. In this manner, 
present interventionists are seeking a “gradualism of collaboration” whereby as a 
national government gains more and more capability to effectively govern its territory, 
the intervener gradually withdraws until the intervention can be concluded.
4.3: An updated ‘theory of collaboration * for state building interventionism
They were in the indigenous business o f  faction and clientage-making with 
zamindars and talukdars, Hindu bhadralok and Muslim jihad leaders, 
African clan heads, paramount chiefs and kings. The permutations on 
which they rang the changes, the brinkmanship involved in pushing 
indigenous politics in desired modern directions, constituted the true genius
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o f colonial administration.
o /r
- Robinson on colonial administrators
Michael Ignatieff argued that an intervening power presently intends to engender 
transitions “through the medium of an exit strategy... to get results, to turn the place 
back to the locals, and to get out.” This thesis contends that the premise for such a 
transitive strategy be determined by what collaborative possibilities are available from 
the very start of an intervention. Collaborative systems are what should define the 
‘opportunity structure’ of state building interventions. Indeed, the context of 
collaborative possibilities determines everything else. With this in mind, this section 
will outline a theory of collaboration that can be used as a theoretical foundation for the 
analysis of present state building interventionism.
The framework for collaboration
The most important consideration in understanding present interventions are the 
changing bargains of collaboration. These bargains, i.e. the agreements between 
collaborating actors, define the actual structure of an intervention at the point of impact 
at a particular time. The relationships between intervening actors and those of 
indigenous actors can be termed ‘collaborative systems’. The dynamics driving 
collaborative systems during interventions are the politics of collaboration, the 
“continual renegotiation of the terms and conditions of cooperation.... [a] process... of 
constant manoeuvre for political advantage.” Overall, the defining feature of 
collaborative systems can be summarised as the “the constant struggle for leverage” 
between the different collaborating actors, especially of the indigenous collaborative 
elite who have to balance the interveners’ demands with their own and to at least some 
extent with those of the wider indigenous society.40
The collaborative systems used during interventions are centred on two interconnecting 
sets of socio-political linkages. The first set, what can be called the ‘external’ one, is 
the collaborative arrangement between the intervening power’s agents and the 
indigenous elites drawn into collaborating with them. The second set, what can be 
termed the ‘internal’ one, is that connecting the collaborative elite to local interests and 
institutions, be they political, ethnic, or religious 41 Collaborative elites have to perform
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certain functions in the external set with the intervening power’s agents whilst being 
sure that they accord with that done in the internal set, the more important o f the two. 
In this way, the kind o f collaboration possible in the external set is largely determined 
by that of the internal one because it shapes its parameters.
Collaborative systems’ linkages
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The emergence of collaborative systems begins in the external set, most often through 
initiating events such as a national reconciliation conference, for example the ‘royal 
jurga’ in Afghanistan, or through the acceptance o f a negotiated peace agreement, such 
as that which officially ended the Congolese civil war in 2002. The purpose o f the 
external set is primarily to interface the intervening power with indigenous society 
whereby the demands o f the interventionists are made known, such as stipulations for 
certain types of governments (mostly democratic and liberal), while conversely the 
general “intentions and demands of the subject people are articulated” through 
indigenous elites collaborating with the interventionists, namely through a national
42government.
‘Progress’ during state building interventionism requires a strong interface o f the 
internal and external sets through the indigenous collaborating elite. Collaborating 
elites exerting prominence in the external set that have no broadly accepted legitimacy 
to govern will lead an intervention to fail. Avoiding this requires that the developments 
agreed to and worked towards in the external set are able to gamer consent through the 
relationships formed in the internal set. Given these considerations, the challenge for 
interventionists is that the state structures they are attempting to solidify correspond to 
the broader demands o f the indigenous society, namely there must be “acceptance of,
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and commitment to, the processes of the state- belief in their legitimacy, a sense of 
ownership in their representation, and even pride in the development.”43 In that manner, 
the indigenous collaborative partners from the external set are required to explain 
through the internal set what the intervention is trying to achieve and why that is a 
worthy cause for the society involved.44 Most often, this explanation of the intervention 
being beneficial simply means demonstrating peace has been achieved initially and later 
that good governance and economic development are to be possible.
The internal collaborative set is, as mentioned, the more important of the two. Michael 
Doyle argued that “the problem of rebuilding a war-torn society [is] one of rebuilding 
social trust.”45 Essential to the internal set supporting the goals of the intervention, 
namely the creation of a more capable, stronger state, is the consent given by the 
broader population to the external set’s agreements, namely of the creation of a national 
government that has broadly recognised legitimacy. Furthermore, the internal set is 
important for allowing ‘citizen agency’ whereby individual citizens have a sense of 
participation in broader political developments which helps to overcome societal 
divides, such as ethnicity or religion.46
Characteristic o f collaboration
There are three characteristics of collaboration shaping the internal and external sets of 
collaborative systems. Firstly, rather than there being entirely unified groups of 
indigenous ‘collaborators’ representing cohesive social groups, collaboration is instead 
more generally dispersed throughout indigenous societies as ‘collections of mediating 
functions’.47 There are few, if any, entirely dedicated indigenous collaborative partners. 
Collaboration does not stipulate that indigenous partners be subservient ‘proxies’ of the 
intervening power; indeed they must have an autonomous ability to negotiate their 
relationships as actors in their own right.
Interventions are both a disruptive as well as a potentially stabilising force and the 
function of collaboration is to mediate between these polar dynamics. The purpose of 
the indigenous partners to collaboration will be of mediation to achieve goals when they 
are in common with the intervening power rather than mere implemental subservience.
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However, it must be said that collaborative relationships are fairly lopsided at times, 
notably in the beginning of an intervention when collaborating elites are relatively 
dependent on the intervening power for material support and security.49 Even 
considering that there is some dependence initially, analysis of a “collaboration- 
exploitation ratio” shows that dependence is of less importance to determining the 
relationship’s dynamics than the expected benefits of the relationship, specifically the 
satisfaction of achieving expected and shared outcomes.50
Secondly, the efficacy of collaboration is significantly affected by the amount of 
resources, both material and political, that is committed to it. Intervening powers that 
attempt to sustain collaborative systems with little more than goodwill, notably of their 
agents on the ground, should not expect to achieve their interventionist goals. 
Collaboration is a nuanced mixture of cooperation and manipulation. It is not based on 
altruism and mutual goodwill between the participants but fundamentally by the desire, 
or indeed the need, to achieve more together, often acrimoniously because of the 
manipulation involved, than what could be done individually. Given that forced 
rationale of necessity and the driving role of manipulation, resources are required to 
facilitate it rather than just friendly intentions conducive to mere cooperation (although 
those do help). However, resource provision is not an end in itself and poorly 
rationalised collaborative systems will perform inadequately even if they have 
significant amounts of resources at their disposal.
Thirdly, degrees of trust and amounts of knowledge sharing are crucial factors shaping 
collaborative relationships. Trust entails a general understanding of the motives and 
intents of collaborative partners and given that, a willingness to try new and different 
approaches that would not be contemplated otherwise.51 It is inherently affected by how 
much one collaborative partner actually does know about the other’s roles, needs, 
objectives, and constraints faced. During an intervention, the intervening power wants 
to trust that its indigenous partners are serious about implementing the significant 
reforms necessary to build a stronger state. Conversely, indigenous partners want to 
believe that the interventionists are actually going to leave but provide security and 
resources to them in the meantime. Furthermore, indigenous partners want to trust the 
interventionists to “provide guarantees for the peace process that transcend the lack of
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trust among the belligerent parties.” Knowledge sharing can be in either an explicit 
form, such as reports and speeches, or implicitly conveyed through actions and 
procedures. Poor information sharing can result in stymied partnerships that suffer from 
a lack of trust. Trust based upon knowledge sharing is also crucial because it affects the 
willingness of collaborative partners to engage in risk taking. Overall, decidedly low 
levels of trust and knowledge sharing cause hesitation and anxiety for collaborating 
actors about making decisions and managing ongoing relationships and hence damage 
collaborative systems.
All three of these factors are important because they determine the degree of 
engagement which the participants sustain in their collaborative systems. Low levels of 
engagement provide for low levels of collaborative work being accomplished.54 
Choosing and managing indigenous partners capable of effectively mediating foreign 
demands into indigenous realities as well as engendering trust and effectively sharing 
knowledge between collaborative partners all serve to increase the efficacy of 
collaboration to produce results on the ground. A lack of achievement through 
collaborative work serves to dilute the impact that all of these factors connote for 
collaborative systems.
The mechanics for collaboration
Coalition Forces are building capacity o f indigenous forces, forging 
relationships with local leaders and preventing Taliban attempts to re­
establish themselves in the area.
- US military efforts in Afghanistan55
The mechanics for collaboration centre on the ability of collaborative partners to 
manage options. Namely, the ability of the agents of the intervening power to both 
cooperate with and manipulate their partners in the indigenous elite through 
collaboration is largely defined by their capability to provide and exclude options.56 As 
military and political powers as well as financial resources, the agents of the intervening 
power can shape to a significant degree the working environment for collaboration by 
the options that they control in order to achieve their particular goals for an intervention. 
However, while the agents of the intervening power do have significant leverage, they
100
are still ultimately dependent on their collaboration with indigenous elites to attain their 
goals at a bearable cost, in both terms of blood and treasure. Given this, their ability to 
coerce the shape and undertakings of their indigenous collaborating partners, especially 
in the longer-term when partnered with a sovereign government, can be fairly limited.
For their part, the indigenous partners, also through the provision and exclusion of 
options, strive to translate the power and resources of the intervening power into 
opportunities to strengthen their positions within indigenous politics and to push their 
own domestic platforms. Successful indigenous collaborative partners are those who 
can translate external resources and power into terms of indigenous politics. They can 
manipulate those external forces of the intervening power into terms that can be 
‘internalised’ into indigenous politics, rather than just being other ‘external’ variables 
that might or might not have consequences for indigenous politics. In this way, 
indigenous collaborative partners attempt to channel the energy of the intervening 
power into not just strengthening their own positions, but also into roles and outcomes 
that are actually defined by indigenous politics rather than what the intervening power
fO
might attempt to define as their own ‘foreign’ ones.
Motivations for collaboration
Establishing good governance and national order will reduce the 
opportunity for the return o f  Taliban forces and their terrorist associates. It 
will ensure that Afghanistan is no longer a safe haven for terrorists to plan, 
organise and train.
- Government of Australia, ‘Australia’s National Security, 2005’59
As has been argued extensively in this thesis, Western states are motivated by their need 
to respond to the pericentric dynamic of frontiers of insecurity. They are provoked by a 
desire to mitigate their security concerns, and to a lesser degree to dampen humanitarian 
worries, by working to empower national governments in frontier states. The rationale 
to collaborate is more ambiguous for indigenous actors who face a ‘collaboration 
dilemma’, deciding whether to collaborate with the interventionists or to oppose them.60 
Overall, what indigenous elites are willing to participate in collaborative systems do so 
for the simple reason that if interventionist forces cannot be totally excluded, notably 
through military resistance, they can instead be used to improve their own status, access
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new resources, and change domestic realities.61 In that way foreign interventions 
provide indigenous elites with opportunities previously unavailable to them. These 
opportunities can cover a range of possibilities.
Undoubtedly prime motivations for many indigenous actors who participate in 
collaborative systems are genuine interests in improving their states. One of the most 
important ones in this regard is the desire by groups that had been brutalised by the
fkXprevious government or the ruling social group to collaborate with the interventionists. 
Furthermore, a general desire to end an anarchic, violence prone existence, even if that 
means tolerating a foreign intervention, is a compelling one. However, other less 
altruistic motivations can include economic considerations and personal 
aggrandisement.64 Whatever more individual motivations may exist, collaborating 
elites often see themselves as being required to play the role of an intermediary, 
positioning themselves to protect constituent groups from the interventionists or other 
domestic actors during turbulent times.65
The broader interests of social groups, often expressed through their elites, to 
collaborate with an intervening power can stem from a number of rationales, not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Allen Isaacman argued that five major reasons were 
prevalent: 1) to protect ones primordial group against encroachments by a historic 
enemy, 2) to facilitate expansionist ambitions, 3) to enable a segment of the ruling strata 
to regain or reinforce its privileged position, 4) to eliminate authoritarian regimes, and 
5) to increase ones economic status within a new order.66 In sum, group behaviour 
towards collaboration with other domestic groups or an intervening power is 
conditioned by past history and current realities. The more that a group’s needs can be 
met in isolation, as deemed possible from current realities and past experience, the less 
willing a respective group will be to engage in collaborative relationships and vice
67versa.
In addition to these more generalised points regarding collaborative motivation, a more 
specific analysis of ‘motive force’ can be applied through the development of a 
typology of collaboration. There are many types of individuals and groups who can
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participate in collaborative systems. Foreign actors can include military forces, 
diplomats, UN officers, NGO aid workers, and private sector contractors. By example, 
the US identifies its military ‘Combatant Commanders’ and diplomatic ‘Chiefs of
/ o
Missions’ as its primary actors for collaborative endeavours. Indigenous actors 
participating in collaborative systems can include government agents, warlords, 
politicians, religious and clan leaders, tribesmen, diaspora returnees, militias, local 
NGOs, civil society organisations, businessmen, and indeed the assorted strata of the 
general public.
Rather than try to create a typology of specific actors, as there are so many, it is more 
useful to look at the instrumental motivations for indigenous collaboration. This is 
because it helps ascertain the internal dynamics and approaches taken to the state 
building project of present interventions. Werner Rings created a typology for an 
historical analysis of collaboration and this thesis will use that as a basis but amend it 
accordingly for the conditions of present interventions.69 Four types of collaboration 
can thus be ascertained:
1) Neutral collaboration is that done knowingly and from self-interest and which 
indirectly works towards the achievement of the intervention’s goals. It does not mean 
that the intervening forces are actively supported or encouraged but because of the 
circumstances and the lack of better alternatives, they are tolerated. The best example 
of this collaboration can be found in the general public, often the majority of which 
might not particularly like the intervening power but also are unwilling to resist it in any 
meaningful way. Because of that they are willing to participate in such activities as 
elections or to continue with old jobs in the civil service.
2) Unconditional collaboration is when indigenous actors fully cooperate with an 
intervening force because they entirely endorse its principles and ideas. The motive is 
not dictated purely by circumstances but rather by a sincere belief to see the intervening 
power achieve its goals because they are considered a common cause ideologically. A 
frequent example of unconditional collaboration would be that undertaken by liberal 
indigenous political parties and diaspora returnees.
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3) Conditional collaboration is that done ‘up to a point’ and arguably the most 
common. Indigenous actors may endorse some but not all of the intervening power’s 
goals. Collaboration is partaken on points agreed but resistance provided elsewhere 
when there is no consensus with the intervening power. Furthermore, the conditionality 
of this type of collaboration also defines its modus operandi of leveraging the 
intervening power and other indigenous actors to concede to demands. A common 
example is political parties who have signed peace agreements and are bound by that to 
collaborate but who still exert resistance as felt necessary to pursue their own domestic 
agendas.
4) Tactical collaboration is that done despite outright animosity towards the 
intervening power. It can be done for a variety of reasons- to help overthrow an abusive 
regime or majority community, to prevent the mass murder of innocent people, or to 
engage in group or individual opportunism. Because it is tactical, it can be seen as 
collaboration to some shade but also as a form of resistance. Tactical collaborators 
would say of their collaboration, “I do... but I don’t.” Militias and armed groups can be 
examples whereby short-term collaboration is implemented secretly with an intervening 
power for local tactical gain.
Considering the rationalisations of both the intervening power and indigenous actors, 
the success or failure of collaborative systems is ultimately determined by the ability to 
mesh the demands of the intervening power, viz. to create a stronger state, with the 
rigidities of indigenous politics through achieving an evolving equilibrium between the
70two sets of collaborative linkages. In this way, the role of the indigenous 
collaborating elites as mediators is crucial and they can be considered as a fulcrum for 
achieving equilibrium between the often opposed external demands of the intervening 
power and the localised dynamics of indigenous politics.
Furthermore, given that the collaborative systems should change in tandem with the 
evolution of indigenous politics over time, indigenous collaborating elites can be seen 
as a sliding fulcrum for balancing the demands of the intervening power vis-a-vis those 
of indigenous politics as they respectively change. Ultimately, the challenge of
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collaboration is reaching an agreement as how to achieve the “overarching rationale for
♦ 71everybody”, i.e. the collaborative advantage. This overarching rationale to achieve
more together than alone helps to “drive the collaborative process and make it work
77more effectively.”
Collaboration as an evolution o f capacities
... from crisis response, to shaping the future...
- US Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006’73
Collaboration as a dynamic, interactive process of state building interventionism can be 
broken down into four phases: 1) identifying and selecting potential collaborative 
partners, 2) negotiating the terms and structures of a collaborative agreement, 3) 
monitoring and managing an ongoing collaboration and 4) terminating the collaborative 
project.74
The first phase is perhaps the most critical because the intervening power’s agents’ 
ability to control a foreign state is limited and collaboration with indigenous elites is
7c #
always necessary to some extent. Considering this, the choice of indigenous elites 
available to the intervening power is what should determine the form that the
• • 7Aintervention takes during and after any initiating military or diplomatic action. The 
intervention’s chosen administrative, constitutional, military, economic and social 
policies should all fundamentally be institutionalisations of the indigenous politics that 
the intervening power is interfacing with through collaboration. A poor choice of 
policies by the intervener, based on miscalculations of the capabilities of collaborative 
partners in the indigenous elite and more importantly of the dynamics of the internal 
collaborative set, can only result in a decreased likelihood of interventionist actors 
achieving an intervention’s initiating goals.
In sum, the potential for successful collaborative systems in the external collaborative 
set is possible through the choice and combination of collaborating indigenous elites 
available to the agents of the intervening power. The selection of collaborating elites 
must be made in consideration of how those elites are to collaborate themselves in the
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internal collaborative set with local interests and institutions. It is counter-productive to 
prescribe which combinations of actors are most useful for interventionism because the 
context of each intervention is too important to allow for formulaic prescriptions. The 
one driving dynamic of choosing collaborative partners by the intervening power is that 
they have “amenable successors” in the form of a more effective national government
77once the intervention concludes.
As the political, social and economic conditions that define indigenous politics evolve,
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the collaborative systems for both sets of linkages should change accordingly. If 
collaborative relationships remain static, then it is likely that the entire collaborative 
endeavour will fail. The agents of the intervening power may be able to exert a 
disproportionate amount of leverage, at least initially, due to their political and military 
dominance. Yet, if the agents of the intervening power demand too much from their 
collaborative partners in the indigenous elite, they risk undermining them if those elites 
are unable to ‘square’ their subsequent actions with the local interest groups and 
institutions of the internal set given its very different collaborative dynamics.79 
Similarly, for their part, indigenous collaborating elites must be careful not to be seen 
conceding too much to the intervener’s agents as to do so would serve to de-legitimise
AA
them within the internal collaborative set. Overall, for interventionists the benefits of 
intervening must outweigh the costs of temporarily exerting control in a frontier state. 
Concomitantly, for indigenous politics the benefits of indigenous elites for collaborating
o 1
must exceed the costs of not doing so.
The surest source of striking a balance of interests between the intervening power and 
its collaborators in the indigenous elite stems from the fact that the interventionists and 
indigenous collaborative partners will generally have different levels of interests
o9 •
conducive to partnership. The intervening power will most likely be concerned with 
central politics and other macro-issues, for instance the respective state’s foreign and 
defence policies. On the other hand, indigenous collaborating partners will be much 
more focused on localised interests and strengthening their standing within the domain 
of domestic politics. This diffusion of interests, albeit interfaced by general 
commonalities of the individual goals of the intervention, allows for collaboration to 
continue and be beneficial to all of its participants.
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At this point it is useful to illustrate what roles interventionist might play and how these 
roles will be shared over the evolution of an intervention with indigenous collaborative 
partners. The roles played by interventionists can be viewed as a spectrum, notably in 
terms o f the depth of sovereign control assumed by interventionists. Building upon the 
work of Michael Doyle and Andrea Kathryn Talentino, it is possible to present such a 
spectrum. The below table summarises how this thesis views the possible roles of
interventionists: 
Table: 4.1.
Role(s) of
intervening
actors
Structure of
intervening
party
Reform mandate for internal 
politics
Degree of intrusiveness 
and coercion
Peace-making Political
delegation
Only peace agreement advice Very low- external efforts 
to push peace
Peace- keeping Light military 
force
None, just to monitor peace 
agreement
Low- military forces on 
ground but only 
monitoring and advising 
accordingly
Peace-building Civilian force 
backed by light 
military presence
Monitoring peace agreement and in 
some cases organising the 
implementation o f human rights 
policy, national democratic elections 
and economic rehabilitation
M edium- external actor 
helps to shape domestic 
events- such as elections 
but does not regularly use 
military force
Peace-enforcing Civilian force 
backed by strong 
and active 
military presence
Actively supports settlement terms 
against spoilers, including through 
regular military force
High- external military 
forces are engaged in 
using military force to 
shape domestic situation
Peace-instigating Strong civilian 
and military 
forces
Comprehensive- includes all major 
aspects o f domestic politics and all 
the other roles
Very High- can include the 
temporary, official control 
o f  the state
If undertaken by themselves, peace-making and peace-keeping could be seen as first 
generation interventionist roles while peace-building and peace-enforcing could be 
construed as second generation ones. Lastly, peace-instigating could be viewed as a 
third generation role. These latter three roles are important because they allow for the 
active participation o f the intervening power in state building itself. Peace-making and 
peace-keeping are important roles that potentially could be employed during an 
intervention but conversely can be utilised outside of interventions as well whereas the 
other three cannot.
Many academics have advocated undertaking and implementing state building 
interventions in numerous, singular forms- for instance as ‘security-keeping’ or ‘peace 
maintenance’, or just focussing on one o f the roles o f peacebuilding, peace-making, or
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peace-enforcing in themselves. However, rather than view interventions in singular 
ways and as binary choices, what is important to conceptualise is that present 
interventions can come in many forms and that a respective intervention can evolve in 
terms of role-playing as the situation in the state evolves, most notably as the national 
government’s capacity changes and depending on how peace spoilers develop.84 
Indeed, those designing and implementing interventions may decide circumstances 
dictate that they undertake various roles simultaneously or progress through them 
dynamically.85 Lastly, they might assume different roles in different parts o f a frontier 
state. For instance in the DR Congo’s capital o f Kinshasa, the UN provides a peace­
building role to support the national government while in the eastern provinces it 
assumes peace-enforcement responsibilities as it actively engages in combat with anti- 
government militias to disarm them.
Overall, it is crucial to visualise collaboration as a spectrum of collaborative systems 
continually shifting during the evolution o f indigenous politics as collaborative 
participants assess their goals and change their capacities. The degree o f control of 
internal processes and outcomes, notably o f the state’s military or administration 
functions, required by the intervening power to realise its goals for an intervention are 
inversely proportionate to the ability o f the collaborative indigenous elite to provide the 
same control within the state, notably through government apparatuses, depending on its 
own changing capacities. As an intervention proceeds, those roles played by 
interventionist forces should ideally change accordingly, viz. ‘peace-enforcement’ and 
‘peace-instigation’ through to a presence resembling classic peacekeeping, until an 
intervention is outright concluded.
Evolving capacities of collaborative partners during interventions
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The ability of the indigenous elite to function more effectively through governance is 
then dependant through the internal collaborative set upon the shape and structure that 
local interests demand and institutions take. By example, an indigenous collaborating 
elite lacking in popular legitimacy and overseeing an exceptionally fractured domestic 
society would require a more coercive and intrusive participation in the frontier state’s 
political space by the intervening power. Yet, during the course of an intervention, 
assuming the given frontier state progresses from exceptionally fractured politics and 
little government capacity to more formalised political processes supported by an 
increasingly capable government, the degree of direct control required by the 
intervening power could decline. As this progression is made, the type of control 
exhibited by the intervener would shift from a more intrusive control of the state 
apparatus itself to more informal influence by the intervening power through the ruling, 
collaborative elite in government. Contrary to this, an increase in turmoil of indigenous 
politics would potentially require a stronger presence by the intervening power.
It is important to conclude this section by defining when state building interventions 
based upon collaborative systems can be considered to have concluded. Emphasising 
collaboration as a spectrum of degrees of control over processes and outcomes geared 
towards state building, two points can hence be made. ‘Progress’ during an intervention 
comes through pushing indigenous politics deftly in a direction conducive to an 
interventionist’s own political and security needs, notably in the form of more capable 
national governance.87 The outright conclusion of an intervention is possible when the 
relationships between states have been restored to a satisfactory level whereby the 
intervening power feels that it will still be able to maintain adequate opportunities and 
protection for itself once its interventionist forces vacate the state in which it intervened. 
If there is no possibility for its indigenous collaborating partners to maintain the 
intervener’s interests and security after its departure, then the intervening power will be 
unable, or at least hesitant, to leave. Interventionist actors will have to stay and either 
further strengthen those particular indigenous collaborating partners or choose new ones 
and develop their capabilities suitably.
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4.4: The ‘collaboration problematique’ of state building interventionism
They may, or may not, be citizens o f a new world empire- perhaps an 
economic, cultural, or media empire, i f  not a political one. They may even 
be barbarians, outcasts or refugees knocking vainly at the gates o f such an 
empire. But they will be world citizens, more fully than their ancestors ever 
were.88
The collaboration problematique is the difficulty that an intervener has in achieving 
collaborative systems with indigenous actors and of maintaining an evolving 
equilibrium in and between the sets of collaborative systems that allows for progress 
towards an intervention’s goals. Defining an intervention’s collaboration problematique 
as a medium for assessing its overall efficacy provides for an insightful analytical 
discourse for academia and a powerful policy-design tool for governments. Considering 
that, this section will briefly outline a theoretical paradigm for doing so.
Challenges to and the failure o f collaboration
The challenges to implementing collaborative systems and maintaining them to allow 
progression towards achieving an intervention’s goals are many. General pitfalls to
OQ
wanting to engage in collaborative efforts are threefold. An actor engaging in a 
collaborative process firstly loses control to make decisions which can be especially 
problematic if events appear to be going wrong and corrective action cannot be readily 
taken. Secondly, individual actors lose flexibility to amend their course of action 
because of agreements with their collaborative partners, which means quick responses 
or the ability to act with discretion can be hindered. Lastly, a further pitfall to 
collaboration is the loss of ‘glory’. Engaging in collaborative relationships means credit 
must be shared at some times and at others completely forsaken by one partner so that 
the other can claim full credit.
In addition to the pitfalls that might cause hesitance to engage in collaboration in the 
first place are other challenges to actually implementing effective collaborative systems. 
The first challenge, and perhaps the biggest one for an intervening power, is to initially 
identify what collaborative relationships are even possible and whether or not the costs 
that are necessary to support them are worthy of the goal that is sought. Miscalculations
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in this regard can be disastrous and ultimately leave an intervening power mired in an 
endeavour that was largely doomed from the start. The second challenge is that the 
maintenance of collaborative relationships is complicated by norms that may not be 
fully shared, if at all, by interventionists and their indigenous partners. Democracy, 
human rights, ‘good governance’, women’s empowerment, and free markets are but a 
few examples of contentious ideas that can provoke tensions between collaborative 
partners from different cultures. A third challenge is the controversial area in 
collaborative relationships of goal setting and timeframes. Collaborative relationships 
are dynamic ones based on bargaining. They need to be constantly in flux allowing for 
the re-arranging of responsibilities and capacities. Discrepancies in the understandings 
of expected outcomes, both in terms of ‘end products’ delivered and within certain 
timeframes, between collaborative partners can greatly weaken responsiveness between 
partners and hence the entire collaborative endeavour.90
In addition to the general challenges of collaboration, the outright failure of 
collaborative systems results for two major reasons. The first reason is that if there is a 
lack of responsiveness between the different participants, the collaborative systems are 
inherently bound to fail.91 Collaboration is by definition a multi-party effort premised 
on being able to achieve more together than what is possible individually. If the various 
participants in either the internal or external sets of collaborative systems do not 
respond to the demands inherent to participation, progress towards the broader and 
individual goals of those systems will not be reached. If that happens, either new 
collaborative systems will be formed or the intervention will stagnate in terms of 
progressing towards its goals until it collapses.
The cause of unresponsiveness by the various parties can result for a variety of reasons. 
Firstly, participants may have initially overcommitted and simply not have the power or 
resources to deliver on their agreements. Secondly, the ability of the participants to 
deliver results may have waned because of changing ‘in-house’ dynamics, for instance 
lowered public support in the intervening power’s domestic politics or the loss of a 
charismatic leader in an indigenous political party. Thirdly, in their efforts to 
manipulate their collaborative relationships, participants may be withholding following 
through on agreements in order to exert guiding pressure on the relationships. These are
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but three possibilities for unresponsiveness, others exist as well, but decisively, 
responsiveness must be exhibited if collaborative systems are to be maintained and kept 
effective.
The second major reason for the failure of collaborative systems is if miscalculations 
have been made by collaborative partners, in either set, in ensuring an evolving 
equilibrium in their relationships. Common challenges to an evolving equilibrium are 
that imbalances are inculcated in the formation of the relationships because the 
intervening power chose poorly or demanded too much of collaborative partners in the 
indigenous elite initially. Furthermore, if collaborative partners are unable to ensure 
that their relationships are sufficiently dynamic to maintain an equilibrium that balances 
the control either side seeks of internal processes and outcomes, the entire collaborative 
endeavour can collapse.
The ability of an intervening power to rally a significant proportion of the indigenous 
political elite into collaborative systems effectively makes active resistance costly and 
ultimately futile. However, should opponents of the intervening power be able to 
effectively detach that power’s ability to collaborate with indigenous politics, then the 
power would be forced to leave the country. This formation of a ‘united front of non­
collaboration’ is a dangerous development for any intervening power’s collaborative
QO *systems. If an intervening power is incapable of undertaking collaboration with any 
indigenous partners with the political or administrative capacity necessary to effectively 
work with, its interventionist efforts are effectively made pointless. Another hazardous 
possibility would be that should one era of collaborative systems collapse and the costs 
of creating new ones be especially high (this assumes there is no united front of non­
collaboration), then the intervening power would have to leave as the new costs negate 
the value of reaching the intervention’s original goals.
The structure o f * non-collaboration ’
A pertinent question to now analyse further is: If not collaboration, then what? Non- 
collaborative systems can be defined in the context of state building interventionism as 
those dynamics within indigenous politics that coalesce in response to collaborative
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systems to challenge both the intents and interests of the intervening power and its 
indigenous collaborative partners, namely their consolidation of an effective national 
government. The non-collaboration participants who align themselves against the 
intervening power and its indigenous collaborating partners will be those indigenous 
actors who can cater to the different strata of indigenous politics that the intervening 
power is unable to interface with through its own collaborative systems.
Indigenous non-collaboration can be seen as an inversed formation of indigenous 
collaboration since they are both catalysed by the intervention itself. While the forms 
and shapes of the indigenous collaborative systems will evolve according to their 
relationship with the intervening power, the development of non-collaboration will also 
be shaped significantly by the presence of the intervening power. The spread of 
technology, the creation of larger political units, the development of broader political 
horizons, and the inducements for the citizenry’s wider interest and participation in the 
respective state’s political processes can all result and be directly shaped by the 
presence of the intervening power and hence the indigenous resistance to it as well.
However, although this thesis uses the terms ‘collaboration’ and ‘non-collaboration’ 
extensively, it must be emphasised that they are not always simple binaries because they 
are both part of a “complex pattern of reaction” to foreign penetration.94 While in some 
instances they are, such as insurgents who actively battle the nascent national 
government and foreign troops; at other times it can be seen that “collaboration and 
resistance mingle.”95 Remembering that collaboration is more about mediating 
functions during an interactive, dynamic process of state building, it is important to 
avoid analysis (and policy prescriptions) that simply label indigenous actors as 
‘collaborator’ or ‘non-collaborator’, something that will be discussed in the detail in 
later chapters.96 In general, as Timothy Brook argued, an understanding of 
collaboration and the challenges to it are best gleaned from the “thickets of ambiguity
07rather [than]... the familiar trees of collaboration or resistance.”
The overall objective of present interventions is to strengthen national governments 
such that they can more effectively govern their sovereign territory. Given that, an
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intervention’s activities strive to help the government gamer the support of the bulk of 
the population. Conversely, non-collaboration as a dynamic seeks to de-legitimise the 
interventionist’s intentions and hence the national government it is supporting. As seen
QO
in the graph below , ideally an intervention must see a gradual change in public 
attitudes towards supporting the national government if it is to progress.
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During an intervention it is unlikely that the elimination o f all forms o f non­
collaboration can be achieved. In any case, all that is required for the intervention to 
conclude ‘successfully’ is if non-collaboration can be minimised to a point whereby the 
national government can stand on its own against such resistance without interventionist 
forces being present.
4.5: Conclusion
The test for US policy in Afghanistan, as in any other post-conflict setting, is 
how quickly and solidly we can help the people and their leaders build a 
political order that is legitimate by their terms and based on their traditions 
and history. - US Ambassador Zalmay K halilzad"
This chapter has outlined an updated and expanded theory o f collaboration premised 
upon the work o f the historian Ronald Robinson. The central tenet o f the theory of 
collaboration is that indigenous collaborative systems, more than anything else, 
determine the structure, dynamics and ultimate efficacy o f state building interventions 
in the post-Cold War era. Present interventions rely on collaborative systems, both of 
internal and external sets, because they define the interface between interventionist
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forces with indigenous politics. Unless the energy and resources of the intervening 
power can be translated and internalised into terms of indigenous politics, the 
intervention will be unable to achieve its state building goals.
Given these arguments, an academic analysis of the agency of collaborative systems is
crucial to analysing post-Cold War interventions. In conclusion, the following four
tenets can be highlighted to summarise the theory of collaboration:
• The absence or presence of effective indigenous partners as well as the
structure of indigenous society determine whether interventions are 
practicable or not.
• The choice and combination of indigenous collaborative systems
available to the intervening power should define the structure and form
that the intervention takes- be it administrative, military, diplomatic, or 
legal.
• The degree of control necessitated for the intervening power to assert in
order to achieve its goals is inversely proportionate to that of the
capabilities (and hence control) which the collaborating indigenous elite 
are able to provide through governance.
• If the intervening power runs out of effective, responsive indigenous
collaborating partners, it is forced to leave even if it has not achieved its 
goals.100
115
C h a p t e r  5 :  G r a d u a l i s m  C o l l a b o r a t i o n
Today, the aim is for partners to govern and police themselves effectively.
- US Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006’1
The previous chapter provided a theoretical explanation for the centrality of 
collaboration to state building interventionism. The theory of collaboration’s value is 
that it presents a set of ideas useful for conceptualising and explaining the very complex 
process of state building during interventions. However, the theory of collaboration is 
relatively clinical and linear yet the reality is that collaboration is an incredibly messy 
and complicated endeavour, especially so in the context of frontier zones. Considering 
that, this chapter will analyse how collaboration is actually undertaken during current 
state building interventions using the theory of collaboration, notably by looking at the 
nature as well as key aspects of the framework and mechanics of collaboration.
Collaboration is currently defined by the ‘gradualism’ required for interventionists to be 
gradually freed of the imperatives to intervene directly and for indigenous partners to 
gradually assume a rightful position of sovereign independence. This is primarily 
because in contrast to imperialism in the past, the ‘imperialistic’ collaboration of present 
interventions is based on a ‘gradualism of collaboration’ centred on the empowerment 
of indigenous partners in sovereign national governments. This requires a strong 
emphasis on compromise, consensus and mutual reliance, something which leads the 
balances of collaborative relationships to be generally inclined towards strong 
indigenous participation.
5.1; The nature of gradualism collaboration
Once, nations were forged through ‘blood and iron’. Today, the world 
seeks to build them through conflict resolution, multilateral aid, and free 
elections2
A starting point necessary to be covered before proceeding is to put present 
collaboration into context by further reviewing that of the past. The imperialism of the 
past, notably that of colonialist Europe, was most often based on the forceful co-option 
of indigenous elites into collaboration through the strong “possibility of coercive 
violence.” As Michael Doyle argued, persuasion was first used to engage with local 
elites, followed by political coercion and outright bribery, but should all of these 
collaborative approaches fail, European imperialists still had “gunboats... to supplement 
their shortcomings.”4
In contrast, the defining rationale of state building interventionists, seeking to 
strengthen indigenous collaborative partners as quickly as possible, means that present 
collaboration is defined by its gradualism. Present collaboration based upon 
imperialistic methods mean that interventionists must largely accommodate the 
dynamics of indigenous politics rather than coerce it through force. In this way, current 
collaboration could also be considered temperate as intervening military forces must 
maintain some self-restraint in their efforts to shape domestic politics through 
indigenous political actors. Given these restraints, the limited control exerted during 
present interventions precludes overt, formal rule except in a few circumstances, 
notably in Kosovo and Bosnia, and instead prefers informal, indirect control evolving 
steadily towards the full withdrawal of interventionist forces.
While present interventionism is imperialistic rather than imperialist, one historical 
comparison worth making is of the US’ experiences in the Philippines. Central to the 
US approach in the Philippines was the “conservative gradualism of collaboration”, as 
identified by David Steinberg. This was namely the US’ effort to reconcile her own 
anti-imperialist feelings with a need to exert imperial control there by reaching an 
“evolutionary understanding” with the indigenous elite. Notably they were allowed to 
“espouse an evolutionary nationalism which would lead to independence when the 
nation was ready” but had to accept US imperial rule in the meantime.5 Thus, a 
symbiotic relationship was made possible by US concessions to the Filipino oligarchic 
elite, which had large amounts of influence over the Filipino masses, which helped to 
ensure relative stability.6
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Overall, what is crucial for understanding present interventionism in relation to this 
historical experience is that the gradualism of collaboration equates to what the theory 
of collaboration termed the ‘evolving equilibrium’ of collaboration. This is notably 
whereby indigenous elites accept an evolving degree of foreign interference because 
they know foreign control is merely temporary and their own empowerment (albeit 
qualified through democratisation) is the exit strategy of the interventionists. The most 
important difference between the collaboration of current interventions and that of 
outright imperialism concerns the degrees of empowerment allowed to indigenous 
partners. The informal, indirect imperial rule of the past, such as that of the British, had 
the goal of “maintaining a balance of political influence between imperial collaborators
n
and nascent nationalists.” Such a balance effectively compromised the ability of either 
group to supplant the imperialist’s ultimate control. Considering that, the major 
difference with present interventionism’s collaboration, viz. why it is imperialistic and 
not imperialism, is that the goal of interventionists now is to strengthen indigenous 
collaborative partners, defined by a high cognizance of nationalism amongst them, to 
supplant their own interventionist control whereby they can gladly leave.
The most important aspect of this empowerment is the role of democratisation, what
o
James Dobbins calls the “core objective” of state building interventions. 
Democratisation during interventions is advocated because it serves several basic 
purposes. Holding elections ideally makes it possible to install a more legitimate 
government which should encourage a more stable state through the instigation of a 
durable democratic system.9 This is especially crucial for present collaboration as it 
allows interventionists to partner with indigenous political actors after elections to fill a 
political void at the national level, one which might have been provisionally filled by 
interventionists such as in East Timor.
In sum, this emphasis on democratisation aims at meeting two paramount needs as 
defined presently by Western states: to create stronger states and ones that that are also 
generally liberal in character. Indeed, one academic has gone so far as to term US 
efforts at democratisation through interventionism, by example, as “Wilsonianism with 
a vengeance.”10 In this way, if one feels compelled to intervene, as liberal states as 
possible ought to be created, something not mutually exclusive to meeting security
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needs. For instance, Robert Jervis argued President Bush’s liberal goals for US 
interventionism were “an end in itself as well as a means to US security.”11 In terms of 
collaboration, Bush has himself articulated a preference to working with governments 
that bear a liberal orientation, noting that the US “can reward and support governments
* • • 17 •that make the right choices for their own people.” This emphasis on democratisation 
is premised on a strong belief in the ‘democratic peace theory’ that democracies are 
inherently the most peaceful states.
The gradualism of present collaboration results largely from this emphasis placed upon 
democratisation. Specifically, democratisation pushes interventionists to choose 
collaborative partners primarily through elections rather than the forceful, opportunistic 
co-option of elites. This is also another explanation of why present collaboration must 
not be ‘traditional imperialism’ in nature, a topic written about most suitably by Robert 
Cooper. The ideology of imperialism is over and with it a desire at times to solely use 
force to co-opt elites into collaboration. Hence, there can be no return to imperialism in 
its traditional form because Western states now have an ideology of democracy which 
cannot be implemented fundamentally through coercion.13 The most Western 
interventions can do is to “create the conditions for it”, notably by providing to 
indigenous actors “breathing space” to enable them to re-establish a more stable state.14
In any case, regardless of Western sentiments, the traditional imperialism of times past 
is simply not acceptable to indigenous peoples in a ‘post-imperial’ age. The most 
important aspect that this distinction means for collaboration is that present 
interventionism must “be voluntary if it is to be acceptable; if it is to last it has to be co­
operative.”15 This responds to the reality that Western states do not seek a return to 
their imperial history and that indigenous political actors engaging them through 
collaboration only do so because they perceive their collaboration to be of a different 
nature than that undertaken during past imperialism. Ultimately, as Cooper concludes, 
present interventions see indigenous collaboration with interventionists as largely 
voluntary and hence subject to negotiation and compromise.16 This parallels Michael 
Doyle’s argument that Western interventionists seek to instigate an “active process of
1 7consent-based intervention.” While such compromise, consent and open negotiation
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may not be as efficient as older types of imperial collaboration; it is all that is possible 
in a post-imperial era.
It is also important to note that aside from the more normative dynamics of a post­
imperial age, the practicalities of present interventions also necessitate a gradualism of 
collaboration. Notable is the reality that intervening forces are usually relatively small 
in number and hence must be more readily willing to compromise and give leeway to 
indigenous partners accordingly. The UN has the most emphasis on a supple, gradualist 
approach to collaboration because it does not have the resources or sovereign mandate 
to use such force so must rely more extensively on collaboration with empowered 
indigenous partners. Even non-UN interventions are the same though, including that of 
the US in Afghanistan, because the interventionist forces are so relatively few in 
number.
However, while the gradualism of collaboration allows for more flexibility towards 
collaborative relationships with indigenous partners, it is still rigid in important ways. 
This is primarily in that it does seek to strengthen states towards a liberal democratic 
outcome. There have been no Western interventions after the Cold War to restore 
monarchies (aside from Kuwait which was not a frontier) and there have been no 
interventions by Western forces, including through the UN, which did not have a clear 
emphasis on creating more liberal, democratic states. It is also important to conclude 
that gradualism collaboration still allows for the strong influence of interventionists. 
Interventions occur in the frontier context where there are “fragmented societies” and 
the “usual structures of mediation between the different segments of the societies are
1 ftgenerally weak.” This allows interventionists a good deal of leeway to impose 
themselves onto a situation, especially during the early stages of an intervention.
A second overarching point for a discussion of gradualism collaboration must be to 
emphasise that Western interventionists are not neutral participants in a frontier state. 
They are partisan actors attempting to push frontier states in very specific directions and 
they do so through their collaboration with partners from amongst indigenous politics. 
At its most simplest, the very presence of interventionist forces compromises their
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neutrality, notably in the context of intra-state war. As Mark Duffield rightly concludes, 
“It is impossible to be neutral within the logic of internal war.”19 Many advocates of 
interventionism, notably under the misguided label of ‘humanitarian’, argue that 
interventionism should be defined by impartiality. However, intervention by definition 
is not impartial or neutral and certainly indigenous actors do not perceive it as such 
because “whatever form intervention takes means influencing the social, political and 
economic foundations of local society.”
While few would doubt the partisan nature of US or NATO interventionism, for 
instance, even UN operations cannot be considered as wholly impartial endeavours 
benignly assisting locals through turbulent times. Not only does the UN affect local 
political dynamics, but local political actors perceive the UN as an actor to be 
manipulated for their own use as well. Even those foreign actors who most value their 
ostensible neutrality, humanitarian aid agencies, cannot be considered as fully neutral 
actors, especially as regards indigenous perceptions of them. For instance, indigenous 
NGOs often “denounce that which they call the collusion, at their expense, between 
large northern NGOs and the UN.”21 In this sense, international NGOs are perceived by 
indigenous actors as interventionists actors of the West, notably as ‘sub-contractors’ to 
Western governments and the UN.22
Given that they are not neutral, Western interventionists presently face a definitive 
conundrum; they feel the need to undertake imperialistic state building interventionism 
but they do not want to be ‘imperialists’. Given that, present interventionism is defined 
by the “essential contradiction” of using imperialistic means to strengthen sovereign 
states, which essentially means “building institutions for the sake of local people, 
without confiscating their decision-making capacity.” One ramification of this is that 
where the imperial militaries of the past “were often too brutal in the actions they took”; 
present interventionists “are often too reluctant to take action. 24 This dilemma 
provokes the driving conundrum of present collaboration, namely how to empower 
locals through the imperialistic means of interventionism without becoming truly 
imperial, a topic to be discussed extensively in the balance of this thesis.
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5.2: The framework of gradualism collaboration
Any effort to build the post-war order must be based on a fundamental 
understanding o f the aspirations or political centre o f  gravity o f a newly 
liberated society and must be implemented by civilian and political leaders 
who know how to align the United States with those goals.
- US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad25
It is important to recall the theory of collaboration’s emphasis on the ‘politics of 
collaboration’, namely the ‘continual renegotiation of the terms and conditions of 
cooperation.... a process of constant manoeuvre for political advantage’. This 
manoeuvring centres on the need for leverage to successfully engage in the bargaining 
that defines collaboration. Considering this overarching imperative, it is necessary to 
understand the framework supporting collaboration by reviewing expected outcomes, 
the external and internal sets of collaboration, and the definitive characteristics of 
gradualism collaboration.
Shared expectations of gradualism collaboration
The US, its allies and partners must remain vigilant to those states that lack 
the capacity to govern activity within their borders.
- US Department of Defense, ‘National Defense Strategy, 2005’26
A starting point for understanding present collaboration is to firstly review what 
expected outcomes are shared by collaborative partners. For interventionists, the 
primary rationale for state building interventionism is the initiating lack of suitable 
collaborative partners conducive to meeting the security needs of the West, viz. the 
pericentric pull of frontiers. Hence the goal of present interventions is to empower 
collaborative partners in the form of stronger national governments to more capably 
administer their sovereign areas. This effort intends to translate the interventionists’ 
external resources and power into indigenous politics conducive to ameliorating the 
pericentric pull of frontiers.
From the perspective of indigenous collaborative partners, what is expected is a stronger 
but ultimately independent state free of interventionists; hence that there be a
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‘gradualism of collaboration’. Western interventionists have an explicit desire to create 
liberal, democratic states. While this goal is certainly shared by some indigenous 
partners, it is by no means a given. What could be considered an overarching goal 
amongst indigenous participants would be more moderated expectations of a new 
political regime supporting greater stability. Of course, such generalisation is open to 
numerous local interpretations, hence the centrality of the ‘politics of collaboration’ 
towards pushing for individual viewpoints. What unites these indigenous and 
interventionists perspectives is a loose consensus that new or reformed state institutions 
are required and that they must be strong enough to enforce ‘the rules’ conducive to 
ensuring greater stability over the longer-term. While some of these institutions and 
rules are fairly controversial, such as constitutional law or security sector reform, others 
are less controversial, such as strengthening national bureaucracies.
The easiest method for ensuring shared understandings of expected outcomes is to have 
explicit, detailed mandates. For UN missions there will be a mandate for the mission 
but otherwise interventionists will declare their aims through public statements. The 
easiest mandate to implement for interventionists is that of enforcing a peace agreement 
because of its explicit dictates. As Beatrice Pouligny argued, this “affects the situation
radically” because the stipulations have already been through long negotiations where
• onthe details have been agreed upon. This of course does not mean that parties will not 
try to later nuance their interpretations but peace agreements do at least allow a starting 
basis for creating common understanding. The challenge more generally is that peace 
agreements do not cover ‘state building’ activities in detail, leaving interventionists and 
their indigenous partners stipulated by the peace agreements to work through those finer 
points.
Where common expectations are decidedly ambiguous, the opportunities for 
manipulation by indigenous actors become greater. The challenge of this is either that 
false hopes are raised about an intervention’s purposes or conversely that the ambiguity 
is openly exploited to foster further conflict. Considering collaboration as constant 
manoeuvring for political advantage, ambiguities in common expectations leave 
indigenous actors free to exploit the situation. One example has been the lack of a clear
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‘end goal’ for Kosovo, which has been exploited by both nationalists within Kosovo 
and Serbia seeking to respectively promote or stymie independence there.
Sets o f collaboration for gradualism collaboration
The theory of collaboration defines the actual workings of interventions as being 
dependent upon collaborative systems, i.e. the sum of collaborative relationships linking 
interventionists with indigenous politics. These collaborative systems are based on the 
internal and external sets of collaboration linking interventionists with their 
collaborative partners and subsequently with the broader population. Given this, a 
defining aspect of present collaboration is the interface of the intervening power 
primarily with national governments, mostly through the holding of elections and the 
institutionalisation of state apparatuses that constitute the external collaborative set. 
Furthermore, even more importantly in the medium and longer-term is the internal 
collaborative set which is defined largely by the efforts of national governments to 
acquire legitimacy from their state’s citizenry and to exude greater control over their 
sovereign territories.
The first set of collaboration is the external set, that which is focused on reforming or 
creating anew national governments. With the most important interventionist goal 
being to strengthen a national government, the key tenet of the theory of collaboration 
related to the external set is that the choice and combination of indigenous collaborative 
systems available to the intervening power should define the structure and form that the 
intervention takes. Considering this, it is important to firstly examine which indigenous 
actors are chosen for the external set and how so.
The first method, and perhaps the easiest one, for ‘choosing’ collaborative partners is 
through the signing of peace agreements, notably so for UN missions. The primary 
advantage of peace agreements is that they clearly identify the principal partners with 
whom the UN will collaborate. Prominent examples of this in recent interventions have 
been the UN partnering with the armed groups which signed peace agreements in the 
DR Congo and Liberia. Furthermore, peace agreements may also legitimise an existing 
national government as a transitional one but also introduce its armed adversaries into
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an extended peace process, thereby introducing them as collaborative partners for the 
interventionists. An example of this was the UN intervention in Cambodia whereby 
Hun Sen’s Vietnamese-backed government was recognized but its primary adversary, 
the Khmer Rouge was also introduced as a partner, albeit one that could be defined as 
‘tactical collaboration’ as they were widely loathed by the UN interventionists and vice 
versa.
The second method is selecting collaborative partners through national elections. With 
its emphasis on democratisation, present interventionism has commonly sought to 
legitimise itself through its collaborative partnerships with democratically chosen 
indigenous actors. This has most often been seen through the election of national 
governments after a transition period, such as in the DR Congo or East Timor. 
Furthermore, during some interventions, actors initially chosen for collaboration 
through peace agreements are discarded after national elections. An example of this 
was the LURD and MODEL rebel movements in Liberia which participated in the 
transition period stipulated by the peace agreement but whom then lost out in the first 
national elections.
The third method is the outright selection of indigenous partners when both peace 
agreements and national elections are entirely lacking. A prominent early example of 
this was the intervention in Somalia. During this time, the UN’s effort to find partners 
became extended down to the local level as it sought to distance itself from warlords
9 o
through the diversification of its indigenous partnerships. This strategy included 
forming local district councils of traditional elders and other civil society actors. A 
more recent example is of the US’ intervention in Afghanistan whereby it chose the 
Northern Alliance and the Pashtun factions loyal to Hamid Kharzai to lead an interim- 
govemment, albeit one endorsed through a ‘loyal jurga’ council.
Lastly, it is also important to note that when there are no peace agreements, no 
elections, and no possibilities for relatively strong collaborative partners to emerge 
quickly, interventionists have been most likely to assume a great deal of control 
themselves. East Timor provides the best example of this whereby the UN felt
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compelled to assume the role of a trustee for an interim period prior to national 
elections. During the interim period, the main collaborative actor chosen to work with 
was the FRETELIN insurgency movement, which gradually morphed into a political 
party to contest the national elections. In a similar line of thought, such ‘default 
collaborators’ are more rarely dictated by the reality that monopolistic political and 
military movements arose in territories and assumed some of the functions of a 
government, for instance the Kosovo Liberation Army. In these instances, the external 
collaborative set is largely limited to these indigenous actors who have been able to
• • 9 0monopolise a state’s political space prior to an intervention starting.
Overall, during processes for choosing collaborative partners from indigenous politics, 
armed actors have stronger likelihoods for selection. The most basic reason for this is 
that frontiers are defined by their intra-state conflict and the proliferation of armed non­
state actors. Interventionists are most concerned, especially in the initiating phases of 
an intervention, with ensuring a necessary minimum of pacification on the part of “the
on
military leaders whose power of obstruction is most serious.” In this manner, peace 
agreements implemented through interventions often exclude other indigenous actors 
from participating in post-conflict activities. A prominent example of this was in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina where the extended conflict negated the potential of political 
parties who had early-on advocated maintaining Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territorial
'X1integrity and multi-ethnic character. However, eventually the diversification of 
collaborative participants away from armed groups is possible. This is primarily as the 
intervention develops away from any initiating violence, which is the time when the 
“salience of military force or presence is more important.” This is especially so as 
national governments are formed and the indigenous actors of most consequence for 
collaborative systems become political parties, bureaucracies, and government leaders.
With these considerations in mind, it is possible to explore the purpose of the external 
set. This is primarily to interface the intervening power with indigenous politics 
whereby, the demands of the interventionists are made known while conversely 
providing a medium broadcasting the intentions and demands of the indigenous 
community through their collaborative elites, especially the national government. Once 
again, the role of democratisation has played a prominent role for attempting to achieve
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this through gradualism collaboration. Interventionists believe that political parties 
assuming power through elections will have the legitimacy to represent the natural 
interests of their constituencies. In this manner, the main interface during an 
intervention is the interactions of the interventionists directly with a national 
government through ministerial meetings, staff exchanges, training programmes, etc.
If democratic elections leading to a national government are delayed in preference for a 
transition period, it has often been accepted that traditional leaders representing their 
own constituencies might play the same role as democratically elected ones. A good 
example of this was the usage of the ‘loyal jurga’ in Afghanistan to connect the 
demands of the interventionists, initially that a new non-Taliban and anti-al-Qaeda 
government be formed, with the desires of the broader Afghan society for peaceful 
change. This was also attempted in Somalia when elections were impossible and the 
UN mission did not want to assume direct control, leading the UN to develop local 
councils led by traditional leaders.
Additionally, should democratic elections not be immediately implemented, the 
interventionists may feel it necessary to create their own temporary authority to 
administer through. Often these semi-sovereign entities of the interventionists are 
created through peace agreements to guide a frontier state through a transition period 
leading to elections. Examples of such institutions include the UN trusteeships over 
Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the Supreme National Council in Cambodia and the 
Commission on the Peace in El Salvador. Michael Doyle highlighted a crucial aspect of 
these temporary institutions in that “they permit the temporary consensus of the parties 
to be formally incorporated in an institution with regular consultation.” Where it is 
impossible for indigenous actors to assume such a governance role directly, either 
because of the depth of the civil conflict or the technicalities of the conflict resolution 
process, allowing the interventionists to temporarily assume such control with the direct 
consultation of indigenous actors allows for the external set to still function. In this 
way, such temporary institutions are designed to be responsive to the general interests of 
indigenous politics when a complete consensus amongst the main indigenous actors 
involved in a conflict is impossible to achieve.34
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The second collaborative set is the internal one, namely those relationships connecting 
the indigenous collaborative elite to local interests and institutions. Within the context 
of frontier states, the internal set is ultimately the more important of the two because 
historically the main security threat to any regime there is internal rather than external, 
namely because of civil conflict. Furthermore, nascent national armies tend to be 
focused directly on internal control, especially when they are “not organically linked to 
their populations” through broadly accepted national governments. Considering that 
indigenous regimes see their ultimate survival as being dependent on domestic rather 
than international politics, they expend most of their effort strengthening their internal 
collaborative relationships.
For collaborative elites to have any authority within indigenous society, they must be 
able to legitimise their collaboration with interventionists. Essential to the internal set 
supporting the goals of the intervention is the consent given by the broader population 
to the external set’s agreements, namely of the creation and running of a national 
government. There are many tools that are available for securing support for the efforts 
of collaborating elites. Probably the most obvious, and potentially divisive, is to appeal 
to the respective identities- be they ethnic, religious, or national- of the base of support 
that the elites build themselves upon. For instance, the efforts of religious actors have 
been crucial in Bosnia-Herzegovina where they “served essentially as a resource for
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mobilisation for political actors.”
A further consideration is the relationship between the interventionists and the broader 
indigenous society rather than only with the collaborating elite. This is an important 
interface, though not a collaborative set in itself, as it allows interventionists some 
ability to shape their relations with the collaborating elite in the external set. An 
important understanding in this regards is that interventionists have “no intention of 
permeating society.” There is an overarching desire to further stability by helping to 
structure a new government but there is no desire to fundamentally restructure 
indigenous society beyond instigating a form of governance and an economic system, 
specifically liberal democracies. This is mostly because the resources available and 
timeframes allowed simply do not allow interventionists the penetration that past 
imperialism was able to achieve, notably through its missionary zeal, extended
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interaction over decades or even centuries, and rigidly imposed resource/export based 
economies.
This is not to say, however, that there is no interaction by interventionists with the 
broader indigenous society outside of collaborating elites. Much interaction and 
outreach is done through the aid provision and civil society support undertaken by 
international aid agencies. NGOs by their nature and mandates have a better ability to
OQ
connect with local people rather than governments. While NGOs would prefer to be 
perceived as neutral and not as ‘interventionists’, their presence amongst the broader 
indigenous society during an intervention nonetheless allows those Western powers 
undertaking the intervention to influence perceptions and build support for an 
intervention’s goals. This is notably because the intervening powers are most often the 
primary donors for the aid work and civil society promotion, and hence can shape its 
development.
Furthermore, there are occasions where interventionist military and civilian forces do 
liaise directly with local populations. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 
Afghanistan are an example of morphing aid provision with the political and military 
agents of an intervening power. Additional interaction also occurs between 
interventionists and general publics through communication campaigns carried out by 
mass media, such as democracy promotion and health or landmine awareness 
campaigns undertaken by the Voice of America, the BBC, or local UN-sponsored radio 
stations.
Characteristics o f gradualism collaboration
Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances 
U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local 
populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian 
needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for  
securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule o f  law, 
democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.
- US Department of Defense, ‘Directive 3000.05’40
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Having now reviewed the sets for collaboration, it is possible to analyse in detail the 
three characteristics shaping the politics of collaboration. Recalling collaboration as the 
continual renegotiation of the terms and conditions for it, specifically the changing 
bargains of collaboration, these characteristics define the political interaction that occurs 
in those sets.
The first characteristic is the mediating functions that indigenous collaborative partners 
provide. Interventions are both disruptive and co-opting events for indigenous society 
and the function of collaboration is to mediate between these dynamics. Interventionists 
absolutely need indigenous collaborative partners to mediate between them and broader 
indigenous society. However, the challenge is that there are few, if any, entirely 
dedicated indigenous collaborative partners with clear, consistent aims. Collaborative 
partners by definition are autonomous actors, not mere proxies of the interventionists. 
Given that, indigenous collaborative partners should be perceived more generally as 
collections of mediating functions rather than simplistically as impermeable, unified 
actors with static aims.
Beatrice Pouligny has gone furthest towards highlighting the need to understand 
indigenous actors interacting with interventionists as complex, often nebulous, 
individuals and organisations rather than as simple unitary ones. She notes that their 
behaviour “needs to be understood in their capacity to move from one network to 
another, maintaining- sometimes deliberately- confusion as to their real status and, still 
more, their intentions.”41 Considering that, Pouligny advises that the interaction 
between interventionists and indigenous actors be considered “in plural and dynamic 
terms.”42
There are many examples of this, such as the collapse in coherence of armed groups 
following a peace agreement as internal divides proliferate with the lack of a common 
enemy. FRETELIN provides an example of this whereby what started as a relatively 
unified insurgency movement imploded over the first several years of East Timor’s 
independence into diverse new political parties and factionalism within the nascent 
military and police forces. Another pertinent example is the Lavalas movement in Haiti
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led by President Aristide. While it was the primary negotiating partner for repeated UN 
missions; rather than a cohesive organisation, it instead “appeared to be a network of 
complex, shifting relations, often among personalities rather than groups.”43 The DR 
Congo has also proven a good example of this whereby countless political factions 
develop and disappear, often into and out of one another and from the armed groups, 
which has made it near impossible for any type of broad-based government to emerge. 
The most notable ramification of this has been that the ‘national army’ is little more 
than a collection of evolving local militias.
In any case, the utility of indigenous collaborative partners to interventionists is in their 
mediating functions, not merely in their existence. The prime function of the 
indigenous partners to collaboration is of mediation with broader indigenous society to 
achieve goals when they are common with the interventionists. It is important to recall 
collaboration as cooperation qualified through manipulation, not unabashed altruism. 
Given that, the challenge for mediating through a process towards achieving common 
goals will be to ensure that collaborative participants, who often lack coherence and are 
evolving constantly, can maintain fairly consistent policies in relation to their foreign 
partners.
A good example of this has been the collaborative dilemma of President Karzai in 
Afghanistan. Mediating between US demands to capture al-Qaeda terrorists and 
counter the Taliban often places Karzai in an awkward position with the Pashtun 
community that defines his internal set but also with his interventionist partners in the 
external one. Considering these dynamics, while Karzai has ostensibly been a strong 
partner of the US in Afghanistan, his mediating role has often meant he has to moderate 
or obfuscate his stances to placate either side of his partnerships. The government’s 
inability, or indeed unwillingness, to counter opium production provides one issue that 
demonstrates the difficulty of Karzai’s collaborative predicament.
In sum, the biggest challenge for successful mediation in frontier states is their 
exceedingly fractured social relations. This is because it makes it hard to achieve the 
critical mass necessary for governance to be secured and political decisions to be made.
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State building activities require extended commitments that are hard for interventionists 
and nascent governments to secure in a frontier context. By contrast, the non-state 
actors who often contest state building activities are able to flourish in such a situation. 
As Christopher Coker noted, while interventionists and national governments inherently 
prefer “fixed alliances” to progress, other actors “can reach their own agreements in a 
world where enmities like allies and alliances appear to be in constant flux.”44 
Afghanistan again provides an example of this whereby the coalitions in contest with 
Kabul’s governmental control range from the Taliban itself to local militias, brigands, 
drug runners, and al-Qaeda all evolving freely as immediate opportunities dictate.
The second characteristic is resourcing dynamics; that is to say that collaboration is 
affected by the amount of resources, both material and political, committed to it. 
Collaboration is an effort to achieve more together, often acrimoniously, than what can 
be accomplished individually. Given that forced rationale of necessity and the driving 
role of manipulation, resources are required to facilitate it rather than just friendly 
intentions conducive to mere cooperation. Resource allocation during present 
interventionism comes in many forms. A general rule is that interventions which 
involve strong peace-enforcement requirements, notably those that “try to impose peace 
upon unwilling parties and aim to alter long-standing power relationships”, require more 
resource commitments than do those that are able to build upon strong peace 
agreements and can co-opt contending factions into “peaceful, but potentially mutually 
advantageous, relationships.”45 For instance, East Timor and Haiti are roughly the same 
in size yet the intervention in Port-au-Prince has been expensive in relative terms 
because the resourcing requirements for brokering collaboration have been decidedly 
more complex than that allowed for in Dili, where relatively simpler collaborative 
partners and dynamics are available.
The third characteristic is the degrees of trust and amounts of knowledge sharing that 
define collaborative relationships. In terms of trust, the most crucial aspect for 
indigenous political actors is to believe that the interventionists are going to leave, 
namely that there will be a gradualism of collaboration. Inculcating this trust is easiest 
during UN interventions because of their international mandates and diverse force 
composition. For instance, despite complaints and reservations, the Timorese submitted
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to the UN’s “yoke” since they knew independence was assured as they had “no reason 
to suspect the UN of hidden imperialist designs.”46 Building trust is more difficult 
during interventions undertaken without a UN mandate because of suspicions that the 
interventionists- such as the US, Australia, and the UK which have all acted outside of 
UN at assorted times- might not actually leave. The US by example has consistently 
refused to declare timeframes for its intervention in Afghanistan. While this may help 
some of the US’ collaborative partners to feel that they will not be precipitously 
deserted, it also opens them up to critiques within the internal set that the 
interventionists are but traditional imperialists.
Furthermore, crucial for building trust is the ability of all collaborative partners to 
follow through on the agreements that have been secured through the collaborative 
process. This can cover a long list of actions- such as resource transfers, military force 
provision, and reaching compromises within the internal set, say about political reforms. 
The “failure to perform as indicated” can lead assorted actors to resist future 
collaborative efforts, notably as they relate to implementing an agreed peace process 47 
Democratisation is again crucial in this regards. President Aristide of Haiti asked his 
foreign partners to trust him, stating “You need me, as I need you. Count on me and 
show me that I can count on you.”48 While they did for a period, the second UN 
mission ultimately facilitated his removal from power because of his deviations from 
democratic norms as well as an inability to implement governance reforms. Trust 
broken once is not likely to return.
5.3: The mechanics for gradualism collaboration
For Special Forces, Afghanistan was the Wild, Wild West and the new
Ranchers revelled in i t49
The mechanics of present collaboration are important considerations for understanding 
how it is presently implemented, namely how collaborative participants manage their 
collaborative systems. For all participants in collaboration, the most important 
management strategy is of controlling options though their respective abilities to 
provide or exclude them as bargaining tools to guide the bargaining process.
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Interventionist strategies in collaborative systems
Conforming to the gradualism nature of present collaboration, the ability of 
interventionists to apply coercive force is generally limited, and would most often be 
counter-productive given the purpose is to empower indigenous partners in governance. 
Hence, other strategies are most often chosen instead which allow interventionists to 
stabilise indigenous partners, to condense and consolidate them when possible, but 
ultimately to institutionalise governments in such a manner that indigenous politics is 
more dependent on the structure of government itself rather than the fluid movement of 
political actors by themselves. Namely, the frontier is to be ‘tamed’ as much as possible 
through the rigidities of modem government.
In this way, interventionists attempt to provide the major missing ingredient in the 
frontier context, the “modem organisation” of governance.50 With a hesitance to apply 
force, the challenge for present interventionists is “to generate voluntary cooperation 
from divided local political actors.”51 The need to institutionalise governance and to do 
it in a voluntary manner amongst fractured local players is decidedly difficult. The goal 
of strengthening collaborative partners through stronger governance ironically means 
that the leverage of interventionists is often limited by working with partners through 
the very medium that dilutes their influence the most, i.e. a sovereign government. 
Christopher Clapham highlighted this conundrum well when he argued that foreigners 
“could usually only implement their programmes in collaboration with the very 
governments that they were seeking to reform, providing these with endless 
opportunities to subvert the reforms themselves.” This makes it notoriously difficult 
to manage indigenous collaborative partners during interventions. However, although 
difficult, it is certainly not impossible and a number of methods are presently 
implemented.
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Confer legitimacy: The most powerful tool for managing collaborative systems is the 
interventionists’ ability to confer legitimacy upon specific indigenous actors, namely for 
their existence in a new political order to be recognised as justifiable. In the anarchy of 
frontier zones, this recognition conferred by interventionists can be decisive because 
indigenous actors use it to increase their stature and authority in struggles with other
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actors domestically as well as to increase their leverage in the bargaining process with 
the interventionists themselves. Foreign recognition to participate in an extended peace 
or reconstruction process can mean continuing life after a war for indigenous actors, 
especially armed groups such as LURD in Liberia and RENAMO in Mozambique. 
Furthermore, often recognition by interventionists can compensate for a lack of internal 
recognition, and hence legitimacy to participate. For instance, one Cambodian political 
party’s leader noted of its rationale for engaging with UNTAC: “At that time we no 
longer had any means to create problems, and above all, we wanted to get a place for 
ourselves in Cambodian political life.”
Without a formal peace agreement, the interventionists’ recognition is even more 
important. Amongst a plethora of competing groups, being recognised as a ‘player’ by 
interventionists automatically raises a group’s stature. This recognition serves to show 
a group’s own supporters as well as its opponents that it has “assured worth”, namely 
that it is strong and potent enough to merit foreign recognition.54 Most often, meriting 
this assured worth requires staying armed and potentially militant and hence a threat to 
the broader process of state building. Examples of this are plentiful, but an especially 
apt one is the KLA in Kosovo. With interventionists’ recognition so highly sought 
after, deciding whom to recognise and in what order of significance is a powerful tool 
for interventionists. Conferring greater recognition on certain participants- for instance 
by deciding which groups should participate in reconciliation talks in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan, or which East Timorese political parties will receive funding and inclusion 
on the ballot, or which local militias in the eastern Congo should participate in local 
peace negotiations- gives the interventionists a strong avenue to nuance the dynamics of 
indigenous politics.
Pick ‘winners’: A second method of managing collaborative systems is to simply pick 
what indigenous groups should come out of a conflict as the dominant ones. The 
clearest example of this was the US’ support of Karzai’s Pashtun factions and the 
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Another example was the UN’s 1994 intervention in 
Haiti to assure that the deposed presidency of Aristide was re-inserted to power. As 
such, these actors are the ‘chosen few’ who are deemed by the interventionists to be the 
core of the external collaborative set. By example, one opponent of Aristide in Haiti
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succinctly noted from this outcome: “We look at Aristide and we understand that it’s 
from outside that you can get power.”55 However, such actions can often leave such 
chosen collaborative elites suffering from a lack of internal legitimacy, the despised 
‘collaborator class’ of traditional imperialism. The ‘dog washers’ of Afghanistan is the 
best example of this whereby the Karzai government is widely criticised for being full 
of diaspora returnees chosen by Western interventionists for no other reason than that 
the Westerners feel comfortable around them.
Pressure through resource provision: A further method for managing collaborative 
systems by the interventionists is to use resource provisioning as leverage. Local actors 
often seek through their engagement with interventionists to acquire material resources, 
be it financial aid directly for themselves or humanitarian aid for their bases of support. 
Using resource provisioning as leverage allows interventionists to pressure collaborative 
partners to meet expected outcomes. Aid provision also allows for more subtle pressure 
to be applied in collaborative relationships because it contrasts directly with the overt 
coercion of military force. By example, the US government has argued that its 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams have proven effective because the provision of 
humanitarian aid money allows the US government “influence without the stigma of 
occupation.”56
Pressure with future options: One of the most effective management tools available to 
interventionists is to apply pressure using possibilities for future developments. Robert 
Cooper has argued of Western efforts in the Balkans that they only began to succeed 
because of the “commitment to EU membership that has gone hand in hand with NATO 
force and money.” This ‘trump card’ has been the ability to present eventual EU 
membership as a shared goal but one that requires strong actions being undertaken in 
the meantime, notably arresting war crimes suspects, implementing peace accords, and 
undertaking assorted governance reforms. In other places such as Liberia, promising 
universal debt relief has provided a powerful tool for managing collaborative 
relationships.
136
Circumvent difficult actors: One of the strongest management tools afforded to
interventionists is to simply circumvent difficult indigenous actors. Often in post­
conflict situations there is a proclivity towards intransigence by local actors “who have 
vested interests in retaining wartime political and economic arrangements and have not
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demonstrated real commitment to reforms.” The easiest way to circumvent these 
actors is by expanding the diversity of potential collaborative partners beyond obstinate 
armed groups or obstructionist political parties. This can be done in several ways.
Firstly, it can be done by creating new actors, such as indigenous NGOs. For instance, 
in Cambodia UNTAC worked to create new actors in the Cambodian political space, 
such as a fledgling civil society and a free press, in order to diversify away from just the 
several main armed parties to the peace treaty.59 This involved the creation of new 
indigenous NGOs as it was often a means for “occupying the political sphere by trying 
to form an opposition force” to existing indigenous power structures, notably the armed 
groups.60
Secondly, circumventing difficult actors can be done by allowing for a lengthy 
transitional period to allow for the diversification of political parties through the 
implosion of armed groups, such as FRETELIN in East Timor or LURD in Liberia. 
Thirdly, often the best way to circumvent intransigent actors is to bypass them by 
appealing directly to the broader indigenous society. Kofi Annan argued UN missions 
should apply the “power of communication” by engaging the general public through 
mass media which allows them leverage that can be used “to push the parties to abide 
by their commitments.”61
By bypassing certain actors to appeal to broader public opinion, interventionists can 
then develop internal pressure for reform. An example of this is efforts by the UN to 
encourage warlord factions to undergo disarmament by directly reaching out to their 
base populations and offer development programming to those that apply pressure for 
disarmament. This has been used as a tactic extensively in Afghanistan for instance. 
Another example are UN efforts to promote indigenous civil society to counter the
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influence of warlords by inviting Somali traditional, religious and women’s leaders to 
peace conferences but excluding the warlords.
Develop constitutional leverage: One of the best advantages available to
interventionists is their ability to manipulate the constitutional legal framework guiding 
the structuring of new governments. Being present and influential during the drafting of 
peace agreements allows interventionists strong this leverage. It allows, for instance of 
the UN in Cambodia, the possibility “to design in bargaining advantages for the UN 
authority.” Usually this ‘bargaining advantage’ covers topics such as institutional 
reform, election frameworks, international monitoring schemes, and economic 
rehabilitation programmes. The value of this is that interventionists can decree the 
advantages when indigenous partners are weakened and fractured, notably during peace 
negotiations, and then implement them without needing further consent from indigenous 
actors. By example, in Cambodia the electoral component was only successful because 
it had been decreed in the UN’s mandate as requiring independent implementation by 
the UN. This allowed elections to proceed successfully without needing to “depend on 
the steady and continuous support of the four factions” that had signed the initial peace 
agreement.63
Apply coercive force: Lastly, it is important to note that there is still on occasion the 
need to apply force to bring about compliance to agreements. Madeleine Albright 
famously called this need ‘coercive diplomacy’, conspicuously using military power to 
persuade intransigent indigenous actors.64 Notably this application of force means 
“raising the costs of non-cooperation” on parties who are deviating from peace 
agreements or undermining the mandate of an interventionist force.65 At times, 
however, this may not require the actual application of force, but instead rely on the 
credibility of interventionist forces to potentially escalate a conflict to ensure 
compliance.66 Often this potentially forceful application of ‘collaborative management’ 
would be preserved for action against wavering fronts of collaboration to prevent the 
splintering of partnerships during tactical collaboration, such as by the US with 
Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance in 2001.
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Indigenous strategies in collaborative systems
First they brought us food. Now, they bring arms. We fear they have in fact 
come to kill us.
rn
- Political rhetoric used against UN mission in Somalia
Conforming to the gradualism of present collaboration, indigenous partners have a 
significant amount of leverage to manage their collaborative relationships and this is 
shaped by the context of the state building purposes of present interventionism in two 
ways. Firstly, while indigenous collaborative partners may share the overarching 
expected outcome of ‘stronger governance’ with interventionists, it is important that this 
be achieved on terms acceptable to them. In this way, while indigenous actors may 
make platitudes to ‘democracy’ or ‘freedom’, what is driving for them is gaining access 
to power and transforming external resources into suitably indigenised ones. Secondly, 
the centrality of working through the gradualism of collaboration, namely through 
empowering a sovereign government through formal governance institutions, means 
that indigenous partners inherently have a strong medium for bargaining, namely their 
sovereign right to do so through their own government. With these overarching 
dynamics noted, several strategies are adopted by indigenous actors to manage their 
collaborative relationships.
Confer legitimacy: The strongest management tool of indigenous actors is their ability 
to confer legitimacy on interventionists. There is currently a strong geopolitical need of 
interventionists to feel and be perceived as legitimate, i.e. not to appear as conquering 
‘imperialists’ but rather as supportive allies to ‘inviting’ indigenous partners.
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Considering that legitimacy is “most of all dependent on perception” , indigenous 
actors use their ability to manipulate such perceptions to bolster their positions during 
the bargaining processes of collaboration on two levels.
The first is to leverage the interventionists’ perceived legitimacy within the broader 
international community. The wider world expects to see political stability develop 
during interventions and given that, indigenous actors can counter such a perception 
quite easily. A frequent tactic during the bargaining processes of collaboration will be
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to publicly claim that interventionists are undermining the sovereignty of a respective 
state, as if this were not blatantly obvious. It is a powerful tool however when 
interventionists wish to appear as ‘partners’ to local actors rather than as coercive, 
imposing imperialists. For example, one UN diplomat in Mozambique noted that every 
time a particular party felt displeasure with the UN, “it summoned the press and accused 
ONUMOZ of interfering in the country’s affairs.”69 This displeasure usually comes 
from the fact that local actors feel interventionists favour another indigenous actor more 
and their main leverage for countering that is to claim that the state’s overall 
sovereignty is being infringed upon. For instance, the Hun Sen government in 
Cambodia often claimed the UN mission was too soft on the Khmer Rouge and
70complained it was undermining the government.
The second strategy is to question the perceived legitimacy of the interventionists 
domestically. Whatever the public rhetoric used internationally to defend an 
intervention, such as whether the UN Security Council mandated it, what defines its 
perceived legitimacy domestically is its ability to deliver results to the general public, 
notably quality of life improvements such as physical security and political stability. 
With such domestic perceptions key and with indigenous collaborative partners firstly 
seeking to strengthen their own positions, “they may not hesitate to undermine wider 
support for a mission by distorting local perception of international objectives” if that
71serves to strengthen themselves during the bargaining process with interventionists. 
Indigenous actors frequently adopt the tactic of building domestic displeasure with 
interventionist actions in order to show themselves as stronger actors.
Holding public protests against interventionist actions are a way of showing domestic 
displeasure and then using that to strengthen an indigenous actor’s negotiating position
77 •or to force interventionists to back down. For example, as a UN official noted, 
President Aristide in Haiti would call protest marches against the UN “in response to the
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pressure they were putting on him, and to show that he could ‘make trouble’.” 
Furthermore, indigenous actors often consider local media and public information 
campaigns as “crucial political tool[s]” for directly reaching out to the broader public to 
sow displeasure with interventionists.74 Another tactic may to question the ‘trust’ of the
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interventionists to actually leave, accusing them of being ‘colonialists’ and 
‘imperialists’ and juxtaposing themselves against that as ‘defenders of the people’.
Exploit fractured interventionist structures: The internal divides of interventionists offer 
one of the surest methods for indigenous actors to apply leverage. These divides can be 
between the states of a multilateral coalition or between states and an intergovernmental 
organisation, notably the UN. The fractured nature of present interventionists is easy to 
manipulate because of disagreements over norms, modalities, end goals, and resource 
commitments. At most times this manipulation can be fairly straightforward as so many 
interventionist actors are involved. For instance, the UN, NATO and the EU have all 
been involved in Bosnia.
Even assuming the international organisations involved in interventions were coherent 
unitary actors, which they assuredly are not, divisions between them could still be 
manipulated. It is particularly easy for indigenous actors to manipulate divides 
considering international organisations are composed of numerous member states, all 
with their own means and rationales. Hence, the easiest way for indigenous actors to 
manipulate internal divides is by simply choosing which interventionist actors they wish 
to interact with once they are found to be suitably ‘good’ in their orientation. For 
instance, in Cambodia the Khmer Rouge would pick “good UNTAC” rather than “bad 
UNTAC” from the multitudes of contingents forming the international peacekeeping
7^forces depending on which contingents were the least likely to pressure them.
Additionally, manipulating internal divides is also made easier in intergovernmental 
organisations which suffer from profound bureaucratic divisions. For instance, UN 
missions often have tensions between their military and civilian components and at 
times it may be easier for local actors to talk to the military observers who are on short- 
assignments and hence less knowledgeable of local dynamics. UN military observers 
may also be more sympathetic of local armed groups than are civilian professional 
staffers who tend to push issues such as human rights and democracy promotion more
7 f \strongly. Even more striking is when local actors disregard locally based 
interventionist staff and appeal directly to heads of UN missions in the capital or in
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extreme cases to New York, such as was done by El Salvadoran politicians at critical
77moments during negotiations there in 1993. Additionally, indigenous actors may 
exploit cultural divides between Western troops and others participating in UN 
interventions. For example in Somalia the warlord Mohammed Aydid would encourage 
African UN peacekeepers not to follow US ‘imperialism’ and hence play on such 
divisions for improved leverage in his bargaining with the UN.
Extraversion: A further indigenous approach to managing collaborative systems is what
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has been termed ‘extraversion’ by Jean-Francois Bayart. When confronted by 
stronger interventionist partners and within the context of domestic struggles to access 
power, indigenous actors will at times attempt to use the resources of those foreigners to 
consolidate their own domestic positions and authorities and hence be in a stronger 
bargaining position. Often this will entail situating themselves within a liberal 
ideological paradigm as a strategy for mobilising foreign support for their own local 
political struggles. In the context of state building interventions, this often means 
emphasising stabilisation firstly but also democratisation or civil society and human 
rights promotion. A rather warped example of this is the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia 
demanding humanitarian aid provision for its own areas to strengthen its internal
* 7Qpolitical position in exchange for allowing the UN to proceed with elections there.
With the common application of conditionalities on governments receiving aid moneys, 
extraversion allows traditional power structures to be reorganised to circumvent the 
pressures placed on them. Often, elites will “partly undergo reconversion” into forms
QA
more accepted by interventionists and the political ideology they support. This 
reconversion allows political actors to access aid, a major resource in post-conflict 
environments, and then use it to bolster their own domestic positions. By example, 
indigenous ‘NGOs’ with unofficial but strong affiliations to political parties can use 
their control of aid to benefit that party’s constituents and hence strengthen their 
domestic position. While at times this reconversion means playing the role of NGOs or 
civil society actors, most importantly it means armed groups morphing into political 
parties. For example, all of the major rebel movements in the DR Congo quickly 
morphed superficially into political parties stating full support for democracy so that 
they could compete in national elections.
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In a related manner, a major strategy of indigenous actors to manipulate the strong 
position of interventionists as well as to bolster themselves in domestic battles for 
power is to leave the interventionists to implement politically inexpedient or 
unrewarding actions covering a wide range of issues. These could include basics such 
as bureaucratic reform leading to layoffs to more complicated endeavours such as 
countering militias through violence. Essentially, many collaborating elites in 
governance ‘sit back’ and expect the international community to do things for them,
O 1
especially when the actions are politically disadvantageous. Rather than bear the 
political costs for unpopular actions, such as downsizing government bureaucracies, the 
tactic is to allow interventionists to bear the costs of these respective activities while 
political capital can later be accumulated for their successes, if there are any.
Apply pressure strategies: The application of assorted pressure strategies is a common 
approach by indigenous actors for managing their collaborative relationships. The first 
strategy, and perhaps the most effective one, is to simply withhold participation in the 
state building activities of the intervention. Interventionists must demonstrate that their 
interventions are succeeding and that is dependent upon visible cooperation with 
indigenous actors. Given that, indigenous actors can always threaten to withdraw from 
a peace process, elections, or a transitional government. Indeed, their main leverage 
comes from the ability of withdrawal or non-participation. The possibility to detach is 
especially useful when other collaborative management options are lacking and/or the 
indigenous actor is an especially marginal one. In this way it becomes “the ultimate 
resort of the weak.”82 The threat of withdrawal and the need to show ‘success’ often 
forces interventionists into making concessions that are not particularly palatable. By 
example, in East Timor prominent leaders Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos-Horta often 
threatened to resign and did so repeatedly from the UN’s transitional National Council 
unless more active consultation was taken with indigenous actors. This was an effective 
tool as it challenged UNTAET’s legitimacy, which was advocated on the premise of
oo
direct consultation with Timorese leaders.
The ability to threaten withdrawal or actually undertake it is especially powerful as a 
tactic in relations to the interventionists’ explicit desire for democratisation. As one 
Cambodian political leader noted of managing relationships with the UN, “Everyone
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applied blackmail about non-participation, because it was undoubtedly the thing that 
made the United Nations most afraid.” Often, interventionists are willing to literally 
pay indigenous actors for their participation in democratisation to counter threats of 
non-participation. For instance, in Mozambique the UN paid for ex-combatants to 
participate in the peace process and to prepare for elections, notably the former rebel 
group RENAMO which received 15 million dollars for their participation because they
Of
were always threatening to pull out of the peace process or to boycott elections. This 
provoked smaller parties into demanding cash as well in order to participate in a ‘multi- 
party’ election.
In addition to detaching from participation, a second major pressure strategy of 
indigenous actors is to stay armed. This serves several purposes. The first is that to be 
armed strengthens an indigenous actor’s chances of continued recognition and 
strengthened leverage during extended periods of collaborative bargaining. One 
Cambodian political leader that had disarmed his armed group early-on regretted the 
decision afterwards, noting of the UN: “they fundamentally only gave way to people 
who kept arms in their hands. We should have kept our armed forces and police
o / r
forces.” Threats to detach from collaborative relationships are strongest when an 
indigenous actor has the possibility to return a state to war. The lack of this possibility 
greatly affects their ability for “refusing to play the cooperation game” and hence is 
generally a turning point in that respect. Considering this, there is often a desire by 
interventionists to proceed with the military aspects of a peace agreement, notably 
disarmament, before proceeding to elections. Conversely, indigenous armed groups, 
and specifically warlord commanders are often “not inclined to give up the leverage of 
their ragtag soldiers” since their existence is particularly valuable during election
00
periods.
A third pressure strategy is attempting to force interventionists into partisan support of 
particular indigenous actors over others. As mentioned previously, there is a general 
belief amongst indigenous actors that ‘neutral interventionism’ is an oxymoron and 
given that, it is better to have an intervening power as an ally when possible. 
Considering that, in near every case, indigenous actors will try to co-opt interventionists 
into being allies rather than neutral parties because in reality, “winning an argument
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often means having the UN on one’s side” as well as any other intervening power. 
This is easiest when a conflict is ongoing and no peace agreements have been signed 
stipulating an ostensibly ‘neutral’ arbitrator. Provoking interventionists to ally with a 
particular group has at times been attempted by making the situation on the ground even 
worse. For instance, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Izetbegovic (a Bosnian Muslim) 
attempted to provoke the EU or US to forcefully intervene on the Bosnian Muslims’ 
side through a “strategy of making things worse” by stalling the peace process.90 At 
other times, urging allying is undertaken by certain indigenous actors secretly targeting 
interventionist forces in the hope of confusing them and provoking retaliation against 
their enemies. This was seen at times in the immediate aftermath of the US’ toppling of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan when assorted warlords attempted to use the US military to 
target one another.
Capacity provision: The last major management strategy of indigenous actors is the 
provision of capacity for governance. Providing capacity for governance is effective as 
leverage considering there is never enough foreign capacity for complete control and 
hence interventionists are dependent to a significant degree on local capacity. 
Furthermore, capacity provision is central considering the gradualism of collaboration 
means that interventionists are explicitly attempting, sooner than later, to rely on the 
capacity of their indigenous partners so that they can conclude the intervention and 
leave. With this knowledge paramount in the minds of indigenous actors, the 
requirement for local capacity provision leaves indigenous actors with leverage to 
nuance the direction of the bargaining process with interventionists.
However, the dependency of interventionists for indigenous capacity provision, 
especially early on, is somewhat paradoxical in that indigenous actors’ ability to act is 
in itself extremely weak, i.e. the whole reason an intervention was provoked in the first 
place. The ability of indigenous actors to play off this dynamic is however profound 
and Lord Carnes argued their “extreme weakness can become [their] greatest source of 
strength” in bargaining with interventionists, notably when those indigenous actors 
control nascent governments.91 This is because interventionists have little choice but to 
compromise and concede to the demands of indigenous actors to provide capacity for 
governance since they are unable to do so themselves.
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The leverage of capacity provision is in terms of the ‘inversion of capacity’, notably 
using another’s weakness as leverage to force them to allow one to fill the gap instead 
and hence control outcomes. For instance, tactics such as delaying an interview, 
cancelling meetings, restricting information flow all allow indigenous actors sitting in 
positions of governance to circumvent or obstruct the ability of interventionists to 
directly oversee and hence guide the direction of state building institutionalisation.92 
Platitudes of ‘cooperation’ and ‘partnership’ are made of course, but the interventionists 
are quietly obstructed or excluded from exerting control.
5.4: Gradualism collaboration is currently not effective
They [UN observers] are here on picnic and holiday. I  wish we could open 
the beaches for them to sun-tan and enjoy their dollars.
- Local commentary on the UN in Sierra Leone93
It is important before concluding to ascertain how effective gradualism collaboration 
has been for state building interventionism. As argued previously, rather than focus on 
success as a clear end state, such as a liberal democracy, it is better to focus on it as 
‘progress towards stability’.94 In this sense, progress should be conceived as the state 
building processes that empower more capable national governments to exercise 
stronger sovereign control over their territories. Anthony Zinni summed up this sense 
of progress best when he noted that the “measure of successful on-the-ground programs 
is greater capacity leading to increased stability.”95
In certain ways there has been progress towards improving stability in the frontiers. 
Despite ongoing claims of ‘new world disorder’ or a rash of ‘new wars’, the post-Cold 
War era is cumulatively one of increasing peace and prosperity.96 The proliferation of 
state building interventions can take much credit for this as civil wars from Haiti to the 
Congo, Liberia, and Cambodia have been concluded through foreign interventions. 
However, while there have been some successes at conflict resolution, achievement of 
the actual state building goals of present interventions are still decidedly lacking. 
Interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo continue even after a decade of an 
interventionist presence in the Balkans. East Timor requires the continued presence of 
Australian peacekeepers while the US intervention in Afghanistan sees continuing
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oscillations of violence and a perpetually weak government incapable of overcoming 
domestic turmoil. Some interventions have ended in outright failure, such as Somalia, 
while other states have seen repeated interventions following failures to establish 
stability, such as in Haiti, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The democratisation emphasis has 
also not been particularly effective. By example, the US has engaged in sixteen state 
building projects since the end of World War II and only four have been successful at 
democratisation: Germany, Japan, Panama, and Grenada, none of which occurred after
Q7the Cold War ended. Even the conflict resolution successes of present interventions 
are shallow. The World Bank has found that half of all states emerging from civil war 
relapse into conflict within five years.98
That progress is wanting can best be seen in a few key features of states undergoing 
interventionism. The first is a general tendency towards poor local security engendering 
broad mistrust between interventionists and indigenous society. With local populations 
still fearful, trust in national governments and their interventionist partners is stymied 
and hence people rely on local coping strategies such as seeking protection through their 
clans or tribes, leading to the creation of neo-feudal security regimes. At times personal 
security in the post-conflict environment is worse than it was during the official conflict 
period, such as in El Salvador where more people are now killed through crime related 
incidents than during the civil war itself.99 Ultimately people don’t trust the ‘new’ state 
if it cannot protect them.
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This leads into the second general feature of present interventions, the overarching 
weakness of present interventionists within the context of frontier states. Rather than 
being strong ‘imperialists’ most often interventionists are perceived by indigenous 
actors as decidedly weak. One Haitian noted this when he commented on current UN 
‘occupations’: “We do what we like, that can’t be denied, it isn’t like the other 
occupations we knew. The problem is rather they do nothing for us.”100 This leaves 
local peoples pondering why they should collaborate with interventionists when one 
cannot believe in their assurances of personal security. A common local perception is 
thus that ‘the peacekeepers have lots of guns, but they don’t do anything to actually 
protect us’. Interventionists often compound this sentiment by making public 
comments that are condescending and ultimately counter-productive. For instance, a
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UN spokesman’s message in Haiti was consistently to the effect that “insecurity forms a 
part of democracy” or “Haitians must get used to this insecurity, it is normal 
development.”101
However, the third and most damning feature that defines frontier states undergoing 
interventions presently is the continued dire weakness of national governments. Ideally 
and in theory, an intervention should see ‘evolving capacities’ whereby national 
governments are empowered so that interventionists can leave, viz. the gradualism of 
collaboration. However, often this empowerment has been drastically lacking and all 
too often interventions have been concluded after the ‘victory’ of national elections 
leading to new governments which have no actual capacity to really govern. 
Considering state failure as the inability of governments to provide a minimum degree 
of order allowing routine interactions by individuals, it can be seen that all too often 
weak governments with little actual capacity for governance still exist after an 
intervention is officially concluded or continues in seeming perpetuity.102 Simply put, 
frontier states are all too often staying as frontier states.
5.5: Conclusion
Present state building interventionism is based on a gradualism of collaboration centred 
on the empowerment of indigenous partners in sovereign national governments. The 
central tenet of the theory of collaboration is that collaboration with indigenous actors 
determines the success or failure of present interventions. Unless the energy and 
resources of the intervening power can be translated into terms of indigenous politics, 
the intervention will be unable to achieve its goals. It must be concluded that the West 
is poorly managing its frontiers of insecurity presently because its approach to 
collaboration with indigenous politics is deficient. If gradualism collaboration is indeed 
lacking in its current conceptualisation and implementation, then present state building 
interventionism will remain largely ineffective. This leaves one pondering how so and 
why. Indeed, what is the ‘problematique’ defining gradualism collaboration?
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C h a p t e r  6 :  T h e  C o l l a b o r a t i o n  P r o b l e m a t i q u e
... in many ways it was harder to be aggressive in political matters than it 
was in military ones, even though diplomats were in no danger o f  
disembowelment. The UN and its international partners were all too well 
versed in the evils o f  colonialism...1
Post-Cold War interventionism has not been successful at achieving its state building 
goals despite some successes at immediate conflict resolution. This means the current 
response to frontiers in the form of state building interventionism has not been 
particularly effective because frontier states are not stabilising sufficiently to dampen 
the pericentric pull. Improved state building interventionism requires ameliorating the 
collaboration problematique, the difficulty that an intervener has in achieving 
collaborative systems with indigenous political actors and of maintaining an evolving 
equilibrium in and between the sets of collaborative systems that allows for progress 
towards an intervention’s goals, namely a more stable state.
Given the West’s current approach of gradualism collaboration and the 
contextualisation of frontiers, the collaboration problematique currently facing Western 
states undertaking interventionism is on several levels. Firstly, and the most important 
aspect, is the general lack of indigenous actors for collaboration which makes the 
challenge of finding and strengthening suitable partners definitive. Secondly, 
collaboration is not defined as a strategic doctrine, meaning the West effectively lacks 
the ‘collaborative know-how’ to undertake effective interventionism presently. 
Compounding this lack of doctrine is that the West is not willing to bear the costs for 
more effective interventionism as shown by its emphasis on shallow democratic 
processes, short timeframes and limited material and political commitment. Thirdly, the 
values debate surrounding interventionism constrains the formation of collaborative 
partnerships as Western states hesitate to be ‘imperialists’ and actors from indigenous 
politics resist being ‘collaborators’.
6.1: The contextual challenges of frontiers of insecurity
To maintain power, Karzai has to work with people who are not optimal, the 
same way we had to work with Dostum.
- US officer on partnering with warlords in Afghanistan
The most definitive aspect of the collaboration problematique is that there is a lack of 
suitable indigenous actors with whom to collaborate, viz. the whole reason there is a 
deepening of interventionist control provoked by a pericentric pull. This is the primary 
contextual challenge provided by frontiers of insecurity. While Germany and Japan are 
often cited as lessons to learn from in terms of how best to occupy a state and transition 
it towards liberal democracy, they are actually not insightful because they were 
ethnically homogenous, offered good possibilities for post-war collaboration (namely in 
the form of established bureaucracies and reformist elites) and were distinctly not 
definable as frontiers of insecurity. In contrast, by example of Somalia, Haiti and 
Afghanistan, “[a]ll three societies are divided ethnically, socio-economically, or tribally 
in ways that Germany and Japan were not.” The fragmentation of politics in frontiers 
is defined by the increasingly strong presence of non-state actors and localised rather 
than national politics which has dire consequences for picking and strengthening 
indigenous collaborative partners.
The overall lack o f partners
In Kosovo we had judges, lawyers, prosecutors; the problem was finding 
one who didn’t have a Yugoslav past or a Serbian collaborator past. Here 
[in East Timor]you don’t have a single lawyer.4
- UN administrator on the challenge of finding indigenous partners
In frontier circumstances, finding and strengthening collaborative partners necessary for 
achieving interventionist goals is decidedly difficult although the challenge, while 
definitive, does vary between interventions. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in the 
early-1990s was an extreme example of this as it was an intervention in a “stateless 
society.”5 There was not even a rudimentary governmental structure to work with 
which left aid agencies, and eventually the UN mission, to try and finagle deals with an 
exceptionally diverse group of warlords. Cambodia provides another example of an 
extremely challenging context, namely the UNTAC mission there was expected to fill a
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political power-vacuum “in the face of obstructive violence” by nearly all of the major 
Cambodian military and political actors.6
Afghanistan offers a more moderate example whereby the US was able to immediately 
partner with the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban government, especially as it 
had previously been in power itself. However, the Northern Alliance, and the 
government it eventually formed the bulk of, proved hard to partner with in the longer- 
term as its component forces often fought with one another or proved utterly lacking in 
capacity, leaving the US to rely on even more local partners, such as ethnic militias. A 
more limited occurrence for interventionist forces is the possibility to work with a 
single, united political movement. FRETELIN in East Timor provides one of the few 
examples whereby the UN was able to proceed towards establishing a new government 
by working with an already established political actor with broad representation and 
legitimacy in indigenous society. However, as mentioned previously, FRETILIN itself 
eventually imploded into multiple political parties after independence, leading to 
violence within and between the army and police forces.
Further compounding the sheer proliferation of non-state actors is their proclivity 
towards localised politics and identities, which hinders finding collaborative partners 
conducive to strengthening national governments. In the ‘post-conflict’ violence of 
frontiers, local affiliations are especially salient as people seek protection through 
localised mediums, the neo-feudal security regimes of gangs, clans, or allegiance to 
personal warlords. The challenge that these affiliations provide is that while they offer
n
a “spirit of community”, it is one that “often feeds off war.” Subsequently, the hardest 
need for interventionists to respond to is that of building a critical mass of collaborative 
partners conducive to strengthening a national government. Thomas Friedman noted 
that while external meddling at times might compound civil conflicts, that foreign 
meddling was possible because “the insiders were not united enough to make a fist” to
o
resist it. The goal of interventionism is to reverse this tendency such that the 
intervention can conclude and leave a ‘fist’ behind in the form of a more effective 
national government supportive of Western security interests.
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The lack o f ‘suitable’partners
... the warlords who filled the government’s upper ranks were stealing funds 
as fast as the international community could deposit them in Congo’s 
treasury, sacking the country’s fathomless trove o f  natural resources, and 
ensuring that their militia fighters remained loyal to themselves rather than 
to the nascent national army.9
It has become a cliche that ‘winning the peace’ is harder than ‘winning the war’. As 
overused as the sentiment is, its validity is that while foreign interventionist forces have 
enough military advantages or political leverage to forge peace agreements, failing at 
collaboration in the mid- to longer-term of an intervention is what breaks current efforts 
at transitioning frontier states through state building interventions. This is primarily 
because once a ‘critical mass’ of collaboration has been accrued, such that a national 
government can be formed say after a peace agreement, it is still difficult to find 
‘suitable’ partners. This means those roughly sharing the liberal inclinations of the 
interventionists as well as those genuinely interested in engendering stability.
If the goal is to strengthen governments in a liberal democratic fashion, what is required 
most are committed elites, who might be termed ‘unconditional collaborators’, those 
that share the interventionists’ norms and are wholeheartedly committed to their 
implementation. However, what is most often the case is the prominence of indigenous 
actors who are purely opportunistic in their motives, i.e. they are tactical or very heavily 
conditioned collaborators. The problem with such actors is they “are notoriously 
unreliable, their cooperation ebbing and flowing in proportion to the patronage they 
receive.”10 Furthermore, with a ‘gradualism’ emphasis on empowering government 
actors first and foremost, a major challenge is often that local actors within the 
government itself often actively undermine a progressively stronger government 
forming.11
For instance, Sierra Leone highlighted this whereby the world focused on RUF rebels 
but tolerated a weak and fractured military junta and overlooked abuses by government 
forces while at other times in Sierra Leone’s history, military actors actually 
collaborated with rebels to stage a coup. The case of the DR Congo is perhaps the best 
example of an utter deficiency of suitable indigenous partners. What the DR Congo
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fundamentally “lacked was not only the machinery of state.... [but] a legitimate
19conception of the state” amongst its elites. Decades of kleptocratic rule by President
Mobutu meant that participation in governance was little more than a business
proposition. The continuing failure of the Kinshasa government led by Joseph Kabila
highlights that whatever the ostensibly benign state building intents of interventionists
they will be greatly challenged to “create functioning institutions when state power rests
11with people hell-bent on abusing it for their own purposes.”
Even when ‘suitable partners’ are chosen, namely those that do share the democratic 
and liberal viewpoints of the interventionists, they are most often too weak to 
implement effective governments, something notably compounded by the chaos and 
violence of frontier zones. This is best seen in the Karzai government in Afghanistan 
whose writ has barely extended beyond the capital, hence Karzai’s nickname as ‘the 
mayor of Kabul’. While Karzai has very publicly espoused the US’ emphasis on 
democratisation, he has been forced into problematical coalitions with much more 
illiberal indigenous actors in order to try and expand the government’s influence. 
Furthermore, efforts to simply import suitable collaborators from the diasporas have not 
been particularly successful as they are widely branded as ‘dog washers’, namely US 
proxies, and subsequently disdained by the broader society in Afghanistan. Overall, 
attempts to explicitly empower such suitable partners often have poor results because 
these actors frequently lack public support which ultimately undermines an intervention.
The other major aspect of suitable collaborative partners widely missing comes in terms 
of interventionists needing actionable partners to meet immediate needs, notably when 
government capacities are literally non-existent or grossly insufficient. The best 
example of this has been that the most ‘suitable’ collaborative partners in Afghanistan 
for combating al-Qaeda terrorists have been local militias and warlords. This has 
presented a contradiction in policy because the Bush Administration wanted the Afghan 
government to take responsibility for the country’s security but it also wanted to use 
warlords to kill al-Qaeda, which detracted from solidifying the central government and 
building the national army.14 Ultimately, because of national government incapacities, 
Western forces are often inclined to make use of “allies of convenience” in frontier 
zones.15 These allies may provide immediate capacity, but nonetheless detract from the 
broader goal of instigating a more capable government.
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6.2: Collaboration is not a strategic doctrine
The biggest problem is that the UN doesn’t have a clear idea o f  what it 
wants to do.
- Timorese political activist16
The second major aspect of the collaboration problematique is the internal conceptual 
and administrative dilemmas of Western states undertaking interventionism. Central to 
this is that the importance of collaboration to state building interventionism has not been 
and continues to be poorly understood. This has meant that collaboration has not been 
defined as a strategic doctrine, meaning the West effectively lacks the ‘collaborative 
know-how’ to undertake effective interventionism presently. Specifically, the West 
lacks effectiveness at identifying suitable partners, building trust, managing evolving 
relationships, engaging in conflict resolution, effecting logistics and resources transfers,
17and negotiating agreements.
By example, despite interventionism and state building being central to its foreign 
policy, the US military still lacks a ‘doctrine of collaboration’ for application at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This has been for several reasons. In addition 
to a long held affection for its own technology-driven ‘American way of warfare’, 
another challenge is that the US has not tended to learn from its past experiences at state 
building. A reluctance to acknowledge a general condition of frontier crises and a 
disdain for believing itself to be imperialistic has meant that “successive administrations 
have treated each new mission as if it were the first and, more importantly, as it were 
the last.”18
The application of any sort of doctrine of collaboration by the Europeans has also been 
lacking. In some ways the Europeans are even further behind as they bizarrely prefer to 
‘wage peace’ rather than war as the Dutch, for instance, have termed their mission in 
Afghanistan. A further European proclivity has been to emphasise ‘human security’, 
especially through local economic development and social service provision, rather than 
a keenness to engage in combat missions. The crucial result of this has been a 
debilitating reluctance to apply military force when required to function capably in 
frontier zones.
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Collaboration may indeed be fundamentally about consensus and cooperation, but that 
does not negate the fact that at times violence is required, usually against insurgencies 
and in support of indigenous collaborative partners. The willingness to act decisively 
when necessary is required for the trust essential to collaborative relationships. As 
Robert Cooper argued, “where there is no possibility of following up words with deeds, 
words are often irresponsible.”19 A result of this is that the Europeans are often not 
taken as seriously by indigenous partners as is the US. For instance, in the Balkans the 
US is viewed as a great power while the EU is not since “it is power that makes troubled 
countries feel secure, not goodwill.” Furthermore, in Afghanistan, even though the 
Europeans give more aid and have more troops there, “it is the United States that calls 
the shots” both politically as well as military because military power is in fact
91paramount in an ongoing conflict situation. For the Europeans to better manage their 
own collaborative relationships they have to be ‘taken seriously’ by their indigenous 
partners and that means being perceived as showing a willingness to act decisively, 
notably through military force as required.
The United Nations is somewhat different. With little comparable military resources 
and few combat troops on the ground, UN missions have resorted to a much higher 
degree of interaction with indigenous politics out of need rather than any thoughtful 
doctrine. The primary challenge of the UN’s approach for collaboration in terms of 
applicable doctrine is that it has been overly mechanistic and formulaic. As Beatrice 
Pouligny noted, the UN approach to interventions is based on a major contradiction, 
namely that “while it claims to be (re)building the state, it continually reduces the
99process to highly technical dimensions, depriving it of all political substance.” In 
short, it lacks a nuanced approach to collaboration with indigenous politics and instead 
attempts to apply a uniform, mechanistic approach to state building universally.
Somalia provides a good example of how collaborative know-how has been misjudged 
since the very start of the post-Cold War era. The overarching problem in Somalia was 
that the interventionist forces of the UN could not determine whether the failed state 
“should be under UN trusteeship or negotiations with local authorities, including in
9 -3
some cases the warlords, should be fostered.” The lack of conceptual clarity for 
defining an intervention’s modalities, notably based upon the requirements for 
collaboration, meant there was much confusion about how to undertake the intervention.
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This was because interventionist forces thought that they ostensibly shared goals, 
namely humanitarian relief, with all indigenous Somali actors and given that, there was 
little to no emphasis placed on bargaining and partnering with indigenous actors in a 
thoughtful manner, merely arriving and distributing aid. However, the initial aid efforts 
quickly ran into trouble as the humanitarians of the world found themselves quickly and 
uneasily partnered with warlords for protection. If something as outwardly benign as 
relief aid becomes a medium for disagreement with indigenous actors, then the 
enormously more complicated task of state building is all the likelier to provoke 
tensions. The extreme incompetence determining ‘with whom and why for’ of 
collaborative system implementation has continued as a major error of interventionist 
policy conceptualisation.
A further example of a poor understanding and application of collaboration is that by 
the US. With little to no emphasis on collaboration, the US has instead most often 
turned to its long-held emphasis on technology and overwhelming military power as its 
response to state building interventionism. While this approach makes sense for 
conventional warfare, it is direly lacking in the frontier context of current 
interventionism. The problem has been that the US’ strategic doctrine “did not easily 
translate into tactical principles” for managing the day-to-day operations of 
interventions, especially after any initiating combat.24 While the Pentagon has begun to 
somewhat euphemistically emphasise ‘indirect action’ in its policy papers and even with 
‘military operations other than war’ now officially parallel to conventional war in 
priority, they are still strongly overshadowed by the US military’s historical desire to 
wage warfare ‘the American way’. The reluctance to commit American ground troops 
for extended periods when there are possibilities to instead call in air strikes has been 
hard to overcome. For instance, Thomas Friedman argued that while the US won the 
initial stages of the war in Afghanistan by “remote control” using air power and Special 
Forces; it continues to belie a naive belief that it can “win the peace in Afghanistan by
96remote control as well.”
6.3: No willingness to bear the costs of collaboration
... the UN and ‘the internationals’ have an unrealistic timeframe... they
think they can implement very complicated ideas like the rule o f law in a
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couple years, i t’s impossible.
-  Timorese political activist27
The second internal challenge for Western interventionist forces is that they are still 
largely unwilling to bear the costs of collaboration during interventions. How much 
interventionists are willing to ‘pay’ to mitigate insecurity can best be put in terms of 
blood and treasure. If a state were willing to pay a heavy cost, it could impose a great 
deal of force upon a target state and occupy it with relatively little emphasis put into 
collaborative efforts. Presently, in an era of instant global media coverage, sensitive 
home publics, and odes to liberal values, such an approach is neither feasible nor 
desirable in any case.
Considering this, the challenge for today is that interventionists must place a heavy 
emphasis on achieving their goals through significant, if often poorly implemented, 
collaboration with indigenous politics, i.e. gradualism collaboration. Even given that, 
interventions still suffer from their superficial effort. Namely, they want to create 
stronger, democratic national governments as quickly and cheaply as possible and this 
has so far proven to not be particularly effective at transitioning frontier states through 
strengthening collaborative partners there. Within the dire environment that defines 
frontier states, it is simply impossible that progress can be made with relatively small 
amounts of military and economic resources and political capital dedicated.
Firstly, the relatively scant political will that is placed into transitioning frontier states is 
problematical. This lack of political will must be contextualised within the domestic 
environments of Western states by highlighting that troubles in distant locales still do 
not provoke public consensus as being national security threats. Even in a post-9/11 
US, many Americans still doubt the broader presence of what this thesis terms frontiers 
of insecurity. By example, Kimberly Marten argued that the “liberal democratic states 
of today for the most part do not feel that their survival is threatened” by post-war
951Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. In more pacifist Western countries, the degree of 
scepticism is especially pronounced. While European governments have generally been 
supportive of the intervention in Afghanistan, their publics often have not. For instance, 
the German newspaper Die Welt noted in defence of Berlin’s 2006 White Paper, which 
called for more interventionism, that the German public was “barely aware of the
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dangers” presently faced and felt compelled to argue that “Germany’s security is also 
defended in the Hindu Kush.”29
Amongst home publics, policy wonks, and academics alike, there is a general doubt of 
arguments which turn every failed state into another ‘domino’ capable of instigating 
global chaos. This doubt centres on the rhetorical question articulated by Alan 
Tonelson: “If those countries are not strategic... why should the United States [or 
anybody else] care whether their problems get addressed or not? Western publics 
retort that question by doubting that state building interventions indeed do serve 
national interests despite what political leaders may say. The result of this public 
apathy for ‘foreign adventures’ is a policy environment that encourages insufficient 
prioritisation to ensure follow-through precisely because publics have perceived that 
national security is not really at stake but the costs are potentially high. Ultimately, 
when political leaders struggle to persuade their publics, strategies of interventionism 
are reduced to the attention span of individual administrations rather than enjoy 
consistent national attention and hence effort.
The results of these domestic political dynamics manifest themselves in several ways. 
The most prominent is the relative lack of military and monetary resources dedicated. 
Given that, thoughtful policy responses to frontiers are stymied by inadequate budget 
allocations because of domestic spending priorities. The European budgetary 
commitment is exceptionally lacking since most European governments are unwilling to 
invest adequately in defence, despite the policy rhetoric of the EU to improve its
o i
competence to engage equally with the US in foreign interventionism. Most EU 
countries spend 2 percent or less of GDP on defence but perhaps the most lacking is 
Germany. The Merkel government has managed to push budget increases to support 
more interventionism abroad. Yet even then, such increases barely cover inflation and 
wage hikes much less radically supplement Germany’s weak military, which relies on 
Ukrainian charter planes for transport and receives only 1.5 percent of Germany’s
'X'yGDP. The consequence of such Western hesitance is that the armies of developing 
states are most often sent on relatively cheap UN peacekeeping missions save for few 
notable exceptions, namely when the frontier states are close to Western states as were 
the Balkans and East Timor. Ultimately, UN peacekeeping forces, small in number and
158
lacking in the financial resources of the West, “lack the wherewithal to actually keep 
peace.”33
The second major example of a lack of political will is the continuing inadequacy of 
institutional capabilities, notably of a civilian-political nature, by Western governments. 
While militaries have been pushing some initial reform, for instance by the US and UK 
emphasising ‘expeditionary’ capabilities, within the civilian world, the required changes 
have been even more deficient. Time and again this has been highlighted in 
government policy papers. The EU conceded as much when it highlighted that “in 
almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian 
chaos.”34 Considering that rather stark admission, it has called for itself to have “greater 
capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis
or
situations.” As is a common proclivity, despite official pronouncements the EU still 
lacks a consolidated, authoritative institutional structure to organise its interventionism.
The US’ civilian institutional capabilities are also deficient and are best described as “ad 
hoc, under-funded, and understaffed.” For instance, the State Department has, in 
Anthony’s Zinni’s opinion, struggled to put competent teams of civilian managers on 
the ground:
State and other government agencies dig into their staffs, pick a bunch of 
people and kluge them together. There’s no cohesion, no preparation, no 
deep knowledge of the situation, no integrated planning with the other 
operational units.37
While the US Government has created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 
and Stabilization at the State Department “to bolster the capabilities of US civilian
iq 9 # # #
agencies and to improve coordination with international partners” , it is still fairly 
marginal politically, notably against the Department of Defense, and woefully 
understaffed with just several dozen Foreign Service Officers.
The situation within the UN has not particularly improved either. One of its own 
prominent reports identified “a key institutional gap”, namely that there is “no place in 
the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid state collapse and the slide to 
war or to assist countries in their transition to from war to peace.” Kofi Annan further 
remarked the UN “has lacked a dedicated entity to oversee the process, ensure its
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coherence or sustain it through the long haul.”40 Given these concerns, there is now a 
Peace-building Commission yet it is mostly concerned with emergency financing and 
technical advice rather than being a decisive umbrella of coordinated implementation on 
the ground.
The third major example of a lack of willpower is the short timeframes that Western 
interventions attempt. All too often, interventions have been brought to premature, 
politically expedient closures. Often these short timeframes have been provoked by 
‘successful’ national elections but all too often the hasty departure of foreign forces sees 
said state return to conflict. Prematurely concluded interventions in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Haiti were good examples of this whereby national elections saw the quick 
withdrawal of foreign missions and the similarly quick return to outright war. And 
while longer timeframes in themselves may not ensure success, “leaving early ensures 
failure.”41
A last example of an unwillingness to pay the costs that would be necessary for 
effective collaboration is an overemphasis on force protection. This has been a long- 
running critique of interventionist forces stemming from an early-history of withdrawals 
over fears of casualties, namely after nineteen US soldiers were killed in Mogadishu in 
1993. Because of the low level of political will attached to most interventions by 
Western states, the emphases of their troops have been to “privilege their own safety 
over the achievement of mission goals.”42 This emphasis on force protection has been 
particularly acute for the US military and it has subsequently been characterised as “a 
debilitating obsession.”43
So prominent has its reputation for force protection become, the Pentagon itself 
acknowledges that non-state actors will “choose irregular warfare... in an attempt to 
break our will.”44 Even neo-conservative commentators in Washington have argued 
that US troops make “lousy peacekeepers” because they spend “95 percent of their 
energy just protecting themselves.”45 The perception of indigenous actors about 
interventionist troops is that they are often ‘prisoners of peace’, as peacekeepers in the 
Balkans were known as they largely stayed in their bases, while in Somalia foreign 
troops were decried as ‘human tanks’ in their layers of body armour. Between a
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shallow level of political will and a detaching overemphasis on force protection, 
indigenous actors can understandably be rather sceptical of the sincerity of foreign 
interventionists.
6.4: The values debate of imperialistic interventionism
Without an imperial ethos (or something very like it) it is difficult to justify 
casualties, and more difficult still to keep the peace in the way that imperial 
armies once did.46
The driving conundrum facing interventionists in frontier states is the desire not to 
appear as ‘imperialists’. This is true of Western states but also of the UN, itself bom 
largely through de-colonisation efforts and keen not to appear as any sort of neo-empire. 
In an era where imperialism as an ideology is dead, imperialistic interventions are 
naturally clouded by normative values debates. This covers both the internal 
conundrums of Western liberal democracies that want to believe their imperial 
adventures are now purely historical as well as indigenous actors who resist becoming 
modern-day ‘collaborators’.
Western sensitivities to imperialism9 accusations
We ’re not imperialistic. We never have been.
- US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld47
While Washington DC’s neo-conservative news pundits have no hesitance advocating a 
return to imperialism, the dislike of the West’s actions being perceived as imperialism is 
profound for most Westerners. Although present interventions are in reality merely 
‘imperialistic’, that does little to assuage sensitivities to charges of a return to traditional 
imperialism. A major manifestation of this sensitivity is the denials of Western political 
leaders that they are modem imperialists. George W. Bush has argued, for instance, that 
the US “has never been an empire... We may be the only great power in history that had 
the chance and refused.” Germany provides another example of extreme reluctance to 
be perceived as involved in refreshed imperial activities. A major domestic scandal was 
the so-called ‘Skulls Affair’ in which German soldiers were photographed posing with 
skulls found near old Soviet outposts in Afghanistan. The ramifications of the event 
were that domestic support for its foreign interventions plummeted, with 73 percent of
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Germans wanting the Bundeswehr to decrease its foreign involvement.49 Overall, 
Western political leaders go to such lengths to deny the imperialistic nature of their 
interventionist actions largely because to not do so would be political suicide 
domestically.
Western tensions with * barbarians*
They are reluctant to ‘go there and i f  they must go, then they count the 
days until they can come home. They eschew the periphery. They cling to 
the metropolis.50
With a desire to not appear imperial, moral compromises by the interventionists with 
their indigenous partners often have to be made. This is decidedly a metaphysical 
dilemma, as Christopher Coker contended, when the West’s “commitment to make war 
more ‘humane’ is intimately tied to its faith in humanitarianism... a universalistic faith 
that has little sympathy” for localising dynamics of the kind that exist in frontier 
states.51 In such circumstances, Western interventionists are left feeling that the rules 
and conventions applied in the West do not apply in states undergoing interventions
*59because war in such places is becoming decidedly more ‘uncivilised’. This leaves 
making compromises between a pragmatic need for action with a desire to maintain 
some connection with deeply-felt Western values a painfully conflicted undertaking.
Furthering this overarching moral dilemma, state building as a collaborative effort 
inherently must be done in correlation to indigenous politics, notably social orders and 
customs, which at times can definitely bolster reconstruction efforts but at other times 
be decidedly counter-productive.53 This is perhaps no truer than for pragmatic Western 
attempts to partner with non-state armed groups and to turn a blind eye to their 
‘traditional’ actions. This at times means relying on local social structures- e.g. tribal, 
clan, or religious- even if that compromises the national government. Examples are 
plentiful, ranging from the US’ predicament of partnering with Afghan warlords who 
executed Taliban prisoners to UN forces in the Congo who undertake combat missions 
with the Congolese National Army despite its fracturing into individual ethnic warlord 
commands and the use of local militias by aid workers in Somalia to protect aid 
shipments.
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Indigenous hesitance to undertake collaboration
First they send out missionaries, then consuls to support the missionaries, 
then battalions to support the consuls. I  am not a Rajah o f  Hindustani be a 
made a mock o f in that way. I  prefer to have to deal with the battalions 
straight away.
- Abyssinian Emperor Tewodros54
Perhaps even more striking than a Western hesitance to be perceived as returning to 
imperialism is the reluctance of indigenous actors to be seen acquiescing to it. This has 
major ramifications for collaborative relationships. There are profound cultural tensions 
against collaboration with foreigners coming from vastly different backgrounds, notably 
when they assert the ‘universality’ of the norms and structures they are trying to impose. 
Samuel Huntington asserted that the West won ascendance in global affairs not through 
its values and ideas, but instead through its ability to apply military force, emphasising 
that “Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westemers never do.”55 Western efforts to 
promote ‘universal values’, such as democracy and human rights, are often perceived by 
indigenous actors as simple, Western imperialism. In this way, many non-Westemers 
feel that the West, through its interventionism, is using its power to “legislate Western 
habits of the heart.”56
In addition to the challenges of cultural tensions is a strong geopolitical awareness 
against collaboration. As Emperor Tewodros showed in the 1860s, a strong 
appreciation for events elsewhere can influence how indigenous actors perceive the 
overtures and activities of interventionist powers. In a post-imperial era and with 
globalised communication networks, nobody wants to be the one ‘colonised’. To be 
subjected to such pressures is often maddeningly upsetting to local actors. As the 
Bosnian-Serb general Radko Mladic exclaimed, “There is no greater shame for us Serbs
cn
than to be bombed by some Dutchman.” While it is doubtful he would have preferred 
to be bombed by the Americans instead, that such imperialistic pressure was being 
applied at all, and often through smaller powers acting through multilateral forces, was 
all the more galling.
Put rhetorically, who would want to collaborate if that means being part of an empire, 
especially an American one? While Western leaders have denied their intentions are
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imperial, this often counts for little amongst much of the global public if those
c o
intentions are still perceived as actually being imperial. This has important 
implications for collaboration, notably in finding suitable collaborative partners. Rahul 
Rao noted as much when he maintained that “principled collaborators are unlikely to 
step forward at all, if they perceive that they are collaborating with is empire.”59 This is 
notably in regards to ‘empire’ being a strengthened US presence in a region such as the 
Middle East. When Western leaders such as Tony Blair call for the West to “support, 
nurture, and build strong alliances” with so-called moderates, i.e. those on a 
“modernising path”, it is not often the case that such encouragement is welcomed by the 
respective persons or groups.60 Such association by the ‘moderates’ probably 
compromises them in the internal collaborative set as agents of non-collaboration label 
them traitorous ‘collaborators’. This is all the easier in states with a colonial past where 
local actors often claim a heroic status of rebels fighting against foreign domination.61 
Allusions are subsequently made to resisting ‘gringos’ and ‘bwanas’.
Consequently, a major form of countering collaboration is to increase the geopolitical 
awareness against it rather than to physically attack the West’s indigenous partners. 
When faced with the over-whelming military power of Western states, notably of the 
US, a plausible response is to use the asymmetrical means of the media to show the 
world how ‘imperial carnage’ is being wrought by Western forces. This can be 
accomplished, for instance, by funnelling videos to A1 Jazeera or declaring human rights 
abuses through press conferences. The purpose of raising this awareness is both to 
apply pressure onto indigenous actors not to collaborate but also to dampen Western 
public support for interventionism abroad.
The centrality o f democracy
He killed my papa, he killed my mama... I ’ll vote for him!
- Liberian election chant about Charles Taylor62
The issue of democratisation has dominated the debate over what values should guide 
the state building efforts of post-Cold War interventionism. This discourse has ranged 
from the crude practicalities of such efforts to the moral imperatives for it. As the most 
contentious normative issue of state building interventionism, there is hence a need to 
understand how it defines the collaboration problematique.
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The primary argument in favour of promoting democratisation through state building 
interventionism is twofold. The first part is that it is morally right to do so both because 
democracy is essential for universal freedom and that it is necessary for interventions to 
be legitimised. This has been a major argument of successive US administrations, 
although George W. Bush has been more assertive than either Bill Clinton or George 
Bush Snr. Critiques that interventionism which promotes democracy is actually 
imperialism is perplexing to most Americans. As Michael Ignatieff rhetorically asked 
to summarise the sentiment, “How can it be imperialist to help people throw off the 
shackles of tyranny?” By promoting democracy, interventionists believe themselves 
to be more legitimate, both for Western domestic audiences to support and for the 
residents of the frontier state in question.
The second part of the argument is that democracy is inherently more conducive to 
stability than are authoritarian regimes. As the Bush Administration argued, the US 
“will not let the challenges of democratic transitions frighten us into clinging to the 
illusory stability of the authoritarian.”64 Considering this general theme, if an 
intervention is to occur, Western governments argue why not use the opportunity to try 
and create longer-term stability through a new regime with strong domestic support 
engendered through democratic elections. While few would argue that it is easy, the 
challenges surely outweigh the benefits if one accepts Joseph Siegle’s argument that 
“democracies consistently outperform autocracies in the developing world” when it 
comes to political stability as well as quality-of-life measures such as clean water, 
improved literacy, and lower infant mortality.65
Conversely, efforts to promote democracy through state building interventionism have 
been widely critiqued. The primary argument is that it is often actually counter­
productive to extending stability. While the Bush Administration has been exceedingly 
outspoken on the matter, many Europeans have been more muted in their support. For 
instance, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder mentioned in a NATO address 
‘extending stability’ eight times while hardly mentioning democracy at all as a grounds 
for interventionism.66 Many academics have pointed out that interventions are most 
often motivated primarily by geopolitical concerns, namely the condition of weak and 
failed states, and hence that “democratisation alone [does] not fully address such 
concerns.” Pouligny for instance argued that “premature political competition may, in
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some cases, revive logics of confrontation and lead to the destabilisation of the socio- 
political situation.” In this way, armed groups morph into political parties and usually 
keep their own militias, such as has been the case in Liberia, the DR Congo, and 
Kosovo. Continuing this general critique, other academics reason that democratisation 
can be destabilising as it “encourages the conflicts that exist in a collapsing state to 
manifest themselves freely” since the checks and balances of an established democratic 
system are still lacking.69
Even if free and fair elections are held, in themselves they can be problematic if they 
provide a basis for illiberal actors to assume power. For example, Charles Taylor was 
elected initially under internationally mandated and observed elections after ECOWAS 
intervened in Liberia but his government turned into unadulterated despotism at home 
and encouraged Sierra Leone’s civil war. Furthermore, early elections in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina were arguably counter-productive since they merely legitimised the
<1A
nationalistic governments responsible for the civil war. In this way, democratically 
‘legitimate’ governments can use their powers to segregate communities and 
discriminate against minorities, for instance in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the 
case of the DR Congo, exceedingly expensive UN-sponsored elections did nothing to 
dilute ethnic divides, redress endemic corruption, or give much hope for a sustained 
democratic future. As one UN election official wryly noted, “We could spend three 
hundred million dollars to elect a dictator... normally you can get a dictator cheaper 
than that.”71
In addition to arguments that it is counterproductive to stability, many critics dislike the 
messianic pretensions of ‘spreading democracy’. In tandem with arguments claiming 
democratisation provokes instability, other academics have argued for interventionism 
to initially push ‘soft authoritarianism’ rather than outright democracy. Fareed Zakaria 
has been foremost in calling for this approach: “First, a government must be able to 
control the governed, then it must be able to control itself. Order plus liberty. These 
two forces will, in the long run, produce legitimate government, prosperity, and liberal
79democracy.” These sentiments are echoed by ‘classic liberals’ such as Chris Patten 
who argue that democracy, while universally applicable, “must grow organically from
• • •  79within a society” since it “cannot be imposed by force.” Rather than ‘spread
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democracy’ through foreign interventions, many would rather see democracy generated 
endogenously.
Lastly, it is important to note one last dislike for a strong emphasis on democratisation; 
most citizens living in frontier states do not themselves particularly care about 
democracy despite the West’s interest in it. Instead, most frontier residents simply want 
more quality of life improvements, such as the cessation of violence, clean water, basic 
education, and enough food to eat, rather than any particular type of government. This 
responds to the reality that even without Western interventions, many of the world’s 
poorest people have already experienced many ‘elections’ with no particular impact on 
their lives. What has always really been lacking for them is a competent government to 
instigate quality of life changes rather that a specifically democratic one.
If the goal of an intervention is to strengthen a national government so that it can better 
exercise control over its sovereign territory, interventionists are faced with several 
questions when searching for suitable collaborative partners. Namely, is domestic 
legitimacy, and hence stability, best secured through the democratic selection of 
national leaders? Or, do the necessities of post-conflict recovery give more credence to 
domestic legitimacy being secured by leaders who can meet basic quality of life needs 
without necessarily having to assume power through elections? The central quandary of 
democratisation then is that a reliance on elections becomes a “double-edged sword”, 
namely that while it can provide a basis to develop government it can also empower 
dangerous elites, which from a Western interventionists perspective means illiberal
74ones.
Given that, the primary collaborative con for promoting democratisation is the real 
possibility it provides for interventionists getting stuck with illiberal partners in the 
external collaborative set. Time and again, elections during interventions have brought 
to power national leaders with dubious democratic credentials, whatever the hopes of 
the intervention. These leaders are then difficult to bargain with as they have the 
‘legitimacy of democracy’ that the interventionists myopically declared as a paramount 
goal. This leaves interventionist with little flexibility to either seek new collaborative 
partners, if the elected ones are politically divisive or grossly ineffective, or to apply
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pressure as needed to reach their goals. Moreover, with its own short timeframes and 
shallow follow-through, ultimately what the international community often ends up with 
is the “procedural democracy” of elections without the entrenchment of the political 
culture necessary to support it.75 Interventionists are desperate for as much participation 
as possible to secure their own legitimacy and indigenous political entrepreneurs know 
it. They use that to manipulate their participation conducive to achieving their own 
needs, which are often averse to the broader democratisation goals of the intervention.
The main collaborative benefit of democratisation is that in an era where imperialism as 
an ideology is dead and only imperialistic interventions are undertaken, the simple 
reality is that collaboration without some democratic overtures is not likely to occur. 
And indeed, elections can at times greatly stabilise dire political situations. For 
instance, elections in East Timor, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, while not perfect, all 
helped to calm unease following extended violence. As Marina Ottaway argued, the 
“authoritarian solution- perhaps more promising in the short run- in the long run is very
7 f \likely to lead to a new cycle of discontent and collapse.” While democracy as a form 
of governance may be the most difficult to implement initially, it is the most viable in 
the longer-term. Simply put, Western interventions that do not place at least some 
emphasis on democratisation are not likely to find collaborative partners willing to wear 
the ‘collaborator’ label in a post-imperial era.
6.5: The ramifications of the collaboration problematique
... Washington cannot simply avoid or wish away dealing with local elites, 
for ultimately their actions, not those o f the United States, with strengthen 
or undermine institutions.11
The challenges defining the collaboration problematique have profound ramifications 
for the effectiveness of state building interventions. The general lack of suitable 
collaborative partners in frontier states, namely the pericentric dynamic which provokes 
interventionism, is inherently the most problematic. Undertaking interventionism with 
few selection possibilities and stymied flexibility means that interventionists are often 
stuck with nascent governments that all too frequently bear strong connections to the 
armed groups involved in the respective civil wars, have little interest in strong national
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governments, and/or lack the basic competence for the most rudimentary forms of 
sovereign governance.
The second major ramification of the collaboration problematique concerns the effects 
of lacking it as a strategic doctrine, specifically that this prevents Western states from 
developing appropriate tools and mechanisms for undertaking collaboration. Firstly, a 
lack of collaborative agents from the interventionists’ side makes establishing effective 
collaborative relationships more difficult. Even when indigenous partners can be found, 
without competent interventionist agents to collaborate with, they are doubtlessly poorly 
utilised. The West is simply short of the numbers of collaborative agents required to 
implement effective interventionism. Niall Ferguson has long argued this, noting that 
presently not enough Americans, for instance, are “out there” to make current state
• • ♦ • * 78 •building interventionism successful. Furthermore, even in sheer numbers of 
administrators, the UN is also very short of staff. The UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), by example, only has a headquarters staff of several hundred to 
oversee peacekeeping forces numbering over a hundred thousand troops.
The general ‘suitability’ of Western collaborative agents is also lacking in that there is a
major challenge to recruit persons with the right skill sets, namely the linguistic
competencies and political awareness appropriate to functioning in distant frontier states
undergoing interventions. Without the requisite skills, the West’s collaborative agents
are fundamentally lacking in their ability to engage effectively with indigenous politics.
Jeffrey Garten was emphatic on this point of US inadequacy, arguing:
We don’t have enough economists with hands-on experience in managing 
failed financial systems; we don’t have enough lawyers to support judicial 
systems; we don’t have experts for police work; we lack experience in 
general civil administration... and we certainly don’t have the leaders who 
can oversee all these areas.79
The suitability of the UN’s collaborative agents is also often in doubt even though it has
the luxury of recruiting staff from anywhere in the world but still manages to have staff
with superficial understandings of local cultures. A common critique is that the
limited coherence and local knowledge of UN missions is compounded by a quick rate
of staff turnover, usually with individuals serving less than six months in a specific post.
This is also harmed further since UN staff tend to “operate in a closed circle often far
81removed from the ground reality” of indigenous politics.
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Moreover, the suitability of using Western militaries as the primary actors of effecting 
change through interventionism is dubious, especially over the long-term. This point 
has been made most forcefully by Dana Priest who argued the US was “turning more 
and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and
89economic.” The Department of Defense has conceded as much when it noted that “the 
challenges of achieving unity of effort” required for success during interventions are 
problematic since it has “tended to become the default responder.” While militaries 
are essential to responding to the pericentric pull, especially initially, their prioritisation 
as lead agents is often negative for collaboration as they overshadow efforts to effect the 
political changes necessary for longer-term stability.
A further ramification of the lack of a doctrine of collaboration is a general tendency by 
interventionists to simplify local frontier circumstances. Anthony Zinni argued that 
amongst Western leadership there is a “lack of understanding of the complexities, the
84fine points, the subtleties of conditions on the ground.” A failure to understand in 
appropriate detail the nuances of indigenous politics in frontiers leads to the formulaic 
and ad hoc management of collaborative relationships because of the poor decisions it 
provokes. This means that there is naive hope that local politics can somehow be 
circumvented and hence there is a general unwillingness to engage local politics in a 
sophisticated manner. Considering state building interventionism is a dynamic, 
interactive process of collaboration, this is a disaster for better resolving the problems of 
frontier states.
One of the most important aspects of collaborative relationships is that they are founded 
on at least some degree of trust. Rather than analyse and hence understand local 
cultures, interventionists often use their own Western “cultural prisms to determine how 
things should be done” which leads to the stereotyping and over-generalisation of local
or
political actors. Understandably, this can lead to tensions developing within 
collaborative relationships as indigenous actors resist being labelled through simplistic 
stereo-typing. Crucially, considering collaboration as evolving bargain making, 
ignorance means interventionist actors have to compromise more than they probably 
would otherwise. This is most notably because of mistakes in choosing indigenous 
actors with whom to collaborate based on simplified understandings, notably in the 
context of a frontier zone teaming with a plethora of non-state actors. As Beatrice
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Pouligny argued for UN efforts at collaboration in Somalia: “[w]hen missions try to 
identify ‘civil society’ against a ‘failed’ state, to play NGOs, intellectuals, women,
• • •  • R6religious groups, or elders against ‘warlords’... their task is not necessarily easier.”
Attempts to simplify the task of identifying collaborative partners are likely to be 
counter-productive as complex indigenous actors, and notably the mediating 
possibilities they provide, are not clear-cut and easily simplified. By example, efforts to 
look within ‘civil society’ for alternatives to ‘warlords’ are often stymied because, 
though not outwardly obvious, those chosen as ‘civil society’ often are actually
O 'J
connected to warlord factions in one way or another. The attempt to pigeon hole 
indigenous actors using simplified understandings has the other major problem in that it 
tends to solidify challenges of non-collaboration. For instance, targeting the warlord 
Mohammed Farah Aidid individually only built up his power since it presented him as 
the one indigenous actor with the stature to confront UN forces.
A last result of a lack of a dedicated doctrine of collaboration is that it serves to 
fragment the ability of interventionists to collectively bargain with indigenous politics. 
The divisions and rivalries of the interventionists are themselves as big an obstacle to 
state building progress as is the fragmented nature of indigenous actors in frontier 
zones. The primary cause of this is that post-Cold War interventions have generally 
been multilateral endeavours and interventionism becomes difficult to manage when 
numerous Western states are attempting to further their own political visions for a 
foreign state. Recalling collaboration as an endeavour to achieve common goals, that 
the interventionists often exhibit a confusing array of national policies covering aid 
provision, economic regeneration, and political reform can only but be confusing for 
their indigenous partners. In the Balkans, for instance, despite public impressions of a 
united front from the West, what instead existed was a “variety of national and 
nongovernmental actors trying their best- but often failing- to present a coherent 
message to the involved populations about what is expected of them.”
Even aside from an incoherence of shared goals, the fragmented structure of multilateral 
forces is also often counter-productive because it greatly complicates collaborative 
relationships. Afghanistan provides a good example of a decidedly fragmented
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structure. Firstly, although the US asked Europeans for assistance for the multilateral 
force there, it maintains its own separate military forces outside of the ISAF remit. 
Namely it undertakes many missions unilaterally, notably in border regions with 
Pakistan, but also relies on the ISAF force of NATO contingents. Additionally, the US 
asks the UN to coordinate political developments while allowing individual donor 
countries to encourage economic recovery using their own individual aid policies. The 
end result is a fledgling Afghan government wondering who exactly it is partnered with 
politically, militarily and economically and for what intents. This has resulted in efforts 
by the UN to appoint a ‘super-envoy’ to try and consolidate the interventionist presence.
The disparate front presented by interventionist forces is compounded by disjointed 
chains of command, especially within the UN peacekeeping forces. While ostensibly 
under UN command, individual national contingents often defer orders from UN 
DPKO. Sex scandals involving peacekeepers in the DR Congo highlighted as much. 
The primary challenge for presenting a united front on what should have been a clear 
issue (‘child molestation is bad’) was that the assorted national contingents “were not 
ultimately answerable to the mission’s force commander, the civilian head of mission,
on
DPKO headquarters, or even to the Secretary-General.” This reality of UN 
incoherence surely caused Congolese actors to doubt the competence of UNMOC 
overall and hence refrain from collaborating with it.
Furthermore, the fragmented structure of multilateral forces is also resultant from the 
fact that some contingents are simply more capable, and willing, of undertaking 
necessarily assertive missions. The division of interventionist missions along lines of 
competence and willingness can be seen all too frequently and Lord Douglas Hurd has 
for this reason argued that often there lack “coalitions of the genuinely willing.”90 For 
instance, the US, UK and Canada bear the brunt of counter-insurgency fighting in 
Afghanistan while Australia has assumed the most forceful role in East Timor. In dire 
contrast, France, Germany and Italy are largely unwillingly to engage in combat. 
Furthermore, within the UN, there is much jockeying by national contingents to be 
assigned the least problematic areas, often leaving the major troop contributing 
countries- Pakistan, India and Bangladesh- assuming the burden of the most violence 
prone locales.
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In addition, debates over norms complicate Western interventionists’ attempts at 
collaboration. By example, while the US and Europe both have an interest in 
intervening, “they do so according to different norms.”91 These norms cover a gamut of 
issues, but mostly centre upon the role of military force and democratisation. In terms 
of collaboration, the problem this raises is that there are often too many interventionist 
actors with their own deeply felt norms to allow for unified outcomes to be readily 
achieved. A general inclination towards creating a ‘liberal democratic state’ does not 
really constitute a vision specific enough to bargain consistently with indigenous 
partners. A good example is of placing conditions on aid in order to pressure 
governments because deciding what conditionalities should be applied is divisive. Aid 
conditionality may be effective in principle, but there are limits to how well diverse 
groups of interventionists can coordinate who gets what aid, thus making the ability to 
influence even nascent governments difficult.
Disputes over norms cause a tendency to have overly ambiguous mission mandates that 
have important ramifications for collaboration. As a process of bargaining, 
collaboration can be stymied through ambiguous mandates. For instance, the mandate 
of UNOSOM II in Somalia was overly broad, essentially ‘helping the Somalis to rebuild 
a democratic state’ and hence was “open to varying interpretations, resulting in 
disagreements over major issues”, such as whether disarming the factions through force 
was necessary to establish a secure environment. A further ramification of ambiguous 
mandates is that local political entrepreneurs become aware of the “frequent gap 
between the means at the missions’ disposal and the ambitions expressed in the 
mandates” because of their ambiguity.94 Ultimately, the ambiguities of the UN’s 
interventionist goals allowed Somali politico-military actors to extend their own control 
over the Somali political space.
Even in terms of personal clarity, the agents of interventionist forces are in doubtful 
positions to negotiate when they have unclear understandings of a mission’s mandate. 
Somalia again provides a good example of this. Essentially the US and the UN 
“stumbled into Somalia without a plan” which resulted in a humanitarian mission 
evolving into a “misguided attempt at ad hoc nation building” as US troops attempted to 
capture the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid.95 The ambiguity of purpose for 
that mission was certainly felt by US commanders attempting to comprehend a complex
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situation on the ground with little real direction from above. Additionally, UN 
peacekeeping staff more generally share a sentiment that “‘nobody, at any time during 
the mission, ever told me what I was supposed to do’” and given that lack of what is 
essentially a job description, “‘everyone made his own little mishmash’.”96 This 
resulting emphasis on personal interpretations of mission mandates leaves the 
interventionists at a loss because it is easier for indigenous partners to manipulate their 
foreign partners by simply choosing whom and whom not to work with.
The ramification that this values debate has for collaboration is profound in that it 
constrains the formation of collaborative partnerships. In order to overcome this 
predicament, the main response by Western states has been through the
07“depoliticisation” of state building through its “technicalisation.” Policies of 
interventionism are simply presented as ‘routine’ technical processes devoid of politics. 
The present formula for managing the state building processes during interventions is a 
decidedly “one-size-fits-all model for democratic reconstruction”, which leads efforts in 
such diverse places as Afghanistan, the DR Congo and East Timor to “bear a disturbing
Q O
resemblance.” And while a reliance on formulaic ‘toolkits’ may be appropriate for 
building hospitals, nutrition centres or refugee camps, it is “absurdly over-systematised” 
to working through the political realities of state building in varied locales.99
The overarching problem of such technicalisation is that it places no emphasis on local 
collaborative possibilities, namely establishing and strengthening appropriate 
collaborative partners from within indigenous politics. Formulaic responses to state 
building inculcate mistrust and tension within collaborative relationships because of the 
inflexibility it allows for. While a ‘universal approach’ may seek to temper perceptions 
over imperialism, it is still problematic because a formulaic response does not account 
for the state-society dynamics of a particular state; it simply does not allow 
interventionist actors to nuance their collaborative relationships appropriate to meeting 
specific local needs. Western collaborative agents feel compelled to implement ‘the 
model’ with little room for manoeuvre while indigenous collaborators resent the 
imposition, yet again, of a rigid, foreign formula of governance.
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In general, efforts to appear ‘post-imperial’ by applying a formulaic, technicalised 
scheme of democratic state building greatly complicates collaborative relationships, 
because indigenous actors come to perceive foreign interventionists as insensitive and 
unresponsive to local dynamics. The US’ efforts, by example, often display a “lack of 
sensitivity to a whole host of factors on the ground, including cultural differences, the 
relativity of ‘values’ and local national feeling.”100 A good example for this is the 
reality that a key reason for the failure of many state building interventions is poorly 
chosen interim administrations.101 While there have arguably been some successes 
involving deference to local modalities, such as the use of a ‘loyal jurga’ in 
Afghanistan, pre-mature attempts at democratisation, for instance in Haiti in 1994, have 
conversely led to failure in the longer-term.
Lastly, before concluding, it is important to note that the short-timeframes of current 
interventions are especially problematic for collaboration. As Niall Ferguson argued, 
the “fatal flaw” of short-term state building efforts is the “extreme difficulty of securing 
local support” when locals know that the departure of interventionists is imminent.102 
Why would indigenous partners leave themselves open for future retribution, namely to 
be ‘strung from the lampposts’, once their interventionist partners have left? When 
indigenous partners struggle to build enough trust to engage interventionists effectively, 
the entire state building endeavour suffers because of it.
6.6; Conclusion
The New Timor: A Xanana Republic?
i n i- A Jakarta Post headline on government incompetence in East Timor
The challenges of gradualism collaboration for managing frontiers of insecurity are 
profound. The contextual difficulties of frontier states, the lack of doctrines for 
collaboration, a shallow willingness to pay its costs, and the normative debates of 
interventionism all combine to result in the poor actualisation of collaboration during 
state building interventionism. These challenges lead to less “direct encounter” between 
the agents of intervening powers and those of indigenous society.104 The requirement 
for successful collaboration is to get indigenous collaborative partners to want an 
intervention’s state building processes to progress; to get Western energy and resources 
translated into greater indigenous stability. As the theory of collaboration argued, that
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requires collaborative relationships that work through the state building processes in a 
nuanced manner. Better responding to these challenges to allow for that is therefore 
crucial to managing frontiers of insecurity more effectively than is presently done, a 
task the thesis will now turn to.
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C h a p t e r  7 :  A m e l i o r a t i n g  t h e  C o l l a b o r a t i o n
P r o b l e m a t i q u e
America has...better understood the Caribbean basin than it understands 
faraway nations... What reason is there to suspect that America will do 
better in Afghanistan than it has in Haiti?1
The collaboration problematique for post-Cold War interventionism can be defined as a 
lack of suitable indigenous partners, that collaboration is neither defined as a strategic 
doctrine nor is the West willing to bear the costs for it, and there are strong normative 
dilemmas over the imperialistic nature of current interventionism. Given these 
challenges, it is only possible to ameliorate the collaboration problematique; it cannot 
be completely overcome as it is not a mere problem to be solved. There will always be 
inherent difficulties for autonomous actors working together to achieve shared goals and 
no where will this be more true presently than for foreign interventions.
This chapter will argue for ways of ameliorating the collaboration problematique to 
improve the art of state building interventionism to hence allow for the better 
management of frontiers of insecurity. Because present interventions are fundamentally 
provoked by the pericentric pull and since there is little political will or capacity to 
intervene, it is essential that the West does a better job at collaboration with indigenous 
politics. There simply must be better use made of peripheral resources to resolving 
frontier problems, viz. to translate the energy and resources of the intervening power 
into terms of indigenous politics leading to a stronger state.
While this chapter will identify themes for ameliorating the collaboration 
problematique, it should be qualified that the purpose is not to provide an Idiots Guide 
to Collaboration based on precise ‘how to’ points but rather to argue, as did Robinson 
and Gallagher, that the choice of mode for collaboration was a purely tactical 
consideration shaped by circumstances and hence each frontier state must be ascertained 
accordingly and thenceforth the appropriate types of collaboration systems undertaken. 
Nonetheless, there are still cross-cutting themes for improved collaboration, what can be
called ‘collaboration enablers’, which need to be entrenched for the stronger 
management of frontiers of insecurity to be possible.
7.1; Manage expectations for frontiers of insecurity
Here in this unstable borderland... warfare was continuous, o f low 
intensity, and inconclusive.2
A more realistic approach is to emphasize the uncertainties and to throw 
doubt on recipes, formulas and programs.3
The most important collaboration enabler is simply reaching a greater understanding of 
the context and dynamics that define frontiers of insecurity. This is essential to 
allowing the improved management of collaborative systems because it helps to 
moderate expectations and to appreciate the nuances of indigenous politics. The first 
need in this regards is to appreciate more clearly that present interventions are occurring 
in actual frontier zones. With the 20 Century defined by conventional wars between 
states, the need at the beginning of the 21st is to return to unconventional approaches 
that allow for more flexibility because frontiers demand nothing less.
Jeremy Greenstock put it well when he noted that the present environment for 
interventionism is “a progressive collapse into a mosaic of different localities and 
interests, where security is decentralised and government isn’t powerful enough to hold 
the state together.”4 This is what frontier zones mean for interventionist forces and why 
references to state building experiences in post-war Germany and Japan are so lacking, 
viz. they were never frontier zones, hence their post-war collaborative dynamics were 
entirely different. Today, collaborative relationships must be maintained with a diverse 
group of indigenous actors in the confusing environment of a frontier zone.
The second key frontier context is to appreciate that there are no great collaborative 
partners; that is why there is a pericentric pull. If there were suitable partners already 
there, there would be no need for an intervention. Considering that, interventionists 
must appreciate that whoever they partner with will be an inherently difficult, often
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morally ambivalent undertaking. Given that, there are requirements for dampening 
expectations for obvious or particularly solid partners to emerge and be easily engaged.
Furthermore is to emphasise that the response of state building interventionism is 
fundamentally provoked by security rationales. The pericentric pull of frontiers is not 
inherently related to a ‘democracy gap’ or even humanitarian needs. Humanitarianism 
may have “greater political salience” in the post-Cold War era, but fundamentally it is 
not enough to compel action if there are not clear strategic considerations involved.5 
Simply put, current interventions are a response to a pericentric pull, not some kind of 
metro-centric driven ‘do-goodism’. They are endeavours to engender greater stability in 
frontier states so that Western states can mitigate their own security concerns.
There are two reasons for being clear about the security imperatives provoking 
interventionism. Firstly, for the West this is necessary to keep a clear focus on state 
building, endeavouring to expand the more effective control over frontier territories by 
national governments. Ostensible emphasis on the primacy of humanitarianism can 
serve as both an excuse for real political problem solving and a distraction more 
broadly. For instance, the crises of West Africa, and especially Sierra Leone, in the 
1990s saw emergency aid provision prioritised rather than taking the harder steps of 
effective diplomatic negotiations to resolve the deeper socio-political issues rather than 
immediate humanitarian crises.6 The international community was simply more 
interested to dump in aid rather than engage indigenous politics to come up with real 
solutions for the crises.
Secondly, in terms of forming good collaborative dynamics, it is important to be clear 
and honest with indigenous partners in order to build trust. They should be told 
straightforward that state building is not “simple charity” but rather a “smart
n
investment” in the West’s own security. If the West is unable to provide clear, honest 
justifications for the actions it undertakes, but gives platitudes to its own ostensible 
altruism, it is only reasonable that indigenous actors view interventionists with 
scepticism. Odes to humanitarianism and democracy will simply be perceived as 
shallow and hence the collaborative relationships weakened.
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The third contextual need of frontiers is to perceive that state building interventions are 
about ‘managing insecurity’ and not about ‘creating order’, which would require a 
different response than state building interventionism. While the US, for example,
Q
declares that it wants to “achieve decisive, enduring results” , this is not particularly 
feasible in frontiers using shallow imperialistic interventions. As has been argued 
consistently in this thesis, considering the nature of insecurity faced in the present era of 
globalisation, there are no outright solutions, only risk management strategies. This 
means the West can only but manage insecurity. Interventions are undertaken to 
mitigate insecurity because creating stronger national governments more capable of 
managing their sovereign territory is the best option for doing so. Even then, the goal, 
which Anthony Zinni rightly argued for, is a “condition of instability that is 
manageable” rather than to think that such shallow foreign engagement can affect 
deeper changes.9
Instead of clear-cut outcomes of profoundly ‘new and improved’ states, expectations 
should be that some security concerns are mitigated- such as threats of terrorism, drugs 
trafficking or mass migration- and the costs of doing so do not require re-establishing a 
formal empire. Thomas Friedman noted as much for the US’ efforts in Afghanistan, 
“We didn’t have to make it Switzerland, just a little better, a little freer, and a little more 
stable than it was under the Taliban.”10 London’s The Times also argued that realistic 
expectations must be maintained for Afghanistan, for instance, by noting that “progress 
cannot be measured here by the erection of skyscrapers” and instead more basic 
indicators, such as basic education provision and improved physical security, must be 
chosen.11 In this way, it is most important to achieve progress towards empowering 
more capable indigenous partners rather than to believe in any sort of single, decisive 
‘victory’.
Overall, considering these three aspects of contextualisation, there must be more 
realistic expectations of what is possible in frontier zones in terms of state building 
interventionism. For those undertaking interventions, the first question they must 
answer for themselves is where they are; namely in frontiers. Secondly, they must ask 
themselves why they are there; to try to better manage insecurity. Thirdly, they must 
ask themselves what is the best way to do that; namely by finding and strengthening
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collaborative partners to better manage their own affairs in the form of more effective 
national governments. State building interventionism must be conceptualised as a long­
term, dynamic process of collaboration with indigenous politics fundamentally about 
empowering indigenous collaborative partners.
7.2: Make collaboration a strategic doctrine
The actions in 2001 in Afghanistan reinforced the principles o f  adaptability, 
speed o f  action, integrated joint operations, economy offorce, and the value 
o f working with and through indigenous forces to achieve common goals.
- US Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006’12
If it is accepted that collaboration is central to state building interventionism, then it 
must be treated as strategic doctrine, the second collaboration enabler. Doing so would 
allow for improved ‘collaborative know-how’ enabling the West to be more effective at 
identifying partners, building trust, managing evolving relationships, engaging in 
conflict resolution, effecting logistics and resources transfers, and negotiating 
agreements. This responds to the reality that present conventions of Western warfare 
are outdated for responding to the realities of frontier zones.
A new approach for interventionism would be one of ‘collaboration in frontiers’ and
aL
shift away from an understanding of conventional warfare defined by the 20 Century 
with its over-emphasis on the detachment of technology. This thesis does not have the 
luxury of outlining precisely what a doctrine of collaboration would be other than that it 
would follow the general parameters of the ‘theory of collaboration’ outlined in Chapter 
4.13 It would also not be a simple military doctrine, such as ‘counter-insurgency’ 
doctrines, but rather one broader in scope, notably guiding the civilian control of the 
overall process of collaboration and hence a strong emphasis on the political outcomes 
necessary for achieving progress. Assuming a coherent doctrine of collaboration could 
be formulated, there would need to be a number of general actions taken to see it 
implemented effectively.
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Emphasise ‘collaboration ’ in strategic planning
It is their war, and you5re to help them, not win it for them. Armies o f  
liberation have half lives. Money is ammunition. Intelligence is the key. 
Cultural awareness is a force multiplier. Success depends on local leaders.
- US General David Petreaus14
The theory of collaboration is about avoiding formulaic responses to frontiers of 
insecurity. It is about defining the entire ‘mission’ around the specific opportunities and 
challenges that collaboration with a respective frontier state’s indigenous politics 
provides. While no specific ‘collaborative doctrine’ has been outlined, there is some 
growing consensus within the US military, by example, that collaboration is crucial. 
The US Chief of Staff, General Pace, argued there is a need for the US military to 
“maximize our military power through closer coordination” with local partners and that 
“building partnership capacity invigorates our efforts.”15 This follows the general 
sentiments of the Pentagon now towards ‘indirect action’ and recognising ‘the value of 
working with and through indigenous forces to achieve common goals’. However, even 
with growing interest from senior military figures, more than anything else, 
collaboration must be incorporated into strategic planning in detail rather than limited to 
smooth sound-bytes in speeches or Defence Papers.16
Furthermore, given the context of frontiers of insecurity, achieving improved 
collaboration requires allowing for more flexibility in implementing collaborative 
systems. Firstly, a requisite avenue for achieving more flexibility is to be less formulaic 
in approaching the state building activities undertaken during interventions, notably 
those of the UN. This means precluding a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model and allowing 
indigenous political dynamics more influence over institution building such as 
constitutional design, bureaucratic layout, and the distribution of power.17
Secondly, one of the key needs is for Western militaries to have the flexibility to 
perform in the fluid, chaotic environments that define modem frontier zones. Within 
the UK there is acknowledgement of the need for more flexibility from the Ministry of 
Defence. The MoD has argued that it needs the “ability to rapidly reconfigure forces in 
theatre as the conflict develops from heavy war-fighting to enduring peace support and
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1 ftpost-conflict reconstruction.” For its part, the US military has noted its need to have 
“greater flexibility... [in its] ability to partner directly with nations... to allow them to 
participate... in stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations.”19 A major 
challenge for the Pentagon yet to be overcome have been layers of unwieldy 
Congressional legal oversight, left over from the Cold War, regarding who could be 
partnered with and how. Ultimately, more flexibility in being able to work with local
indigenous actors would allow the Pentagon to improve “building partnership capacity
00and strengthening alliances” because it would have greater “freedom of action.”
Thirdly, there is a need to have more moderation in introducing Western value systems. 
This is because the West’s insistence on the ‘universality’ of the norms and values it 
wishes to see entrenched through interventionism often provokes the most tension 
within collaborative relationships. As Robert Cooper rightly contended, it is “easier to
find common ground through a discussion of interests than if an attempt was made to
01negotiate values.” In this sense, identifying the common goals that guide collaborative 
endeavours can best be kept to the common interest of seeking a stronger government 
better able to effectively manage its territory without immediately needing to be the 
perfect democracy demanded by a Western parliamentarian or able to avoid all criticism 
from New York’s Human Rights Watch.
The context of frontiers does not allow for an easy reconciliation of the absolutes of 
Western human rights and democratic norms with local realities. This is notably 
because the West simply cannot always collaborate with ideal types; there are no saints 
in places that have often experienced decades of war. The sheer practicalities of 
collaboration mean that interventionists have to take their partners as they find them and 
accept them as they are, at least initially. The US’ partnering in Afghanistan with 
assorted warlords was a good example of this. For instance, while General Dostum had 
a notoriously bad history (interestingly of collaboration with the Soviets), he still proved 
to be a useful partner for a crucial period and was subsequently marginalised, and 
rightly so, in the longer-term through the national political process.
183
What is more, as Michael Cox noted of the British Empire, “it had to make deals here
99and compromises there in order not to provoke... ‘blowback’.” The same is decidedly 
true of present interventions as well since their lighter imperialistic nature means that 
the ability of the interventionists to impose outcomes is limited and consequently they 
must bargain with their collaborative partners to see changes implemented without 
provoking outright resistance. Returning to the British comparison, Bernard Porter 
argued that many a British colonial officer shared a wide disregard for what was 
“widely stigmatised as ‘enthusiasm’- burning faith, simpleminded conviction, the
9*3
‘crusading impulse’.” In its stead was a more pragmatic worldliness. Presently, this 
can be seen, for instance, in Special Forces troops who argue, “You’ve got to 
compromise and go a little native” in order to function effectively in frontier zones such 
as Afghanistan.24
On the whole, considering the response to frontiers of insecurity is primarily for a 
security rationale, there is a need to moderate the imposition of Western values for the 
sake of pragmatic prioritisation. To do otherwise is dangerously misguided. Samuel 
Huntington argued a “Western belief in the universality of Western culture... is false, it 
is immoral, and it is dangerous... Imperialism is the necessary logical consequence of
9 ^universalism.” Present interventions are merely imperialistic and should stay that 
way precisely because they are limited endeavours focused on state building in 
frontiers, not the global imposition of an absolutist moral and political order for its own 
sake.
Indeed, approaching these norms with messianic zeal can be counter-productive to the 
security rationales of an intervention. For instance, regarding human rights norms, there 
is simply no possibility of approaching their implementation in a frontier in the same 
manner as one would in the West itself. This again responds to the reality of the frontier 
context. David Rieff noted as much when he maintained that it was grossly naive to 
believe human rights norms could be implemented in the midst of state building 
processes: “so Eurocentric is the... human rights perspective that it is somehow 
imagined that these agonizing processes can take place without violence, thanks to the
9 f \worldwide diffusion of human rights norms.” When the West’s own processes of state 
building provoked some of the most extreme violence in human history, it is recklessly
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detached to think that elsewhere such outcomes can be altogether avoided through 
Westerners crassly dictating their own ideas. Even as renowned a human rights 
advocate as Bernard Kouchner reached the same conclusion when heading the UN 
mission in Kosovo, noting it would be “a mistake to implement norms too quickly” in 
the Kosovo of 1999.27
This is not to say that democracy and human rights norms should be entirely forsaken; 
rather that they should be approached in a more subtle, nuanced manner that is defined 
by pragmatism and local realities. These norms are part of the Western identity and 
they cannot be entirely separated from the ethos of an intervening force. They can be 
moderated though and nuanced in such a way that allows for their gradual, locally 
qualified implementation. This moderation should be guided by sheer pragmatism. 
This is for the primary reason that, as mentioned previously, it is hard to imagine 
collaborative relationships being formed with ‘post-imperial’ indigenous partners 
without some ode to democracy made. In any case, the West values democracy and it 
cannot deviate too far from that belief when ascribing improved governance over 
frontier states. Perhaps it would be ‘easier’ if it didn’t, but that is somewhat of mute 
point.
A practical examination of local circumstances can allow for the implementation of 
democratic norms, but adjusted as needed to still be conducive to stability, such as by 
allowing for a lengthy transitional period and traditional leadership to participate. For 
example, the UN in Afghanistan chose not to have quick national elections and instead 
opted for a transitional period, with traditional leadership ensuring representation for the
j o
country’s competing groups through a ‘loyal jurga’ council. In some locales, 
provincial elections preceding national elections allows for “new local leaders to
JQ
emerge and gain experience and for political parties to build a support base.” This 
helps prevent dominant armed groups from simply morphing into coercive political 
parties at the national level, allowing for more suitable collaborative relationships to be 
formed. However, when good fortune presents moderate leaders with broad public 
support, then rapid elections can be undertaken and foreign forces withdrawn quickly, 
such as successfully occurred in Panama.30 These decisions of sequencing and
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timeframes must be based on local conditions, not strictly the West’s own moral 
imperatives.
On the whole, Western interventionists should dictate less liberal, idealist propaganda 
and maintain more official pragmatism. This means appreciating the sentiment of many 
indigenous people who are naturally “suspicious when military powers claim to be
•51
doing favours... by occupying weaker states.” There is simply no need for the 
messianic rhetoric. It is fair enough to admit to undertaking ‘imperialistic’ interventions 
since one cannot send an army into another state and think otherwise. Given that, it is 
better to adhere to proclaiming the security rationales with only a subtle undertone of 
democratisation and human rights norms. This is also helpful for convincing Western 
domestic audiences of the correctness of an intervention as well. For instance, the US 
public, and notably the European publics, are more supportive of the Afghanistan 
intervention as it was advocated for on security grounds whereas the Iraq invasion has 
been profoundly unpopular, notably as it was promoted as ‘expanding freedom’ and a 
democratic Middle East.
Furthermore, pragmatic and deferential approaches to human rights and democratic 
norms are also likely to be more productive towards reaching them anyway, notably in 
the collaborative context of frontiers. As Robert Kaplan rightly argued, military men in 
developing states are “more likely to listen to American officers who briefed them about 
human rights as a tool of counterinsurgency than to civilians who talked abstractly 
about universal principles of justice.” Allowing for the ‘shifting greys’ of democratic 
implementation is also likely to eventually bear results for liberalism more generally. If 
a fledgling government with ‘limited democracy’ “steadily expands those freedoms, it 
should not be branded a dictatorship.” This is notably so for the pragmatism required 
to better manage collaborative systems in frontiers.
Improved ‘collaborative system managers ’
The Special Forces troops then set out to do what they are trained so well to 
do: they squatted down on rugs, ate goat with agas, and got friendly. This 
put us through the door; greater cooperation followed34
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One of the major requirements for implementing a doctrine of collaboration would be to 
have ‘collaborative system managers’, namely interventionist managers with the 
collaborative know-how necessary for achieving more from collaborative systems.35 
Within the UN system, there have been some exceptional individuals who are ideal 
types for the art of collaboration in frontiers. Lakhdar Brahimi and Sergio Viera de 
Mello were widely considered as exemplary interventionist managers while for the US, 
the former ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, should be regarded 
as such. As The Economist noted of Khalilzad, “If you are going to invade and occupy 
a couple of failed Muslim states that have weird and impenetrable politics, it helps to 
have a Khalilzad or two on your team.” The challenge for present attempts at 
interventionism is that there are so few managers that are notably effective at guiding 
collaborative efforts. Given that, if the West is going to continue with its state building 
interventionism, it simply must have more of such people in the field.
A first step to achieving this would be to define appropriate collaborative skill sets. 
This thesis is too limited to go into the details of such a skills set but in sum, it would 
need to be cross-disciplinary and emphasise dynamism and exceptional cultural and 
political awareness. The US military has perhaps gone furthest to defining such a skill 
set when it called for ‘stability operations skills’ being developed, including “foreign 
language capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments
nn
and International Organizations.” Perhaps the most definitive feature of collaborative 
skill sets would be their diversity. This responds to the simple reality that managing 
interventions in frontiers is a complex endeavour. For this reason, Anthony Zinni said 
“renaissance men and women” are needed, competent in political science, economics,
o o
and even anthropology and sociology. Given the West’s own immigrant communities, 
it would be beneficial that first and second generation citizens with deep understandings 
of their countries of origin, such as Khalilzad, be at the forefront of collaborative efforts 
since they would be in the best position to appreciate the political subtleties of each 
state.
Special emphasis for a collaborative skills set should also be placed on the ability of 
collaborative system managers to understand frontier zones. Western interventionists 
must accept that more learning has to be done. As Yahya Sadowski argued, “Learning
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to recognise, acknowledge, and deal with complexity may be the hallmark of successful 
diplomacy in the coming years.” This is certainly true for interventionist actors 
engaged in collaboration in complex and seemingly impenetrable frontier zones. The 
need for more knowledge is required because the reality of frontiers is uncompromising 
in its complexity such that many local conflicts are driven by Freud’s ‘narcissism of 
small differences’, an apparent obsession with tiny distinctions that are almost invisible 
to outsiders.40
Overall, any collaborative skill sets would require an emphasis on the ‘micro-sociology’ 
of frontiers because it would help interventionists to distinguish assorted indigenous 
actors, their relations to one another, and discern their aims.41 Another related 
requirement is an awareness of the subtleties of suasion and coercion required for 
collaboration in frontiers. The key attribute of Roman statesmen was that they did “not 
threaten or menace” but rather “made requests and promises and followed through on 
both”, while the British imperialists also “made an art of imperial understatement.”42 
This contrasts decidedly with a current proclivity for many Western interventionists 
being overly brusque, especially regarding ‘universal’ human rights and democracy 
norms.
Amongst Western militaries, the US military’s effort to improve its collaborative
managers is the most advanced. The Pentagon has argued that it requires personnel
with certain abilities:
... comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local 
and tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures and 
working with local networks to further US and partner interests through 
personal engagement, persuasion and quiet influence- rather than through 
military force alone.43
As a starting point, the Pentagon has started training programmes to “improve the 
ability of the Armed Forces to work more effectively with international partners” 
through greater language competence and cultural awareness.44 In practical terms, the 
US military has decided to increase its Special Operations Forces and has also created 
the post of Foreign Area Officers who provide field commanders with “political- 
military analysis, critical language skills and cultural adeptness.”45
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7.3: Collaboration needs stronger management
We ’re spending a billion dollars, and these people are a bunch o f  crooks 
who are stealing the country blind. We have a responsibility to be pushy.
- UN official on Congolese politicians46
The third collaboration enabler is the stronger management of collaborative 
relationships. While a doctrine of collaboration would allow for improved collaborative 
know-how, its implementation will require stronger management through a willingness 
to apply this know-how.
More politicking, less military force
The Political Officers who accompanied the force... parleyed all the time 
with the chiefs, the priests and other local notables. These political officers 
were very unpopular with army officers... It was alleged they always 
patched things up... doing everything you possibly can before you shoot.
- Winston Churchill47
The major emphasis required for stronger management needs to be on the political 
wrangling that defines the bargaining processes of collaboration and concomitantly a 
shift from military-driven efforts. This is necessary because military means eventually 
reach a “point of diminishing returns” whereby the security presence allowed for does 
not translate further into political stability without hard negotiations.48 Indeed, in the 
context of present interventions, war should be seen as a subsidiary of state building. 
Essentially, any instrumental violence is used towards helping another society to 
recreate itself in the form of a stronger state providing a more physically secure 
environment. There may be an initiating phase of outright war, or there may be ongoing 
counter-insurgency campaigns, but fundamentally interventions are not ‘wars’ in the 
general sense. State building interventions are inherently political by nature and 
collaboration is a dynamic, interactive process and notably political in substance. 
Military force is necessary at times, notably in the frontier context, but it is not a 
substitute for thoughtful political wrangling between collaborative partners over the 
longer-term.
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Placing an emphasis on more politicking and less military force would allow for a 
doctrine of collaboration to be truly implemented. As Lord Carnes argued, for example 
of the US, its strategic focus during interventions in frontier states “should be on their 
politics... the US relationship with the supported government must be considered the 
centre of gravity.”49 Instead of military means, more effective political interaction 
through improved collaboration should be emphasised and a collaboration doctrine 
would focus on building broader political support for the external set of collaboration by 
creating ‘stakeholders’ among the general population.50 For instance, Princeton Lyman 
argued of US interventionist efforts that “if it is to gain local support... [the US] must 
adopt a less heavy-handed approach” and this would be through a “stronger diplomatic 
and intelligence presence on the ground.”51
Considering that collaborative systems are fundamentally political agreements between 
interventionists and their indigenous collaborative partners, this requires that 
interventionists be politically tough and demanding of collaborative elites. As Jeffrey 
Herbst argued, state building does not emerge from eloquent political rhetoric but rather 
results from the “brutal political calculations about how it is possible to extend power 
within individual states.” The challenge of making politically tough demands is 
primarily because of interventionists’ hesitance to be deemed imperialists. This is a 
central part of the collaboration problematique and needs to be countered. While 
indigenous actors are expert at pressuring interventionists over the rights of sovereignty, 
there is an imperative to be more demanding of collaborative elites “no matter how neo- 
colonial it sound[s].” The obligations of interventionists are firstly to meeting their 
own security needs but also to the local population at large rather than just the 
collaborating elites.
Inculcate indigenous collaboration
... it is vital for the United States to position itself as an ally, not a 
conqueror or occupier, and to ensure that indigenous leaders take 
ownership o f the new order.54
The second essential aspect of stronger management would be to inculcate indigenous 
collaborative partners. The most challenging aspect of the collaboration problematique
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is simply finding collaborative partners. When they are found, they are most often 
direly unsuited for the task at hand, i.e. effective state building, which means they must 
be consistently supported as they increase their capacity, viz. through gradualism 
collaboration. An important consideration in this regard is that continuity and 
decentralisation are crucial for the interventionists’ efforts at strengthening their 
collaborative partners.55
Continuity is fairly self-explanatory in that erratic, short-term interventionist partners 
are harder for indigenous actors to collaborate with. This is a pressing concern when 
UN mission staff and the diplomatic corps are quickly rotated in their posts, notably in 
the ‘hardship’ duty-stations of frontier states. In response to this need, the Pentagon, for 
example, is now working to allow its Special Operations forces longer-term missions, 
which “will emphasize building personal relationships with foreign military and security 
forces and other indigenous assets to achieve common objectives.”56 On the whole, it is 
necessary that more continuity is provided by interventionists in their collaborative 
relationships.
‘Decentralisation’ does not mean that a government be federalist, rather that 
interventionist actors must place a priority emphasis as required on inculcating 
collaboration at a local level rather than merely through a central government. While 
the effort of state building interventions is overall focused on engendering a stronger 
national government, it should generally be done in a manner that allows for 
collaborative interaction at the local level. This is because it lets interventionists 
achieve a broader interface between the external and internal collaborative sets and 
hence encourages local participation in broader national changes. Given that state
• 57building processes are “easy hostages to insincere parties” , such as warlords or rebel 
movements, the major rationale for a broadened interface is to hedge against the 
manipulation of peace processes and elections by a few national elites. Rather than 
limit interaction to national leaders in the capital, collaborative approaches that seek to 
engage with general publics as much as possible are more likely to succeed.
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At times, the most suitable approach may mean that strengthening local government 
should be prioritised ahead of the central government. A relevant theme of Samuel 
Huntington’s is that state capacity must correlate with broader political changes. If 
there is a weak central government with little ability to provide social services, notably 
personal security, it would be better to emphasise local politics first and build up local 
government capacities, which is often easier done in the fractious, chaotic nature of a 
frontier zone. Local people need to see results in their neighbourhoods, not just hear 
about changes in a distant capital.
Broadening the interface of the external and internal collaborative sets is crucial to 
enhancing overall public support for an intervention conducive to its success. The most 
important aspect for achieving broadened consent is to improve personal security. 
James Dobbins explained this succinctly: “If the population feels its security enhanced 
by the intervening presence, it will be inclined to collaborate.”59 A secure environment, 
while not enough in itself, is then conducive to political and socio-economic progress 
being made and can be built upon to strengthen public support for an intervention’s 
goals. For example, NATO has sought to present itself as a ‘service provider’ in locales 
such as Afghanistan where it undertakes programming, such as rebuilding schools and 
providing medical clinics, to directly help the civilian population. In contrast, those 
who want to undermine an intervention will firstly target a general population’s security 
in order to create resentment against the interventionists and their indigenous 
collaborative partners. Given these concerns, promoting secure local environments 
allowing for individuals to function as normally as possible should be a priority.
There is an overarching need to actively strengthen indigenous actors’ technical 
competence for governance. One good way to do this is through educational outreach 
programmes. The US government has the best experience with this, notably through its 
military and civilian exchange programmes, and provides an example worth emulating 
by other Western states. As the Pentagon argued, indigenous actors- military and 
political leaders- who receive a US education “understand US values and interests, 
fostering willingness to unite in a common cause.”60 In this way, the Pentagon utilises 
programmes such as the International Military Education and Training and the Counter 
Terrorism Fellowship programmes to target “shaping relationships and developing
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future foreign leaders.”61 Furthermore, education exchange programmes are also useful 
at developing links should weakened states falter in the future. By example of the 
Philippines, one commentator noted US Special Forces are currently “developing a 
cadre of Westernized officers and useful contacts... who could be influential even in the
fOevent that the state broke up.”
A last requirement for inculcating indigenous collaborative partners is that the 
interventionists themselves must allow for more empowerment at the local level. 
Managing frontiers is inherently easier with a ‘man on the spot’. In an era of instant 
communication, there is a proclivity by Western politicians for micro-managing from 
afar the current batch of men on the spot- UN Special Representatives, ambassadors, 
and military commanders. The biggest problem with this tendency is that Western 
political leadership often has a decidedly poor understanding of local circumstances, for 
example American congressmen who do not know a Sunni from a Shiite or a Pashtun 
from an Uzbek. Washington and London politicians and any other detached 
concentration of ‘backseat collaborative managers’ should not impose themselves on 
interventionist management. The freedom to detach from rigid national policies and 
manage through specific area expertise is crucial for improved collaboration. 
Maintaining strong collaborative relationships requires “constant political influence and 
interference” and hence men on the spot must often “interfere for reasons that have little 
connection with the official policy” of an intervening power.64 This is because of the 
pure pragmatism that frontier circumstances dictate.
Achieve ‘unity o f effort* for collaborative advantage
The third major theme for the stronger management of collaborative systems would be 
to achieve greater ‘unity of effort’. Recalling collaboration as a dynamic, interactive 
process of autonomous actors working together towards achieving common goals, it is 
inherently critical that unity of effort be achieved in order for the endeavour to be 
worthwhile. If collaborative partners cannot work together effectively, there is simply 
no point in engaging in collaboration. While it is most helpful to have total unity of 
effort between interventionists and their indigenous partners, it is very difficult to 
achieve even amongst the interventionists themselves.
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Considering these challenges of coordination, a starting point for interventionist actors 
would be to truly achieve more unity of effort amongst themselves. For 
interventionists, the challenges for coordinated collaboration are notably so for 
multilateral efforts, such as the NATO presence in Afghanistan or the Balkans. 
Managing collaborative relationships is difficult when each Western state has different 
opinions on and interests sought from indigenous partners. Even within individual 
governments, however, coordinating collaboration is problematical. The Pentagon cites 
gaps in collaboration between its military Combatant Commanders and diplomatic 
Chiefs of Mission and has called for creating mechanisms to allow them “to work more 
collaboratively.”65 In calling for more unity of effort, the Pentagon, by example, has 
correctly emphasised the need for “unified statecraft”, the ability “to bring to bear all 
elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and 
partners abroad... toward common objectives and building the capacity of partners.”66
In addition, key needs for improved collaborative efforts in the field are integrated 
civilian and military efforts. Perhaps the best solution for this would be to have 
dedicated civilian agencies leading interventions. Academics and policy pundits have 
often called for such dedicated agencies, be they a “post-intervention agency” or an
/TO
“Inter-agency Field Force.” The US State Department now has a ‘Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stability’ and there is currently a proposal for a larger ‘Civilian 
Reserve Corps’ as well as a ‘Conflict Response Fund’ to finance operations.69 Needless 
to say, this thesis supports such efforts at acquiring dedicated capabilities but qualifies 
that by noting that while there is much talk, there has been little substantive action to 
date on the ground.
Additionally, one of the intervention types worthy of future emulation is that of ‘leading 
states’ because it allows interventionists a more united front for collaboration with 
indigenous politics. The Australian-led effort in East Timor in 1999 was a good 
example whereby the overall coherence of a mission was consistently maintained. Most
crucially for collaboration, Australia’s decisive leadership was able “to send a clear and
7n
coherent message to the local population, one that integrated its various components.” 
US leadership in Kosovo also provides another example of a leading state being able to 
ensure greater internal collaboration amongst interventionists. With consistent
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leadership, the ability of the mission to bargain with the fairly unified indigenous actors 
involved in Kosovo- be they the Serbian government or the Kosovo Liberation Army 
and its successor political party- was greatly strengthened. Overall, interventionists 
must collaborate amongst themselves firstly if an intervention is to be successful.
Achieving unity of effort within the interventionists’ approach to collaboration would 
then allow for improved interaction between foreign and indigenous actors, the more 
important relationships. The best way to achieving greater unity of effort, and hence 
more collaborative advantage, would be to maintain clear shared goals with indigenous 
partners. For instance, Lord Paddy Ashdown noted of his experiences leading the UN 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina that in order to improve current interventions there is a need to
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have a “political destination” guiding the overall effort. Ashdown placed his emphasis 
on that destination being defined by local conditions and interests, for instance in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina it was to become part of ‘Europe’, i.e. future European Union 
membership. Defining a political destination gives collaborative relationships the 
coherence needed to better maintain trust as well as bargain towards a shared end goal. 
While this emphasis on political outcomes is ideal, at times- such as in the early stages 
of an intervention in notably violent frontiers- it may be pertinent to define common 
goals in terms of improved security at the local level. Recalling interventionism as a 
contest of ungovemed space, seeking common security interests are crucial to 
collaboration, notably when tactical collaboration is required. Examples of this were 
US military efforts with Afghan warlords and between local armed groups and UN 
peacekeepers in the chaotic eastern regions of the DR Congo.
Improved scaling o f institutionalisation
The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their
form o f government but their degree o f government.72
Assuming that more unity of effort can be achieved, a crucial requirement for the 
stronger management of collaborative systems would be the better scaling of state 
building processes. The most important aspect of this would be to focus on the theory 
of collaboration’s emphasis on an evolving equilibrium of capacities, namely ensuring 
indigenous partners’ capacity to govern evolves in tandem with that capacity provided
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by the interventionists. Ideally, as Marcus Fielding contended, “as the public 
governance sector strengthens and the indigenous government develops its capacity to 
govern, its mandate progressively expands” to cover the security and other roles 
previously assumed directly by interventionists.
Interventionists must also be careful to decide which institutions should be prioritised 
for strengthening and the real possibilities for doing so, although security organs will 
need to be strengthened near universally. When the purpose of state building 
interventions is the gradual empowerment of indigenous partners in governance to the 
point where foreign support can be withdrawn, the institutionalisation of bureaucracies 
simply must be done better. In reality rather than theory, this is difficult to achieve. 
There is already much emphasis on institutionalisation during interventionism and the 
UN, for instance, notes that “the core task... is to build effective public institutions.”74 
However, the overarching problem is that interventionists often undermine it through 
several mistakes of collaboration.
The first is to ‘hollow out’ nascent governments through the parallel provision of social 
services through international humanitarian actors rather than through their 
collaborative partners in government. Driven by a humanitarian ethos of neutrality, 
international agencies often “create havoc if they insist on operating independently” of a
7c
national government. The outright circumvention of collaborative partners in nascent 
governments is hence a major challenge. With a goal of expanding government control 
over sovereign space, interventionists who bring in yet more foreign actors to assume 
parallel roles are misguided. The challenge this poses over the longer-term of 
institutionalisation is that the humanitarians’ emphasis on relatively small, localised 
projects means implementing larger national projects- such as bureaucratic capacity 
building or improving infrastructure- is hindered.
Rather than import foreign capacity in the form of Western aid agencies, a better option 
would be to ‘embed’ it directly into a developing government, notably for the longer- 
term. The Prime Minister of East Timor, Jose Ramos-Horta, noted that he and his 
government were very “conscious that our public administration, our Treasury, and
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7 f \  * •other branches of government are very weak.” Given that, the UN mission in East 
Timor has since been active embedding technical capacity into the Dili government, 
notably into the judicial system and the national police force, and many judges and the 
police commander are actually UN staff. Another positive example is the US effort in 
Afghanistan whereby ‘Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams’ of American officers 
are embedded within the Afghan National Army. As government competence 
improves, these embedded interventionists are in tandem removed.
Secondly, a further necessity of scaling institutionalisation better is to force indigenous 
partners to assume responsibility as soon as possible but in a manner appropriate to 
actual capacities. This has been achieved inconsistently. For instance, some academics 
have argued that the UN took an overly paternalistic approach to the Bosnians, and this
77“overweening foreign presence has stunted the country’s political development.” In 
contrast, despite a strong initial presence in East Timor, the first UN mission there was 
recalled prematurely, leaving the government with little capacity to effectively govern. 
Eventually, following national rioting, a second UN mission had to be formed and 
peacekeepers redeployed in strength. Achieving the correct oscillation is difficult and 
analysing it in detail is beyond the scope of this thesis suffice to say that it must be 
improved as an art based upon the collaborative possibilities of each frontier state.
Countering non-collaboration
Damn the Americans! Why don’t they tyrannize us more?
70
- Manuel Quezon, Filipino rebel and also its first president
A further major requirement for the stronger management of collaborative systems is to 
effectively counter non-collaboration through co-opting local actors into collaboration 
as well as by raising the costs of dissent. Co-option is a crucial strategy in the frontier 
context for two reasons. Firstly, the definitive challenge of frontier states is the 
difficulty of finding local partners at all and subsequently it is sometimes necessary to 
co-opt any local actor into collaboration rather than allow them to coalesce into 
resistance against an intervention.
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For instance, the US military has received much criticism of its approach of using local 
warlords and militias in Afghanistan. While this can indeed pose problems of 
undermining a nascent central government, as detailed in the previous chapter, it also 
highlights a pragmatic need in certain circumstances to prioritise local security 
provision. A US Special Forces soldier in Afghanistan commented that while 
strengthening the Afghan National Army is ultimately “the only way a real Afghan state 
will come about”, it is also “naive to think you can simply disband the militias” in the 
meantime.79 They are simply too valuable a partner at the local level for the immediate- 
term and efforts to disband them prematurely would more likely drive them into 
outright insurgency than leave them pacified.
Secondly, in an era of interventionism defined by gradualism collaboration, notably 
when there are profound hesitancies to using force, the ability of interventionists to 
effectively co-opt indigenous actors into collaboration becomes a pragmatic approach. 
In the context of frontiers where it is hard to apply force in any case against agile and 
disparate non-state actors engaged in resistance, non-violent approaches need to be 
considered. Before any co-option can be undertaken, however, moral debates over the 
suitability of some potential partners must be tampered because of the pragmatic need 
for ensuring greater stability. By example, NATO’s experience in the Balkans showed 
temporarily moderating criticism of potential partners can be an effective strategy. 
NATO would have simply been unable to stabilise the situation there without the 
cooperation of presidents Slobodan Milosevic from Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in
o0
Croatia, the two men arguably most responsible for the region’s wars. Through short­
term tactical collaboration they served a purpose for the interventionists and were then 
discarded as partners.
There are several possible approaches for co-opting dangerous local actors, especially 
warlords and militias, into collaboration. The first is to co-opt them using foreign aid to
O 1
essentially buy them off. Some local leaders can be enticed into government through 
direct aid provision while others can be pressured into collaboration by providing aid to 
their home communities who then supply internal pressure for more collaborative 
engagement. Other dangerous actors can also be enticed into government by the 
provision of senior government positions. This has been used extensively in the DR
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Congo, notably by giving out senior army posts to warlords. Once officially ensconced 
in the national army, these local actors are then rotated out of their home areas through 
‘promotions’, largely neutralising them as a security threat. Furthermore, in 
Afghanistan during the initial military action against the Taliban in 2001, much tactical 
collaboration was induced through simply buying off wavering fronts of the Taliban 
with cold, hard cash. As a CIA officer remarked at the time, “You cannot buy an 
Afghan’s loyalty, but you can rent it.”
Another method is to co-opt the ‘moderates’ of an insurgency into collaboration, 
especially tactical collaboration, by juxtaposing the interventionists as a ‘least worst’ 
option against the fanaticism of assorted types of extremists. It helps if interventionists 
present themselves in a manner that strengthens the difference between options 
available to local actors deciding with whom to partner, notably by not being repressive 
of the general population. This approach is most likely to work in places where there 
are ethnic divides and a general fear of under-representation in governance. As Roger 
Lane argued, it can be more effective to engage in patiently “talking about the value of 
representation in local government” rather than to call in an air attack “against a group
QO
we think are insurgents but in reality are under-represented peoples.”
The second major method for countering resistance to an intervention is the application 
of violent force to raise the costs of dissent. While it is true that the nature of state 
building interventionism dictates a hesitance to use force, there are sometimes occasions 
where violent force must be applied, notably given the proclivity for ‘spoilers’ 
developing, non-state actors who will only respond to violence. In this sense, even 
aside from the actual application of violence, being firstly perceived as ‘serious’ enough 
to apply it is crucial. For instance, in East Timor a strong mandate which authorised the 
use of deadly force against pro-Indonesian militias and the obvious willingness of 
heavily armed Australian troops to carrying it out was critical to bringing the situation 
there under control in 1999. Another example is that the siege of the Congolese town 
of Bunia in 2003 by local militias was only relieved after the EU, notably France, sent 
in a thousand heavily armed troops to help contingents of UN troops who had come to
Of
be regarded as weak by local ethnic militias.
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While unfortunate, actually undertaking violent coercion is also sometimes required of 
interventionists. The general utility of violence for interventionists can be best achieved 
through its limited application through decisive actions during the initial stages of a 
particular intervention. A good example of this were the British commando strikes 
against the ‘West Side Boys’ militia in Sierra Leone. Whereas the same militia had 
previously taken large numbers of UN peacekeepers hostage in 1999, decisive British 
military action showed that appropriately applied violence could keep the situation from 
deteriorating over the longer-term, notably to the point where foreign troops were 
emasculated by being taken hostage. Where interventionist troops have had “guns they 
were willing to use” they have been able to demonstrate that “robust peacekeeping” can
O/'
accomplish what is needed to bring about greater stability. Other examples of this 
necessary application of force were UN efforts against criminal gangs in Haiti and 
rioting mobs in East Timor.
Pay the costs
I f  you are not prepared to pay the price o f peace, then you ’d better be
prepared to pay the price o f war.
- Harry Truman87
State building interventionism is not altruism; it is a pragmatic response to the 
pericentric pull of frontiers and one that needs sufficient dedication devoted to seeing it 
through. Hence, it is essential that if the West is going to engage in interventionism, it 
needs to be willing to pay the required costs of collaboration. Failing to undertake 
interventions effectively means initial military successes do not translate into longer 
term stability, which ultimately may even increase the danger of security threats from 
frontiers of insecurity. If Western states indeed do not want to invade and occupy 
frontier states for the long-term, i.e. they want to remain merely imperialistic, then they 
need to at least invest enough resources and time to manage their interventions through 
actually empowering indigenous collaborative partners.
A crucial dynamic for effective collaboration is that building trust and achieving 
collaborative advantage require interventionists to invest adequately in terms of political 
support for their indigenous partners otherwise they are unlikely to get much enthusiasm
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and hence results from them. Theodora Gizelis noted of the state building process that 
the “more committed external actors are to the process... the level of investment and
o o
efforts by the locals increases proportionately.” Indigenous actors who doubt the 
commitment of the interventionists, most obviously in terms of their political willpower, 
are simply not as motivated to collaborate as effectively as they would be otherwise. 
While money and other material assets are important, what is more important is using 
those resources appropriately to managing collaborative systems. This means within the 
context of political commitments and as an investment in strategies that create 
thoughtful collaborative systems. In this way resources must be coupled to the strong 
political management of collaborative systems otherwise they are for naught.
While political commitment is crucial, it is still nonetheless necessary that adequate 
material resources be provided and longer timeframes maintained. Providing adequate 
resources, notably funding, has been a major gap in most recent interventions. The 
exception has been the Balkans which consistently received 100 percent of the 
estimated requirements but frontier states such as Somalia, Afghanistan, and Sierra 
Leone at different times have all received less than 50 percent of the resources deemed 
necessary.89 Kosovo has been the best funded, receiving four times more assistance per 
capita than did even Germany after World War II. In stark contrast, Haiti and 
Afghanistan have received less than a quarter of Kosovo’s level.90 Rather than make 
Kosovo the exception, other interventions need this robust resource commitment as 
well. All in all, the provision of adequate resources is essential and must be rectified if 
interventionists are to be able to manage their collaborative relationships effectively.
The other major requirement is for longer timeframes to be implemented. Niall 
Ferguson noted that interventions can be “a frustrating business, yielding only meagre 
returns.”91 This is probably an especially apt description for the challenges of extended 
collaboration when the timeframes necessary to establish greater stability have been 
underestimated. Considering state building as an interactive process of collaboration, 
there is a need to solidify indigenous collaborative partners for the long-term, which 
means accepting gradual ‘progress’ towards a more competent government rather than 
an outright ‘victory’ being achieved. Patience and perseverance are thus crucial, albeit 
costly. The necessary timeframes must be determined according to local needs, but in
201
general interventions are probably going to run at least five years but often more. There 
are moves towards this acceptance and they should be furthered. For instance, the 
Australian military now argues that its ‘robustness’ for interventionism is shown by its 
“depth in resources and personnel”, both essential for maintaining “the ability to sustain
QOoperations for lengthy periods.”
7.4: Alternative collaboration strategies
The existence of frontiers of insecurity means that some sort of Western response will 
be required for the foreseeable future and will most likely still be centred on the 
collaborative processes of state building. If Western states are unwilling to pay the high 
costs required to engage in interventionism themselves, then they will need to engage in 
alternative strategies of collaboration. Possibilities could be to let distinctly nasty 
political entrepreneurs such as Charles Taylor assert control through force, allow quasi­
sovereign entities such as Somaliland to establish themselves, or to ‘give war a chance’ 
and allow the combatants of a civil war to fight and hope a clear victor emerges, such as 
in 1990’s Afghanistan. As Marina Ottaway rightly concluded, “These are all 
unpalatable choices.” Better responses would be to use third parties to intervene or to 
place more emphasis on ‘back-stopping’ collaborative partners in weakening states that 
have not quite crossed the threshold to becoming frontiers of insecurity.
Using third parties to intervene
The Ethiopians will leave when they clear the terrorists and pacify Somalia.
- Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi94
If the West does not want to intervene, its first option is to use others to do the work 
instead. The possibility for using third parties to intervene is a challenging one but 
potentially promising. Some academics have suggested that the “hired guns” of 
mercenaries be used.95 This is notably when the high costs of Western troops are 
compared to the relatively cheap application of private armies, such as Executive 
Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone. While there may be useful applications for such 
firms, notably training indigenous forces and providing embassy security, it is not 
plausible that they could be a full substitute for the army troops of states. Given that, it
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is more feasible to look at possibilities to enlist the governments of developing states to 
intervene or for regional inter-governmental organisations to do so.
In this regards, it is important to highlight that attempts to bring more stability to 
frontiers of insecurity through stronger governance are not just a Western versus non- 
Westem one. The need to intervene in areas of relative anarchy on the margins of the 
states system so as to meet one’s own security interests is also prevalent within the 
developing world, as has been seen by Rwanda and Uganda’s interest in the eastern DR 
Congo, Turkey’s incursions into northern Iraq, or more strikingly in Ethiopia’s recent 
intervention in central Somalia. Given this, enlisting the support of partner states from 
the developing world should not be particularly hard to achieve if it is advocated for in 
terms of security provision rather than solely for extending norms such as democracy.
There are already programmes to augment the capacity of developing states to 
undertake interventionism, notably in Africa. The Pentagon has been especially active 
in this regards, working to strengthen African capacity based on “identifying areas 
where our common interests would be served by partners playing leading roles.”96 For 
its part, the White House argued that the US’ “security depends upon partnering with
07Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states.” The outcome of these sentiments is 
the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multiyear, $660 million effort to train 
and equip 75,000 African troops for peacekeeping operations and founded on the 
premise that “developed nations would not be able to sustain the burden [of 
peacekeeping operations] indefinitely” and hence it should be shifted to the Africans
ORthemselves. For its part, Europe has supported the GPOI by hosting a carabinieri 
training centre in Italy, the Center for Excellence for Stability Police Units. The EU 
also has its own ‘peace facility’, a €250 million fund to support African peacekeeping 
and conflict prevention operations.99
The best example of African troops engaging in state building interventionism in 
frontier states is the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in late-2006 to support the UN- 
sponsored Transitional National Government (TNG). The TNG represents an 
interesting example of inculcating a collaborative partner, notably through extended
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UN-brokered peace conferences in Nairobi, and then using a neighbouring developing 
state to undertake an intervention to support that nascent government. The US provided 
political encouragement for the intervention and on several occasions even bombed 
insurgent Islamists targets. Furthermore, it is also an example of a frontier state that 
was exceedingly unlikely to have another Western-led intervention and hence the 
intervention of a neighbouring developing state offered the best opportunity to stabilise 
it.
The usage of regional organisations also offers possibilities for third party intervention. 
The African Union has been active in Darfur, Sudan and in supporting the Ethiopians in 
Somalia. In terms of collaboration, interventions by regional organisations might 
receive greater support from local actors, because they will regard them as being less of 
an imperialistic threat as well as having a better understanding of local conditions. 
However, there are many challenges to using such organisations, namely their lack of 
resources, skills, and military capacity. The AU’s force in Darfur has been widely 
criticised as incompetent and the AU contingent mandated for Somalia is lacking over 
half its troop allotment. Furthermore, with domestic uncertainty rife in its own member 
states, it is often doubted that African regional organisations can ever be reliable. As 
the Carnegie Endowment noted by example of Nigeria and its own interventions in 
Western Africa through ECOWAS in the mid-1990s, “it is in no position to export 
stability.”100
Despite these admittedly significant challenges, the reality is that aside from engaging 
individual states, such as Ethiopia, or regional organisations, such as the AU, there are 
no other particularly good options. Great Powers such as China and Russia certainly are 
not plausible interventionists. This means the ‘least worst’ option is to support regional 
organisations and individual developing states as much as possible to be adequate 
partners for undertaking required interventions. Considering that, it may be necessary 
to devise new forms of partnership for interventions led by developing states or regional 
organisations but financed, equipped, and to some extent managed by Western ones. 
These ‘hybrid’ interventions are still nascent and unproven but deserve further 
consideration, such as ongoing UN-AU efforts in Darfur, Sudan.
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Provide * back stopping* support
A good rule would be to intervene early before the trouble really begins.101
Engaging in ‘backstopping’ would provide another alternative strategy for 
collaboration. Recalling the dynamic of a pericentric pull, the provocation to intervene 
directly results from the lack of suitable indigenous collaborative partners on the ground 
requiring interventionists to intervene, find some and then strengthen them as best 
possible. However, if there are still some suitable, if faltering, indigenous actors present 
in the form of national governments, outright interventions can be avoided if those 
actors are pre-emptively strengthened. Anthony Zinni has correctly argued that a 
“forward-leaning engagement strategy” should be prioritised, namely of working with 
national leaders who are weakening but whose stabilisation is required for preventing
I  A A
states from becoming frontiers. Mostly this entails providing development and 
military aid and political support. Examples of this are ongoing US efforts to support 
presidents Musharraf in Pakistan, Arroyo in the Philippines, and Uribe in Colombia.
Furthermore, in terms of preventative management, broader packages of support aimed 
at backstopping entire regions are also possible. Tools of influence can range from 
directed commercial relations to the provision of guiding human capacity in government 
administrations and the augmentation and training of security forces, amongst others. A 
first example of such preventative management is the US’ Pan-Sahel Initiative which 
works to bolster the weak states of Senegal, Mali, Niger and Chad by providing them 
primarily with military support. Another example is Plan Colombia, which is the US’ 
effort to help counter long-running rebellions against the Bogota government funded by 
drug trafficking. A third example is the Pentagon’s Horn of Africa Task Force, which it 
describes as an example of “distributed operations and economy of force” whereby the 
US military undertakes a wide variety of actions- security training, aid projects, raids on 
terrorist camps- in order to enhance “effective host nation governance.”
Working in weakening states to stabilise them without needing to resort to outright 
interventionism requires an emphasis on a lighter ground presence for Western actors.
205
Robert Kaplan has been a strong proponent of this and he rightly argues that what are 
needed are efforts to “hold sway... only quietly, off camera, so to speak.”104 Kaplan 
concludes current US efforts in the Horn, the Philippines and Colombia are the most 
telling of what will be needed in the future, notably “deployments in many dozens of 
countries involving relatively small numbers of highly trained people” who engage in 
assorted activities for securing stronger governance.105 In this sense, the small-scale 
efforts in these places, by example of the Horn, can be seen through the lens of classic 
collaboration:
Just like the British and the French dealing with the Iroquois Confederacy... 
Americans in the Horn were interacting with indigenous peoples in small 
numbers, making various deals of mutual self-interest, and killing a few of 
them when necessary.106
Crucially, in a future ‘post-Iraq’ era where Western publics are resentful of large
military engagements abroad and when small professional armies struggle to maintain
extended deployments, these limited, dispersed efforts could help to prevent fatigue
amongst Western states.
These back-stopping strategies roughly match what the Pentagon terms a ‘foreign 
internal defense doctrine’, its efforts to support a foreign military so that it can “free and
107protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” While this doctrine 
was designed for the Cold War context, it has strong applicability to that of frontiers of 
insecurity, notably strengthening partner governments and especially their security 
forces before they are subverted, in this case to the anarchy of frontier zones. In that 
sense, they also parallel William Cohen’s emphasis on activities to “shape the 
environment” in order to encourage more stable socio-political conditions in weak states
10Swithout waiting for the need to intervene. Similar in thinking is Australia’s policy of 
‘enhanced cooperation’ with the national government in Papua New Guinea. Central to 
that effort, and somewhat distinct from the US’ approach, is to embed Australian 
government personnel into key ministries, notably security related, to try and stabilise 
them before a military intervention is required. Overall, prioritising such low-profile 
efforts is necessary because they can be essential for preventing frontiers from 
developing in the first place in states such as Papua New Guinea and the Philippines.
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Contentiously, one last strategy of preventive management through engaging in early 
collaboration would be to ‘pick winners’ and support them during the course of an 
ongoing civil conflict. This was common practice during the Cold War but became 
politically unconscionable subsequent to the Cold War’s conclusion in 1991. However, 
a minimal amount of support to collaborative partners engaged in a civil war could go a 
long way towards preventing a worse situation developing, one provocative of a direct 
intervention by Western states. Notable in this regards is the US’ abandonment of the 
Northern Alliance rebels in Afghanistan during the course of the 1990s. More support 
to them could have helped prevent the ascension to power of the Taliban, and hence al- 
Qaeda. It may be politically challenging domestically to provide support to participants 
in a civil war but directly influencing a conflict in its progression, rather than simply 
responding to its aftermath, may actually be the most pragmatic collaborative approach 
to undertake.
7.5: Conclusion
To better manage frontiers of insecurity, the art of collaboration with indigenous politics 
must be prioritised and improved methods for it implemented. Firstly, interventionists 
must ascertain the correct choice of mode for collaboration based on the indigenous 
collaborative possibilities of each frontier state. Additionally, making collaboration a 
strategic doctrine means that improved collaborative know-how can be maximised. 
This know-how then requires the stronger management of collaborative systems during 
interventions. Lastly, in addition to collaboration during its own interventions, 
alternative strategies must be adopted by the West in the future, such as allowing third- 
parties to intervene in its stead and applying approaches that allow for a lighter, more 
detached presence aimed at the preventive management of weakening states before they 
become frontiers of insecurity. Through these efforts, the West can begin to ameliorate 
the collaboration problematique and gradually dampen the pericentric pull of frontiers 
of insecurity.
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C h a p t e r  8 :  W h o  W a n t s  F r o n t i e r s ?
I  saw corruption and incompetence there: I  saw little progress in building a 
viable nation.1
With these stark words US General Anthony Zinni reminisced on his formative 
experiences in Vietnam. From US interventions in Indochina to Europe’s development 
efforts in post-colonial states, the shadows of historical failures at state building linger 
in a Western psyche musing if past mistakes are being mindlessly perpetuated. Perhaps 
it simply is impossible “to make countries out of places that were never meant to be 
countries” and frontiers of insecurity are a dire reality that must be countered in other 
ways. This hesitance is shown most starkly by the reality that when imperialism as an 
ideology is dead and humanitarianism is hardly a replacement, the West is left with no 
‘grand project’ upon which to base change in frontier states. This chapter concludes 
this thesis by analysing this predicament, namely why attempt state building 
interventionism when there is no ‘will’ to really transition frontiers?
Rather than naively hope a grand project will miraculously materialise, it is better to 
focus on the practicalities of frontiers, namely of their improved management resulting 
in gradual gains in stability, instead of an immediate conclusion through the imperial 
imposition of ‘order’. Given that, and so as to frame the context appropriately, it is 
most important to ask a simple question in order to spur improved management: who 
actually does want frontiers? While the West assuredly does not, there are many 
dangerous non-state actors that in fact do, from al-Qaeda terrorists to militias, warlords, 
and drugs and human traffickers. With this in mind and despite the challenges of state 
building interventionism, the efforts must be continued and strengthened by improved 
collaboration with indigenous partners who also do not want to see frontiers exist in 
perpetuity, the ‘moderates’ of the world.
8.1: Why even do state building interventions?
When, as in Cambodia, people have lived almost permanently under the 
domination o f  neighbours for centuries, before being ‘protected’ by France,
'backed ’ and then bombed by the United States, 'abandoned’ by all and
then 'liberated' 6y Vietnam, the foreigner is readily presented as the cause 
o f all evils, past and present.3
The first major point to conclude with is whether state building interventions should 
even be undertaken. James Mayall highlighted that “the problem of intervention” and 
particularly whether or not it can be justified “lies at the heart of all debates about 
international order.”4 This is certainly true for the controversy surrounding state 
building interventionism since the end of the Cold War. This thesis has itself argued 
that in terms of the state building efficacy of current interventions, rather than in 
immediate conflict resolution, they have not been particularly successful. Given that, it 
is fair to ask if state building interventionism is even an appropriate strategy for 
mitigating security concerns in an era of manic globalisation and a fractured states 
system. Many critics argue that present interventionism is both immoral and
impracticable and hence the challenge of responding to frontiers of insecurity is best 
achieved through other means.
*Neo-imperialism’ is morally wrong
It is the fault o f Empire... One thought alone preoccupies the submerged
mind o f  Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era.5
One of the strongest critiques of present interventionism is that it is morally
unacceptable because it constitutes ‘neo-imperialism’, the continuation of a long history 
of capitalistic Western exploitation of the periphery. Indeed, it is argued by many 
critical theory academics that the problems that exist presently, such as arbitrary 
boundaries and class divisions which helped to create weak and failed states in the first 
place, are in fact “a hangover from older periods of empire.”6 If that is so, they 
challenge how a return to imperialism, or anything even resembling it, can possibly help 
and argue it is rather more likely to perpetuate even more Western exploitation. 
Allegations cited in this regard are the US’ interest in securing pipelines through 
Afghanistan or Australia’s exploitation of oil and gas fields in East Timor.
Furthermore, it is contended that present interventions are morally corrupt internally as 
they leave liberal Western societies being asked to act “in ways that are fundamentally
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nat odds with their own character and values.” This has been a theme long articulated 
within the US, most famously by President John Adams when he contended America 
should not go abroad ‘in search of monsters to destroy’ since that would mean ‘she 
would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit’. And while many would agree the 
exigencies of security imperatives are pressing, critics of present interventions argue it
Q
is hardly worth it if the West “loses its soul” in the process. Indeed, many critiques of 
the morality of present interventionism argue it risks turning its ostensibly noble goals 
upon themselves since they are based upon the control and penetration of foreign 
societies, namely that “the necessary ‘dirty hands’ of violent means often become 
‘dangerous hands’ in international interventions.”9 This means interventionism 
ultimately creates the Abu Gharaibs and UN sex scandals of the world or as Bernard 
Porter concluded, “Along with the ‘jodhpurs and pith helmets’ can come this.”10
Lastly, compounding fears over internal moral corruption is the critique mirroring that 
of ‘classic liberals’ that interventions “undermined the authenticity of domestic 
struggles for liberty” which were then left lacking of the legitimacy provided by self- 
determination.11 In this sense, ‘liberal democracy’ cannot be imposed at ‘the point of a
gun’ through imperialism, meaning “democracy and empire are ultimately
1 ^
incompatible.” To claim interventionism as ‘liberation’ or ‘freedom’ is dubious as 
such change was not instigated endogenously.
Still other critics argue further that in a ‘post-imperial age’, notably in post-colonial 
states, the “abhorrence of empire is too visceral” for change through imperialistic means
to be acceptable because it becomes grossly paternalistic, negating the agency of
•  1indigenous actors to instigate positive political transformation on their own. This
leaves indigenous peoples feeling that interventions have little to do with real change 
for them and everything to do with the self-interested whims of interventionists. As 
they say in Haiti of the UN: “Many Whites, plenty of light; few Whites, little light; no 
Whites, no light.”14 Or, as locals complained bitterly of in East Timor, while the UN 
freely spent 25 million dollars annually on bottled water for international staff, only a 
tenth of the UN budget of $500 million actually reached the Timorese themselves.15
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State building interventionism is counter-productive
With all that is crying out for attention... can we really afford this 
missionary zeal to remake the Middle East in our own image? We could 
end up merely creating for ourselves ever more crumbling frontiers o f  
insecurity.
- Paul Kennedy16
Aside from moral qualms, the second major critique of present interventionism has been 
that not only is it ineffective, but outright counter-productive towards assuring the 
security interests of the West. The most stinging critique is that “the result of
1 n
intervention is all too frequently prolonged violence and bloodshed.” Central to this 
are Western pretensions that they can even instigate positive change through state 
building interventionism. Christopher Coyne terms this the “nirvana fallacy”, the naive 
belief that “foreign governments can generate, via occupation and reconstruction, an
152outcome preferable to that which would occur absent these interventions.” Edward 
Luttwak has been most forceful in this regards with his ‘give war a chance’ argument, 
noting that “although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve 
political conflicts and lead to peace.”19 The main problem with interventions is that
90they prevent solutions that would “come out of letting wars run their natural course.”
The irony of actually furthering crises is also noted as a worry by historians, such as 
John Gaddis who argued that the “first problem for a strategy of seeking security 
through expansion... was how to keep that expansion itself from generating new 
sources of insecurity.”21 Furthermore, Karen Feste noted the lesson from Cold War 
interventions was that where interventions “were regarded as meddlesome intrusion”, 
the efforts could “backfire, leaving the principal disputants in conflict longer and with
99greater intensity than would have occurred in the absence of any intervention at all.” 
This thesis noted in its introduction that while Iraq was not originally a frontier of 
insecurity, it did become one after the US invasion. Somalia is also cited as an example 
of interventionism spreading insecurity. With no experience of effective central 
government and a proclivity towards clans, state building efforts there have largely
9^
“resulted in failure and chaos.”
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Another argument against state building interventionism is that it is a counter­
productive policy response because it suffers from a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the situation. A starting point is the critique of the present emphasis on democratisation, 
namely it is a “fundamental paradox” since it is “conceived of as a solution to the 
dangerous transnational problems of our day.”24 Equating the two, the insecurity of 
globalisation and domestic governance in the form of democracy, is hence directly 
misguided as a policy decision since they are fundamentally different issues. Critics 
cite the election of Hamas extremists in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as an 
example of democracy not being a simple remedy for terrorism spreading across 
borders.
On a more existential level, others have similarly argued that in the era of 
interconnectedness through globalisation, “there are no local solutions to global 
problems” but that is what present interventionist efforts try to achieve and fail so 
miserably at.25 A critic of interventionist policies might rhetorically ask: where are the 
frontiers? Even London could have its own ‘frontiers’ accentuated by globalisation, 
such as the crime plagued East End. Anarchy in the periphery may be ‘localised’ to 
some extent, Afghanistan is Afghanistan, but a policy response that is insular and 
isolated rather than ‘globalised’ can only but fail. In this sense, many have challenged 
whether interventionism can even be an appropriate response to terrorism; with 
commentators musing why states should be targeted and not only the networks of non­
state actors. Critics pointedly conclude that interventions in states such as Afghanistan 
lend credence to the argument that foreign rule is “notoriously a producer of terrorist 
movements.”26 What the Soviets achieved for global terrorism in the 1980s in 
Afghanistan is only being furthered by US efforts there presently.
Other options are available anyway
From a globalist, humanitarian and true political economy perspective, the
system known as Westphalian has been an abject failure?1
Overarching these critiques is an observation of a major gap in analysis, namely that 
state building interventionism is conceptually lacking because there is now a general 
trend towards ‘Olympianism’, the supra-govemmental structures of international
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organisations and global civil society networks, instead of a mere states-based system. 
Globalisation is cited as the major cause of this, namely that the states themselves are 
weaker, and hence critics of interventionism challenge why an institution that is 
weakening regardless should still be utilised. If one accepts that globalisation is at the 
centre of current insecurity, governments surely can never match the manic ability of 
non-state actors to evolve, utilise technology, and to form shapeless networked 
organisations. This has been seen most vividly in the international narcotics trade and 
Islamist terrorism.
Rather than attempt the strengthening of states through state building interventionism, 
critics suggest that other non-coercive modalities be used instead. The benefits of non- 
military means and of non-intervention more broadly for the West would be that it could 
“avoid charges of imperialism and project an image of tolerance and non-
Oftinterference.” The current emphasis on military means is critiqued because “it trains
its sights only on the symptoms and not the cause” of tensions between states and
00societies and other modalities would in fact better respond to these causes. Instead of 
interventionism aimed at states, the ‘soft power’ of political tools needs to be applied 
instead, notably international law. Mary Kaldor, for instance, argued that what is 
needed is “the global extension of the rule of law... changing the currency of deterrence 
and coercion from the traditional use of military force to that of law enforcement.” By 
example, progressives and critical theorists on the Left have generally argued that the 
West should rely more on policy tools such as spreading human rights norms, 
humanitarian and financial aid, economic cooperation, constructive social and 
environmental policies and political dialogue and conflict mediation.
Furthermore, there have also been calls for the existing system of sovereign states to be 
maintained less rigorously. Rather than undertake interventions, it might be more 
suitable to allow for the endogenous creation of new states. The sub-region of Somalia 
known as Somaliland is the most cited example of this whereby the West should focus 
on the ‘state-building’ that has progressed there without external assistance. Namely, 
Somaliland exemplifies where “a state has been built... in contrast to the transitional 
national government in Mogadishu” and hence Western efforts would be better utilised 
to help locales where rulers are actually instituting stability rather than marginalise them
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because of their lack of formal sovereignty. Additionally, there have also been 
suggestions to encourage more participation by sub-national units such as warlords and 
traditional leaders. Western efforts would then be to pragmatically partner with 
people who have given up on sovereign governments and have endeavoured to seek 
‘normalcy’ outside the framework of the states system through the structure of stronger 
non-state actors.
8.2: And vet, frontiers do require interventions
The arguments against the morality and efficacy of state building interventionism are 
profound. Nonetheless, despite their strengths, the critiques do not sufficiently proffer 
viable alternatives for dampening the pericentric pull of frontiers of insecurity. 
Considering that, for the foreseeable future and in the continuing context of 
globalisation and an international system based on states, the necessary strategy for 
responding to frontier of insecurity will continue to be through state building 
interventionism.
Other options are not particularly viable fo r  frontier zones
Who is being fooled by this? Perhaps the Western public. Certainly not the 
warlords.33
David Rieff comments above challenge the viability of Western human rights norms to 
actually bring about stability in weak and failed states and he starkly concludes that they 
have never “actually kept a single jackboot out of a single human face.”34 This serves 
to highlight that the general suitability of other options, while appealing in many 
regards, are nonetheless decidedly lacking for the frontier context. If pursued solely, 
they would leave the West having to be content with frontiers lingering in anarchy and 
dealing with their direct consequences perpetually. In actual fact, the only reason there
or
has been a so-called “imperialist revival” is because other options are so unreliable.
Arguments to spread international law and human rights norms or to engage in conflict 
mediation and dialogue all the way through to ‘giving wars a chance’ are not necessarily 
wrong and may have applicability in certain contexts, but those are aside from that of
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frontiers of insecurity. By example again of human rights norms, it is perfectly fine to 
argue for such modalities as ends in themselves for states that have the capacity to bring 
them into effect but altogether different for those “societies that are too poor, or 
convulsed by ethnic war or political strife, to do so.” The reality is that the West has 
tried most of these other options with normal developing states, notably aid provision 
with human rights norms and democratisation conditionalities, and although there have 
been some successes, they have never been outright and their feasibility for frontier 
states is dubious if not distinctly inappropriate. Additionally, a major alternative 
proposed to interventionism is development aid and between 1950 and 1995 
approximately a trillion dollars in unrequited transfers were made by the West to 
developing countries. This significant amount of aid by itself has neither resulted in 
consistent economic growth nor notably improved standards of living and good 
governance.
Furthermore, some policy advocates contend interventionism should be allowed, but 
limited to cases of genocide. For much of the 1990s, ‘humanitarian intervention’ gained 
much prominence as an intellectual concept within academia but also as a political 
justification for Western leaders undertaking interventions. By example, Tony Blair 
declared that the UK’s intervention in Kosovo was because of “its values, not its 
interests.”38 In reality, the intervention there was actually more about wanting to 
confront aggressive Serbian nationalism in the “European backlands once and for all.”39 
Even in as seemingly marginally strategic states as Liberia the security imperative’s 
dominance is true. Princeton Lyman argued that in “painting US interests in Liberia... 
as solely humanitarian” the US government failed to show that US interests were more 
significantly strategic.40
Indeed, even in the most troubled continent of Africa, it is a remote possibility that an 
intervention will occur in the future for solely humanitarian purposes41 Purely 
humanitarian interventionism is dead and most likely never existed at all. Arguments 
giving primacy to humanitarianism are flawed as they do not respond to the pericentric 
pull of frontiers of insecurity, merely the West’s own shallow sense of humanitarianism. 
There must be a strategic desire to mitigate security problems for action to be 
undertaken and sustained. Indeed, the emphasis in the early-1990s on humanitarian
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rationales being “somehow divorced from strategic considerations was an illusion.”42 
That humanitarianism is secondary has been shown time and again, most strikingly by 
Rwanda and in the continuing debacle over Darfur.
Furthermore, the viability of ‘giving war a chance’ is also doubtful. While it would be 
convenient if war would gradually allow for stability to emerge, this is not particularly 
successful as a policy option as long-running conflicts in the DR Congo, Somalia, 
Sudan and Afghanistan highlighted. One problem is that frontiers are not defined by 
‘war’ so much as by their ‘anarchy’, a condition not likely to dissipate entirely on its 
own once it is entrenched. The ‘give war a chance’ argument also assumes a time 
threshold that is a luxury not afforded by the pericentric pull of frontiers of insecurity; 
globalisation does not stop and ‘giving war a chance’ accrues costs in the meantime. 
Lastly, Machiavellian allowances for the emergences of ‘strongmen rule’ which do 
result in temporary stability are most likely to eventually backfire as in themselves, they 
have historically been “a major contributor to the collapse of the state”, especially in 
Africa.43
In any case, these options, aside from ‘giving war a chance’, are not wrong for 
developing states more generally, merely ill-suited for the extremes of frontiers of 
insecurity by themselves. While de-colonisation was supposed to result in a system of 
stable sovereign states, it has instead seen an “age of ethnic cleansing and state 
failure.”44 The international system has simply not seen post-colonial states universally 
progress towards stability, leaving the international system with its present frontiers. In 
frontier states, defined as they are by civil conflict and the collapse of any meaningful 
governance, a further step must be taken towards state building, namely by instigating 
the creation of the institutions of sovereign governance that make all other development 
achievable. Whatever its admitted faults, and there are many, state building 
interventionism simply is the “only coherent model” for responding to the pericentric 
pull of frontiers presently 45
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Frontier states can only be *managed9 through interventions
While the state is an institution that has been weakened by globalisation, it has not yet 
been made redundant. The simple reality exists that the international system is still one 
based upon states because the world is still one “enclosed by equal sovereignty”, a 
principle that defines International Relations.46 In the future it may be desirable to 
evolve away from the states system as a model for organising global order but that does 
not change the need to maintain it in the meantime, something that requires slowly but 
determinedly responding to frontier states to allow their governments to achieve more 
sovereign control over their territories. In this way, it must be acknowledged that the 
cause of instability in frontier states is “the inadequacy of state authority” first and 
foremost and given that it cannot be solved by trying to immediately surpass the 
Westphalian model.47
Even with the proliferation of non-state and supranational actors, the world “still relies 
on governments” as the EU’s Javier Solana argued from his position as a leader of the 
most advanced supra-national organisation. There is no desire by the West to replace 
sovereign governments because the West actually does value sovereign states. K.J. 
Holsti correctly summarised this sentiment when he noted that sovereignty has 
“provided more security, protected more diversity, and constructed a context for more 
human progress and improvement than any other political principle or arrangement.”49 
While talk of sub- or supra-national actors are amusing for academics to ponder, states 
still prefer to deal with other states, what Michael Cox argued was the imperative of 
“strong pressures for socialization in the international system.”50 States would rather 
engage with the governments of frontier states that still do not possess full control over 
their territory than none whatsoever.
Frontiers of insecurity are still part of the states system, albeit its frayed edges but 
nonetheless still part of the whole. Mitigating the pericentric pull of frontiers requires 
stronger states, not their replacement. This does not necessitate a return to traditional 
imperialism but rather the effective application of state building interventionism that 
ultimately empowers indigenous governments to implement stronger control over their 
sovereign spaces. A simple reason for this is that for all their faults, the governments
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of states remain the “front-line responders to today’s threats.”51 This was argued by the 
UN no less, one of the most advanced international organisations but one still 
fundamentally dependent on its member governments to alleviate poverty, counter 
infectious diseases, obstruct transnational crime, undertake reconstruction after civil 
wars, and combat terrorism. In short, they are needed to manage all the risks of 
globalisation.
Furthermore, the necessity of foreign military power invoked during interventionism 
may be unfortunate but is nevertheless essential. In the context of frontier states, 
outright anarchy must be overcome and this requires applying some degree of force, at 
least initially or potentially, against the warlords and terrorists of the world. While it 
would be ideal to rely only on civilian and peaceful means, this is naive to the extreme. 
Without the ability of military power to impose a modicum of stability, “aid workers 
will simply get themselves killed.” Although it is pleasantly self-gratifying to ponder 
that other more peaceful means can be a suitable catalyst, it is not likely that frontier 
zones will transition only through the nice words and sentiments expressed by 
thoughtful Westerners.
The Balkans provides the best example of this. Many policy makers, especially in 
Europe, advocated in the early stages of that conflict that “peace and justice could be 
achieved by simply asking people to be reasonable.”54 However, while the Balkans are 
now a great deal more peaceful, this is in direct consequence of it being “brought there 
by military power” applied through multiple interventions, notably by the US after 
1995.55 Ultimately, it is only in this context of transitioning frontier states that
interventionism aimed at state building becomes legitimised as an unfortunate necessity: 
the temporary application of foreign power to transition sovereignty back to states that 
are valued as part of an international system built upon them.
8.3; Values and individuals still matter
For strategy is not merely a reflection o f the interests which it purports to 
defend, it is even more the register o f the hopes, the memories and neuroses 
which inform the strategists ’picture o f the world.
- Robinson and Gallagher56
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This thesis has emphasised the security imperative of responding to the pericentric pull 
of frontiers of insecurity through a necessary strategy of state building interventionism. 
While true, it is not enough to leave that necessity without qualification by looking at 
the broader moral and ethical parameters that guide such strategy, what Robinson and 
Gallagher observed as ‘the hopes, the memories and neuroses’ of the strategists. 
Indeed, present interventionism could be perceived as pragmatic utilitarianism and left 
as such, but this would mask that it is still a human endeavour of applying coercion and 
manipulation instrumentally and hence a very morally conflicted one for those 
undertaking it.
In a post-imperial age the West does not want to return to an ideology of imperialism, 
but it does however feel compelled to use imperialistic means. This is a hard moral 
conundrum and one not easily reconciled. This is most directly seen in the 
collaboration problematique. The need to find and strengthen collaborative partners in 
frontier states but at the same time push a liberal democratic agenda is decidedly 
difficult. Nonetheless, this desire represents a belief that frontiers can in fact be 
transitioned to achieve ‘progress’, as has happened at times in the past but something 
that is still conflicted by the memories of other state building efforts that have failed, 
overshadowed by often brutal imperial histories. This discord leads to a hesitance that 
has slowed the response to frontiers and hindered the efficacy of interventions. Most 
problematically, it has engendered a detachment between the West and those people 
whom it could and should be helping in frontier states.
The West still does not mind frontiers
The marginalised societies o f the globe are an embarrassment. At best, they
cn
are seen as useless; at worst, threatening.
A starting point for understanding this conflicted mindset over frontiers is that while it 
may be increasingly fearful, the West still does not mind them, both literally and 
morally. Frontiers are seen as wholly disconnected entities, to be viewed idly on 
television: “You, the viewer, are not in Afghanistan, Cambodia, or Bosnia so much as 
you are in a humanitarian-tragedy land- a world of wicked warlords, suffering and
C O
innocent victims and noble aid workers.” This detachment from the reality of frontiers
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shapes Western perceptions of them as still not particularly worthy of efforts to manage 
and progressively transition them. Indeed, the “risks averted” through state building 
interventions, those unknown catastrophes prevented through steady frontier 
management, do not appeal to Western politicians keen to highlight tangible foreign 
policy results to publics expecting them in thirty-second news clips.59
Current interventionism inherently raises the “question of ultimate as well as immediate 
responsibility.”60 In terms of literally, the major fear of Western publics and 
governments is of ‘ownership’. Colin Powell famously quipped over the US’ 
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan that ‘if you break it, you own it’; a sentiment that 
drives much of the present hesitance to engage frontiers. When “the world’s grown 
honest”61 and no longer wants to conquer, the West does not want to assume 
responsibility for crises in the frontiers. This is especially so if that means ‘occupation’, 
however qualified it is as being merely imperialistic and defined by the gradualism of 
collaboration leading to independent, sovereign governments. And while some 
academics grandly conclude “nothing less than the reconstruction of a global order of
fi)stable nation states is required” , normal Westerners are left musing who is actually 
responsible for what in distant lands.
By example, for most Americans pondering current US interventionism, the costs 
appear too high while the “the benefits of doing so seem at best nebulous.” Americans 
by and large simply do not want to dedicate the means that are necessary for 
strengthened interventionism to take place because they have not been sold on the idea 
by their political leadership. Needless to say, the ambivalence within Europe is even 
more so, detached as it was from the pain of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Perceptions are 
that the costs of frontiers are not worth bearing because frontiers are still far away and 
relatively non-threatening to individuals. Conversely the concerns of intervening forces 
getting into ‘quagmires’, committing human rights abuses or being accused of 
‘imperialism’ are too great.
Considering these fears, there is little desire to engage in the interventionism required to 
better manage frontiers and Martin Shaw pointedly highlighted that “Western reluctance
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to intervene... has been more widespread than interventionism.”64 The cumulative 
result is that the Western body public still does not particularly care if some places ‘out 
there’ are anarchic frontiers even if there is an increasing acknowledgement by 
governments that such locales can cause personal harm to them. Subsequently a 
deluded naivety has developed that frontiers can then best be ignored. The net result of 
this apathy is that the political will required to deal with frontiers as literal realities 
through strong policy choices is generally lacking, a defining feature of the 
collaboration problematique.
Moreover, the West still has difficulties engaging frontiers morally, which has led to a 
profound detachment as described best by Christopher Coker. Anarchy in the frontiers 
is considered to be separated from the ‘progress’ that is being achieved currently in the 
West and so many other places in the world. Frontiers from the DR Congo to Haiti, 
East Timor, Afghanistan, and Somalia are all still seemingly distant lands with little 
connection to a present history in the West defined by stable democratic governance and 
unparalleled economic success. In contrast, by themselves frontier states have come to 
be seen as “a disaster zone, one so unrelentingly bleak that much of the world can be 
said to have no future.”65 What has happened in places such as Bosnia with mass rapes 
or in Sierra Leone where arms were systematically amputated, leads Westerners to 
perceive such places as existing in “nihilism, barbarism or anarchy” which contrasts 
with a Western desire to see history as rational and ordered.66
Coker further notes that Western perceptions of violence in a locale such as Liberia, by 
example, is that it appears to be autistic; “the belligerents appear to be unable to 
distinguish between destruction and self-destruction, or to conceive of the consequences
f n
of their acts.” This leads to the West’s unwillingness to get involved at times because 
of a belief that in such anarchy, war and violence are no longer rational and hence 
controllable, and certainly not by foreigners. In this sense, the West has sought to 
“quarantine the nihilistic regions of the world” by effectively dividing the “globe into 
various time zones defined in part by their humanity or inhumanity, their civility or 
barbarism.”68
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A belief that frontiers are composed of a humanity that is in substantive ways different 
from the rest, notably in its partaking of violence, and the resultant moral detachment 
are compounded by the fact that there are no longer deeply-felt metaphysical beliefs to 
impel Western action despite such doubts. Western soldiers no longer have a 
metaphysical basis to rely on, one “which would allow them to act cruelly- if only to be 
kind.”69 This is notably so in regards to conceptualising humanity as an extant whole, 
or at least one worth sacrificing for. When casualties mount, the rule has been for home 
publics to demand withdrawal. In the West, current interests lie in the “mundane
70satisfaction of mundane needs.” This has notably been so in the context of a 
superficial, ephemeral interest in ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the lack of a ‘grand 
project’ deemed worth constructing.
Why the West should care about frontiers o f insecurity
But we only win people to these positions i f  our policy is not just about 
interests but about values, not just about what is necessary but about what 
is right.
- British Prime Minister Tony Blair71
Despite this moral detachment, there are good reasons for Westerners caring about the 
fate of people living in frontiers in terms of lives lived in perspective of truth and 
justice, i.e. their metaphysical value. As has been argued extensively in this thesis, 
frontiers of insecurity should be effectively responded to because they do affect global 
security. There is no need for pure altruism, the West is responding because it is in its 
rational self-interest, notably in an era defined as it is by manic globalisation and the 
illegal trades, disease epidemics, mass movements of people, terrorism, and WMD that 
define it. The West simply cannot leave large swathes of the world as anarchic frontier 
zones. Indeed, what were once regarded as 'remote and petty interests' in the extreme 
periphery can no longer be benignly pandered to or outright ignored because they are 
indeed our frontiers of insecurity.
However, justifying a strategy of state building interventionism through the security 
imperative of a pericentric pull should not be viewed as enough in itself. The West 
should also feel compelled to act because frontiers are a part of a universal humanity,
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not merely isolated ‘frontiers’ to be observed on television. While this thesis has 
emphasised the security imperative of the pericentric pull, it has not argued that 
humanitarianism as an ideal is wrong; rather that it is neither a primary rationale for 
intervention nor a cause of the pericentric pull. A humanitarian desire to help those in 
need is actually a crucial rationale for interventionist efforts because it connects 
interventionists to indigenous politics on a human level, i.e. as individuals working 
together towards common goals. Interventionist actors in the frontiers as well as home 
publics need to feel their actions and support are guided by some sort of individual, 
moral purpose rather than mere selfishness.
Besides, while it is true that it is ill-advised to become involved in distant conflicts as 
mere matters of principle, notably humanitarian, it is also equally true that alleviating 
human suffering and empathising with strangers in want versus meeting the rational 
self-interests for security need not be contradictory of one another. It could even be 
argued that the failures of the past were because they attempted to do so. In the 1990s 
too much emphasis was placed on a ‘responsibility to protect’ individuals through so- 
called ‘humanitarian interventions’ that were advocated as ends in themselves. 
Problematically, not enough emphasis was placed on the state building required to 
ensure individual security for the longer-term. David Reiff has been the most vocal 
critic of this lopsided emphasis of humanitarian intervention, arguing it is a “perversion 
of humanitarianism” and hence morally dubious.72 Interventionism that is justified 
solely on humanitarian grounds is infeasible and morally lacking just as interventionism 
without any qualification by moral imperatives can be cast in the same light as the more
j .L  i L
brutal types of European colonialism undertaken in the 18 and 19 centuries.
Indeed, the security imperatives of state building and humanitarian sentiments to help 
individuals should be understood to a good extent as being “inextricably intertwined” 
and hence any policy response should not try to keep them separated but rather 
“understand how they should be addressed simultaneously.” Anthony Zinni noted as 
much when he argued that “accomplishing good, noble and altruistic goals also happens 
to accomplish the pragmatic goals that will promote our self-interest in survival, 
security, well-being and future growth.”74 In this way the role of the state becomes 
central as an institution for both providing security to the individual as well as the wider
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community of states that is the international system. At the end of the long process 
stemming from responses to chaos in the periphery is greater freedom for the individual, 
“first protected by the state and later protected from the state.”
This thesis has been concerned most with the ‘point of impact’ of collaboration, the 
interface of interventionists with indigenous politics. Considering that a desire to help 
individuals is indeed important, it is subsequently crucial to again ask the rhetorical 
question, who wants frontiers? This question is imperative because it frames the 
response to frontiers as a contest between possibilities. There are stark alternatives for 
who will assume control for the outcomes of the livelihoods of those living in frontiers. 
There is a responsibility to keep this rhetorical question in mind because the peoples and 
groups which do want frontiers to exist, from al-Qaeda to drug lords, do so for all the 
wrong reasons- segregation, exploitation and absolutism.
It is important to firstly consider why anybody would willingly collaborate with 
interventionists. Many local people collaborate because they simply know it is the best 
chance to bring about positive change to the most violent, anarchic places on the planet; 
to live as people everywhere wish to, in peace and security and with hope for the future. 
Overall, many people do not want frontiers and the West should support them as they 
seek more stability and security, the most basic wants of humanity everywhere. The 
collaboration problematique can only be ameliorated, not overcome, but that does not 
mean that the inherent tensions of interventionism should prevent Westerners from 
empathising with their fellow humans who indeed do value and need foreign help.
This has been seen most poignantly in Liberia where locals dumped bodies in front of 
the US embassy and pleaded for Western intervention, in Sierra Leone where Britain 
was asked to return, or in Somalia where an UN-sponsored transitional government has 
requested foreign peacekeeping troops. The UN chief in East Timor, Sergio De Mello, 
once said that despite occasional complaints by some Timorese that the UN acted like 
‘colonial masters’, “Regardless, they keep asking us to stay.” And so the UN should. 
In this sense, what is special about much of present interventionism is its resemblance to
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an ‘empire by invitation’, namely the encouragement of foreign interference as a means
77of achieving positive results domestically.
In this spirit of empathising with strangers, values do matter, not just security interests 
and imperatives. The West should still emphasise its liberal democratic values because 
it believes in those values. John Lewis Gaddis put this well when he argued, “For
70
however imperial we’ve become, we have held on to liberty.” This thesis argued that 
values should be projected in moderation during imperialistic interventionism. This is a 
call for their pragmatic sequencing, not their outright dismissal. The West may go to 
the frontiers fundamentally for security rationales, but it can still nuance the 
implementation of state building interventionism accordingly and pragmatically to 
values that ultimately do have at least some universal appeal. The kinds of states that 
exist are crucial for both the well-being of individuals that inhabit them and the broader 
international system’s security and hence the present emphasis on liberal democracy, 
though moderated, should still be maintained.
This is because an emphasis on liberal democracy is still both a utilitarian necessity of 
ensuring collaboration in a post-imperial era as well as a moral imperative to push as a 
form of governance since the West insists upon it for itself. Most importantly, Tony 
Blair was correct to highlight that if you want people to engage with you, i.e. 
collaborate towards common goals, then you need to offer them more than your own 
shallow self-interests. To work through the long, tortuous path of state building through 
interventionism, bloodied as it is by insurgency or terrorism, there must be some sinews 
of shared values to pull collaborative partnerships together through troubled times. It is 
necessary that Westerners maintain a belief, albeit qualified through pragmatism, in 
universal wants, such as security for individuals and responsible, responsive 
government. There may be a time and a place for such developments, notably 
democracy and Western conceptions, of human rights, but to argue that they have no 
role would be condescending and cynical of the universal nature of humanity.
Values do matter and the West can only but maintain a belief in the ones that have 
served it so well when seeking to instigate change for others, especially when those
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values are already shared to a good degree. It is necessary to push values to some extent 
because indigenous populations must believe, even if only rudimentarily, that they are 
part of an effort to create a better future for themselves as well as the West. That future 
can include the West’s improved security but it must also include a belief in security for 
individuals and responsible governance for local populations. The onus of inculcating 
this belief is on the interventionists, namely that there is a “future worth creating
<70
there.” This requires that these nominal values are identified and shared. By working 
with partners and emphasising a minimum of shared values, it is possible for those to 
gradually become institutionally entrenched in frontier states; helping to lead to their 
eventual transition away from such a condition.
Christopher Clapham makes an important point in this regards when he argued that 
China’s current ‘no strings attached’ outreach to Africa ultimately risks failure as it will
O A
be seen “merely as an interloper bent on short-term gain.” In contrast, the West has 
had an exploitative relationship in many ways with Africa, yet enduring linkages have 
nonetheless been formed because they have “come to be valued by Africans
o  1
themselves.” Most significantly, the ideological agenda which the West seeks to 
promote “is not merely an alien imposition on unwilling Africans” because it presently
O A
“also strikes a local resonance”, including on moral grounds. The values that the West 
pushes are actually shared by many in the developing world. Njugana Ng’ethe argued 
as much when he stated that “for many in Africa, democratic leadership is the preferred 
investment option” while Francis Deng contended that Africa is engaging in a ‘Second 
Liberation struggle’ against “its own dysfunctional systems of statehood and
» 8 4governance.
The challenge is to find and empower collaborative partners through the 
institutionalisation of governance with whom the West shares at least a minimum of 
values. At its simplest these should be basic protections for the individual and a 
relatively responsible and accountable system of government. In the context of the 
question of who wants frontiers, this is important because there is a need to frame 
collaboration as a contest between those who want frontiers- such as terrorists, mafias, 
militias and drug traffickers- versus those who do not, the moderates of the world who 
do believe in stable, responsive or even representative governance and open, friendly
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relations with the wider world. And indeed, there are significant numbers of moderates 
‘out there’ on the frontiers. Through finding them and strengthening their position 
within indigenous politics, they can be used to ensure the stronger management of 
frontiers and even their eventual transition out of such a condition.
Crucial to this collaborative engagement with moderates is valuing them as individuals 
and indeed as partners. The requirement is not think of frontiers as ‘keeping out the 
barbarians’ or even as being full of ‘barbarians’ but rather to consider them inherently 
as part of one whole, both an international system of states and a universal humanity. 
Presently, too much of the Western discourse takes places as if interventionists were 
“working on ‘objects’ outside our own world, as though the people in question are not
Of
women and men like us.” On the other hand it is counterproductive to think that there 
are no frontiers just because of a naive and ultimately pretentious Western belief that 
there is one ‘global space’ without any notable divergences within it. There are 
fundamental differences between daily human existence in the chaos of the eastern 
Congo or central Somalia which demands tangible action, not merely eloquent rhetoric 
on the universality of the human condition.
Reaching shared understanding for improved collaboration is feasible because moral 
barriers are easily dissolved when individuals from the West encounter “naked 
humanity”, notably the misery that cannot be qualified by different social norms or
o /
obfuscated by geographical distance. Put another way, the “brute fact of humanity”
0 7
can be seen and connected to by those who wish to do so. In fact, the extremes of 
frontiers- when so much of humanity’s facades have been stripped bare by war, anarchy 
and social depravation- should allow the commonality of all humanity to be more 
clearly seen than anywhere else. Making moral connections with fellow individuals in 
frontiers requires a thoughtful approach by interventionists that is based fundamentally 
on understanding the nuances of local politics through considering local people as the 
driving dynamic and not as passive ‘beneficiaries’ of foreign help or as ‘barbarians’ 
incapable of ruling themselves.
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Simply interacting as individuals, valuing one another as fellow humans, on the 
frontiers and valuing the sacrifices that one’s collaborative partners are willing to make 
is the easiest method to build moral bridges and shared values. In this way, for 
example, the actions of a majority of Muslims in Afghanistan can and should be 
supported as they represent a rejection of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism. The 
grave dangers faced by indigenous ‘collaborators’ should not be dismissed because of a 
tendency by foreigners to be overly cynical about their motives. It is necessary to 
realise that as a rule, there are more commonalities than differences in the values that 
link such collaborative partnerships. True there is ‘tactical collaboration’ but it is 
secondary to deeper collaboration undertaken by individuals who do share longer-term 
desires and values. In this way it is important for interventionists to believe of their 
collaborative partners, as Tony Blair argued, that “victory for them is victory for us all”
OQ
because otherwise interventionism is in fact pointless.
Furthermore, by way of example, the White House correctly noted that everywhere the 
US has fought Islamist terrorism, “Muslim allies have stood beside us, becoming 
partners in this vital cause” because of a shared understanding that such radicalism 
threatens “the survival of their own liberty, the future of their own region, the justice
O Q
and humanity of their own traditions.” The West can support these aspirations 
because they mirror those found everywhere. And indeed, for instance, the only way to 
overcome something as odious as suicide bombings is to ultimately deter them in an 
efficient manner by partnering with groups and individuals within indigenous society 
who can expose and delegitimize them because they also detest such tactics.90 
Resistance against such extremism is a value that can be shared universally.
Crucial to all of these efforts is the need to interact as individuals in the frontier zones 
themselves. This requires personal and sustained interaction. Thomas Friedman 
succinctly noted as much when he argued, “You can’t do this online. You can’t 
download understanding.”91 The West’s current over-emphasis on the technology of 
military power and its formulaic responses through state building ‘toolkits’ have created 
a dangerous level of detachment on a human level leading to the loss of appreciation for 
personal interactions and of forming real relationships, viz. those with some shared 
values and acceptance of the universality of humanity. There needs to be more personal
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understanding through collaboration and less reliance on precision weaponry such as 
smart bombs. And this does mean a continued emphasis on the values that the West has 
long advocated. While more pragmatism in implementing values is required, to forsake 
an emphasis on such values risks losing the trust of collaborative partners who have 
risked so much to partner with the West at all. Michael Ignatieff rightly concluded, to 
do otherwise means that “peoples disillusioned with our promises will have enduring
92reasons never to trust us again.
The imperialistic interventionism of today is defined by its goal of strengthening 
frontier states through their national governments to ensure a modicum of stability. It is 
precisely that need to exert control relatively briefly over the effective sovereignty of 
another state that allows for the installation of an initial shading of liberal governance. 
While imperialism as an ideology may be dead, that does not mean the exigencies of 
responding to a pericentric pull cannot be capitalised upon. Intervening would be a 
rather wasted opportunity, and indeed counterproductive in the longer-term, otherwise. 
While there should be no delusions that interventionism will instigate grand and 
sweeping changes quickly, what can be realistically achieved is the improved and 
steady management of frontiers that will slowly transition them out of such a condition.
In this way, what interventionists can do is to help local actors, through the processes of 
collaboration, to gradually change the context of frontiers and in a manner conducive to 
engendering a trajectory of state building towards the liberal democratic values that 
have Served the West so well. The job of the West in this endeavour is “not to 
command and direct but to help, support and empower.” And this requires that the 
West, through its interventions, work through a process that recognises the importance 
of local actors first and foremost, namely one of collaboration that provides space to 
suitable partners to begin the long process of state building.
Need to keep trying despite the challenges
Fundamentally, the official calculations o f  policy... were inspired by a 
hardening o f  arteries and a hardening o f hearts... What stands out in that 
policy is the pessimism. It reflects a traumatic reaction from the hopes o f
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mid-century; a resignation to a bleaker present...
- Robinson and Gallagher94
The challenges of state building interventionism are profound. The successes have been 
few and the failures significant while the collaboration problematique is a condition that 
can never be overcome, merely ameliorated. Despite all of this, there is a need for the 
West to continue a strategy of state building interventionism as a response to frontiers of 
insecurity, albeit with an improved approach to collaboration. This is primarily because 
frontiers of insecurity will remain a challenge as they are not an ephemeral reality of the 
immediate post-Cold War era. The continued existence of weak and failed states and 
the contact with them dictated through globalisation assures that this be so for the West.
It is important that despite the challenges of frontiers, that they do not lead to a 
‘hardening of hearts’ amongst Western leaders and their publics. Robinson and 
Gallagher argued that one of the primary dynamics of the late-Victorian era of the 
British Empire was that official policy increasingly attempted to preserve the status quo 
of empire rather than “to liberate social energies abroad.”95 Victorian strategists 
gradually maintained less faith in their ability to shape events on the ground, through 
their values and ideals and the collaborative partnerships that they sought to implement 
them through, and instead put more emphasis on blunt military force articulated in 
concomitantly crude foreign policies.
In a similar vein, there is the possibility that the challenges of the present will stymie 
efforts to engage frontiers appropriately, either through naive attempts to merely isolate 
them or on the other extreme to respond to them through the greater application of 
military force. The success or failure of post-Cold War interventions still “hang in the 
balance” as nobody can say conclusively that sustained, democratic governance and 
improved control over sovereign territories is impossible.96 It is necessary to attempt to 
salvage the effort through improved collaboration with indigenous politics during 
interventions, both for the West’s own sake and that of the peoples living in frontiers.
The biggest mistake for Western strategists to make would be to do nothing in an era of 
dynamic globalisation, leaving frontiers in the hands of those actors who thrive in their
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anarchy, who in fact do want frontiers to exist because they are so empowering to them. 
That mistake should be obvious as it has been made before to dire consequences. Eliot 
Cohen argued this point well when he contended that the “anarchy unleashed” by a 
withdrawal of a US disgusted by its failures in frontiers and the rest of the worlds
07indifference to them is “too horrifying to contemplate.” Frontiers dominated by 
suicidal al-Qaeda terrorists, genocidal militias in the Congo, atrocious rebels in Sierra 
Leone or bastardised druglord-insurgents in Afghanistan are a reality that simply does 
not permit passive observation or blissful ignorance.
Considering the need for strategic perseverance is a parallel requirement for the 
continued assumption of Western responsibility for frontier zones. Most importantly, 
assuming responsibility solidifies the West’s ability to partner with actors in frontiers 
who share similar values. Gaddis put this well when he stated, “We keep hope alive...
QO
by taking responsibility.” Collaboration is a partnership of autonomous actors and the 
West always needs to bear that in mind. Local actors will collaborate if they believe 
that Western engagement and partnership can provide for a better future more plausibly 
than anybody else and that the West is engaged for the long-term. If the West does not 
present herself as a partner, it is only understandable that other actors who in fact do 
present themselves- such as dangerous non-state ones- will be chosen in her stead by 
individuals in frontier states.
The need for strategic perseverance and assuming responsibility is important for the 
West because it has already invested much and benefited well from the international 
system it has been paramount to creating. If the West values the current system, it must 
be willing to bear the costs to continue with it. Moreover, the simple reality is that if the 
West is not prepared to act and assume responsibility, there are few other possibilities 
other than frontiers continuing to exist and the insecurity they wrought getting 
exponentially worse. There may be a need to focus on fewer interventions in the most 
pressing frontiers of insecurity and to improve the follow-through on those that have 
already been started, but the West must persevere altogether.
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8.4: Conclusion
No one who has been involved in decisions that are weighed down with 
fateful consequences can afford to ignore the calculation o f  risks and 
probabilities. From this point o f  view, prudence is a virtue. Without 
prudence all visions o f the future degenerate into mere utopia, with all its 
attendant dangers.
- James Mayall"
Managing frontiers of insecurity through state building interventionism is required such 
that the challenges of insecurity shared through globalisation will be less in the future 
than what they are in the present. Central to this management is the need to engage in 
improved collaboration with indigenous politics in the frontiers, to find and empower 
indigenous partners to better manage their territories through stronger governance. In 
an era where imperialism as an ideology is dead and the political willpower to intervene 
is direly lacking, the West simply cannot do everything. Hence, it clearly must interact 
with local people better to work through partnerships towards achieving common goals 
benefiting everybody, essentially a more stable world.
The collaboration problematique is profound. The lack of the political will to really 
dedicate the resources, thought, and sincerity to decisively engaging frontiers is widely 
lacking and an obstacle that can only be resolved through brave political leadership in 
Western states. While implementing a doctrine of collaboration and improving a 
willingness to pay for it are easier achieved, the values debate surrounding 
interventionism is not likely to dissipate in a post-imperial world. The normative debate 
of state building interventionism will be harder to confront but ultimately is most likely 
to be dampened, never ended, through interventions being successful at strengthening 
states and hence improving the quality of peoples’ lives there. As Michael Ignatieff 
rightly argued, “There is nothing odious or invidious about helping local people to find 
their way to the right institutional mixture” required for stronger, more stable states.100 
If interventions are able to achieve that to a meaningful degree, the difficulties of 
collaboration will gradually dampen.
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Frontiers of insecurity can only be managed presently; their insecurity mitigated rather 
than ended outright because of the dynamics of present globalisation. Yet, there is still 
a need to know that when Western leaders put the lives of their soldiers on the line and 
expend large sums of national treasure, these costs are being borne for a reason. That 
may not be a ‘grand project’ but it must still nonetheless be that the ‘something’ worth 
endeavouring towards is real, even if that means merely more stable states that pose less 
of an international security threat and ones that are starting to bear a general trajectory 
towards liberal democracy.
The West can help to change the context of frontiers even if that can only be fully 
completed by the people who live there. The easiest way to avoid policies of pessimism 
and a ‘resignation to a bleaker present’ is through finding, strengthening and supporting 
indigenous partners over a long duration of collaboration and thinking of them and 
broader indigenous society in frontiers as real individuals. Keeping a human face on the 
challenge of frontiers of insecurity is essential for responding to them because it serves 
to reaffirm the common humanity that unites the world, including that existing in the 
direst periphery.
My own experience with frontiers was started in the violent chaos of western Ethiopia 
but the human face I attach to the need for avoiding detachment and emphasising the 
personal engagement of collaboration was also experienced during trips to Afghanistan, 
the DR Congo, and East Timor. A trip to Liberia provided the most telling anecdote of 
the task at hand. My taxi driver on the ride into Monrovia from the airport was agitated. 
He oscillated between what was unabridged hope and the deep, heartfelt hesitance to 
believe something good might actually happen, the cold hard reality check that comes 
from lots of crushed dreams over the years. His general theme, exclaimed over and 
over, was that he hoped the recent elections, those of 2004, would “pave the way” for 
long-term peace and prosperity. He seemed to especially enjoy saying it after the car hit 
each jarring pothole, the analogy obviously striking him as particularly appropriate. 
The road into Monrovia has lots of potholes, as does the path to a better future for 
Liberia.
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When you enter the capital, one of the things that strikes you the most are the 
signboards lining the road. “UNMIL supports democracy through elections” is painted 
in bold letters on one sign, proclaiming the UN mission’s participation in organising the 
country’s elections. The next signboard says “Democracy is regular elections,” just to 
clarify the first one perhaps. One gets the feeling that all of this UN advocacy for and 
explanation of democracy is geared towards the political elite rather than the general 
masses. That is probably a good idea since much of the political elites are still a 
scandalous mixture of retired warlords, shady businessmen, and the remnants of 
disgraced former governments. Progress brought about by the UN intervention and its 
Liberian collaborative partners has at times been painful and slow with crime waves, 
little social service provision, and high unemployment rates continually nagging at the 
Liberian people’s hopes for a better future.
My taxi driver exclaimed to me one last time as I was getting out at my hotel, “What we 
need is somebody to pave the way. Yes, to start us forward again.” Indeed, the 
potholes of Monrovia are deep but one large pothole in Liberia’s future has begun to be 
filled in by the intervention there. The UN mission and its Western backers have tried 
hard to bring stability to the country and push it towards a better future. They are still 
there ensuring an environment of security and support for the national government. 
Now it is up to that new government led by President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, herself a 
committed reformer and a Harvard-educated economist, to fill more potholes, both 
proverbially and literally, lest the country should fall back into the ruinous hands of 
those who thrived in Liberia as a frontier state. It is easy to be cynical about present 
interventionism but it is deadly serious that the West supports the likes of Madame 
Sirleaf, who has an immense challenge. Surely the future for Liberia is brighter now 
than it has been for decades.
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